US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI7493

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 007493 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KNNP, IR, IN, India_Iran 
SUBJECT: INDIAN GOVERNMENT AGGRESSIVELY DEFENDING ITS VOTE 
ON IRAN 
 
Classified By: Charge Robert Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  India's decision to support the US/EU 
resolution on Iran at the IAEA was the most important signal 
so far of the UPA's commitment to building a transformed 
US-India relationship.  To counter the domestic backlash, the 
GOI launched an aggressive campaign to explain to its 
domestic constituency, critics, fellow NAM states, and Tehran 
how its vote in favor of the EU-3 resolution effectively 
promotes a diplomatic resolution of the ongoing dispute about 
Iran's nuclear program.  Of particular sensitivity to Indian 
opinion is the question of whether the GOI has become a 
"lackey in the US camp."  Opinions about the vote seem to be 
split along predictable political lines, but the leadership 
of India's sizeable Shia population has voiced tentative 
support for the GOI decision.  We need to appreciate that 
this is the UPA's first significant step away from the 
relatively risk-free comfort zone of the NAM (and Russia and 
China, both of whom abstained), but exposes the government to 
severe domestic criticism, runs the risk of losing vital 
support from NAM partners on issues such as a UNSC seat, and, 
not least of all, endangers traditionally friendly relations 
with Iran.  End Summary. 
 
Explaining the Vote 
------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) India's decision to support the US/EU resolution on 
Iran at the IAEA was the most important signal so far of the 
UPA's commitment to building a transformed US-India 
relationship.  In a briefing memo released soon after the 
Sept 24 IAEA decision and a September 26 press briefing with 
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, New Delhi argued that its vote 
was in harmony with its position to keep the issue within the 
realm of the IAEA and to facilitate resolution through 
diplomacy.  The GOI argued, "We were not for the Iran nuclear 
issue being referred to the UN Security Council. The 
resolution has kept consideration of the issue within the 
purview of the IAEA itself...The draft resolution has 
conceded that by deferring any decision till a further 
consideration of the matter at the next Board meeting in 
November 2005. We have thus gained time for further 
consultations."  Trying to lessen the sting of this decision 
to both Tehran and NAM, New Delhi also spelled out its 
opposition to designating Iran as non-compliant with its 
safeguards agreement and stated its preference for a future 
decision based on consensus and voiced conditional support 
for Iran's civilian nuclear energy program "within global 
non-proliferation norms." 
 
3.  (SBU) New Delhi also tried to preempt predictable 
criticism that India has abandoned its cherished neutrality. 
Citing India's extensive consultations with the EU-3 and the 
NAM in Vienna and New York, the GOI briefing noted that 
several NAM and developing countries also supported the EU-3 
resolution.  Addressing criticism that India's decision was 
made to secure support for the July 18 civil nuclear 
agreement with the US, the briefing memo emphatically states, 
"Nothing could be further from the truth.  The agreement 
stands on its own, based on a mutual recognition of Indian 
energy requirements, its global impact and on an our 
acknowledgment of India impeccable record on 
non-proliferation." 
 
Hail of Criticism... 
-------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) The usual cast of detractors, including the Left, 
were quick to rail against the vote, citing arguments 
anticipated by the GOI.  Most vocal was a personal statement 
issued by former BJP Minister of External Affairs Yashwant 
Sinha accusing the government of abandoning Iran to save its 
own "questionable deal" with the US.  "The veil is off. 
India is now firmly in the US camp... The UPA government has 
made India a client state of the US."  Sinha went on to warn, 
"Relations with Iran are now in jeopardy" and lamented that 
India had lost its unique position to "play the role of 
umpire" regarding Iran.  Carrying that theme further, hawkish 
commentator Bharat Karnad wrote in the Asian Age that by 
rebuffing Tehran, New Delhi has not only endangered its 
access to a reliable source of oil, but has undermined Iran's 
ability to check the spread of Wahabi Islam and complicate 
Pakistan's strategic calculus.  Brahma Chellaney, Professor 
of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research, 
expressed resentment that India was forced to make a choice 
between the US and Iran, "(The US) still wants Germanys and 
Japans for friends, countries that didn't have a choice after 
WWII.  They cannot expect India to be Germany or Japan in the 
21st century." 
 
...And Support 
-------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Other commentators, however, were more positive 
about the effect the vote would have on the international 
objective to gain Iran's full compliance in the short term, 
as well as giving India a higher profile on the international 
stage, and aligning its position with its long-term 
interests.  Rebuffing the contention that India's vote was a 
quid pro quo for its nuclear agreement with the US, 
influential strategic commentator K. Subrahmanyam (who is 
also in charge of advising the PMO on the implementation of 
the July 18 agreement) focused on India's vote as a means to 
compel Iran's full compliance with its IAEA obligations, and 
bring about full disclosure of the source of source of Iran's 
nuclear know-how, i.e., AQ Khan:  "An abstention vote by 
India would mean that this country connived with Pakistan and 
section of the past US Administration and its supporter to 
hush up the Pakistan-China proliferation activity."  He 
explained that besides the US, India needs to have the 
support of France, the UK, Germany, and other members of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group to access the nuclear fuel it needs. 
Writing in the Sept 24 Indian Express, Strategic Affairs 
editor Raja Mohan reasoned that if it had abstained, India 
would have found itself in a worse position by "reinforcing 
the signal of ambiguity from New Delhi," thereby undercutting 
nuclear cooperation with the US without changing the 
discourse on Iran. 
 
