US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI4074

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004074 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/I, NEA/ARPI 
ALSO FOR S/I AMB JAMES JEFFREY 
NSC FOR CHARLES DUNNE 
TREASURY FOR LARRY MCDONALD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, SA, IR, SY, TC 
SUBJECT: MFA U/S ON IRAQ; WELCOMES IRAQ COORDINATOR'S VISIT 
 
REF: A. STATE 176666 
 
     B. ABU DHABI 4045 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
 1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met with MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid 
Al Noaimi September 24 to preview  Iraq Coordinator 
Ambassador Jeffrey's October 8 visit to the UAE.  She had 
earlier previewed the goals of the Jeffrey visit with Abu 
Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and MinState for 
Foreign Affairs Hamdan bin Zayed (refs A, B).  Al Noaimi said 
the UAEG would welcome the interagency consultations.  It is 
time for Iraqis to hold a conference to achieve "national 
consensus" on the future of their country, he said, and 
Iraq's neighbors and the international community can be of 
help.  Al Noaimi had also offered a briefing and insights 
about Iraq during a meeting September 20 with a visiting U.S. 
delegation; his comments during that meeting are also 
incorporated in this message.  Al Noaimi advised the U.S. 
against withdrawing its troops until the Iraq security forces 
have the capacity to guarantee stability on their own, and 
indicated that the Iraqis might be willing to allow certain 
Arab and non-Arab Muslim forces on their soil.  He also 
offered his views on the nature of the insurgency.  End 
Summary. 
 
Previewing Amb. Jeffrey's Visit 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Ambassador previewed the October 8 visit of Iraq 
Coordinator Jeffrey with MFA U/S Al Noaimi, noting that 
Ambassador Jeffrey and an interagency team were going to be 
stopping in other capitals in the region as part of a series 
of consultations with key Arab partners on Iraq (ref C). 
Ambassador highlighted the principal political, economic, and 
security themes of the consultations and acknowledged the 
UAE's ongoing assistance to Iraq and debt relief pledges. 
Ambassador urged accelerated disbursement of aid and 
implementation of debt relief commitments.  She referred to 
her meetings earlier in the week with the Abu Dhabi Crown 
Prince and MinState for Foreign Affairs, during which the 
Jeffrey visit had been discussed, and noted the September 20 
analysis on Iraq Al Noaimi himself had offered (see paras 
5-9). 
 
Iraqis Need a Conference on National Consensus 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3. (C) Ambassador urged UAE's public support for Iraq's 
political process, including posting an Ambassador to 
Baghdad.  Al Noaimi agreed that Iraq,s stability was 
essential to regional stability and in the interests of the 
UAE and the U.S.  The Iraqis needed help from the 
international community, he stressed.  "Given their present 
situation, they are unable to reinvent their future," Al 
Noaimi continued. 
 
4. (C) Al Noaimi shared that he had come to that conclusion 
after meeting with Iraq's Ambassador to the UAE recently. 
"They cannot do it alone."  It was time, he said, for the 
Iraqis to hold a conference that would achieve a national 
consensus on their future.  "Put them in one room and let 
them realize the dangers facing them," he suggested.  The 
Iraqis "need to agree on minimums and stop disagreeing on 
details.  The details can be worked out later."  The unity, 
stability, and prosperity of Iraq were in everyone's 
interest, Al Noaimi said.  Al Noaimi noted Saudi Foreign 
Minister Saud Al Faisal's recent remarks about Iraq heading 
toward disintegration, raising fears of a wider regional 
conflict that will draw the countries of the region into 
conflict.  He cited Al Faisal's declaration that "We fought a 
war together to keep Iran out of Iraq after Iraq was driven 
out of Kuwait.  Now we are handing the whole country over to 
Iran without any reason."  Ambassador asked if there had been 