6.  (SBU) On the more immediate issue of how the vote will 
affect the proposed pipeline with Iran, the Sept 23 
International Herald Tribune reported that some Indian 
officials privately view the IAEA decision as an opportunity 
to allow the technically and politically beleaguered pipeline 
project to dry up without being overtly hostile to it, thus 
removing a further irritant in the US-India relationship. 
 
7.  (C) Congress spokesman and Gandhi family confidant Ananad 
Sharma signaled strong support for the IAEA decision in a 
September 26 conversation, noting that he was preparing to 
deal with attacks on the GOI's policy from both the Left and 
right (BJP).  Sharma recalled that India has been saying for 
months that Iran must comply with its NPT obligations, and 
echoed MEA backgrounding that described how GOI concerns had 
been taken into account in drafting the final IAEA 
resolution.  Nonetheless, Sharma concluded, there was some 
political work to be done in defending the GOI's Vienna 
decision. 
 
Lukewarm Support from India's Shia Leadership 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Shia Muslim leaders in Lucknow have dismissed 
concerns of an Indian Shia backlash against the GOI vote, 
noting that Indian Shias tend to support Indian government in 
foreign policy decisions, and recognize the danger of WMD 
proliferation.  "How can a true Indian oppose his own 
government's decision?" Maulana MM Athar, chairman of the 
Shia Personal Law Board, asked Embassy personnel on Sept 26. 
Zaheer Mustafa, editor of the In Dinon Urdu daily, told us 
that how the UPA government sells the decision to the public 
will determine whether the Shia oppose it or not.  Other Shia 
clerics pointed out that so far the loudest protest from 
Muslims have come from Sunni leaders, but observed that some 
traditionally pro-Iranian Shia leaders would likely try to 
stoke discontent, and expected Shia groups funded by the 
Iranian Embassy to organize anti-US protests on Friday, Sept 
23. 
 
Public Diplomacy Implications 
----------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) In the midst of the intense public debate on a 
highly complex domestic political issue in which the GOI 
finds itself being criticized from the left, right, and 
sometimes the center, there is no benefit for the USG to 
insert itself.  While the USG clearly welcomes the Indian 
decision, as do many Indian analysts, the USG's public 
posture should be to respond to questions on the Indian 
decision by referring questions to the GOI.  The debate on 
Iran's nuclear program and the GOI vote is deeply entangled 
with discussion on India's role in the proposed 
Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline.  It is almost inevitable 
for the US position on Iran and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 
to appear in discussions of the US-India dynamic on Iran's 
nuclear program, with the comment that the USG opposes the 
IPI pipeline.  We should be prepared to answer questions 
regarding the pipeline as well as questions about Iran's 
nuclear programs. 
 
10.  (SBU) We suggest the following press guidance on the 
issue of the GOI vote on the Iran resolution at the IAEA: 
 
-- The United States welcomes the broad diplomatic support 
the EU-3 resolution received at the IAEA on Saturday.  We 
look forward to working with the EU-3 and the international 
community, including India (if asked), in the IAEA as this 
issue moves forward. 
 
-- (If asked) We refer you to the GOI for comments on its 
vote at the IAEA. 
The following is suggested guidance on US policy on the 
Iran-India pipeline: 
 
-- The USG's concerns on Iran are clear and well-known.  We 
are deeply concerned about Iran's problematic behavior, and 
we are sharing our concerns in a constructive way with India 
and Pakistan, which is appropriate in discussions with 
countries with which we have close ties.  At the same time, 
we are seeking ways to cooperate with India to ensure that 
the energy needs of India's rapidly-growing economy are 
appropriately met. 
 
A Difficult Step 
---------------- 
 
11. (C) Comment:  The decision to vote with the EU and US 
when several other NAM stalwarts abstained is the first 
significant public step that the UPA has taken to break from 
its traditional developing country solidarity, and is not 
cost-free for the GOI.  Stepping out on this issue makes the 
UPA an easy target for sincere or opportunistic sniping from 
both the BJP opposition and its Left Front partners, as well 
as running a risk of losing goodwill and vital support from 
NAM partners on other issues India cares deeply about (like 
its continuing pursuit of a permanent UNSC seat).  While we 
need to be careful to not publicly exacerbate the downside of 
New Delhi's choice by giving fodder to critics who complain 
that India is kowtowing to the US or marching to our orders, 
we should appreciate the political and diplomatic difficulty 
of this step for the GOI.  End Comment. 
 
12.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) 
BLAKE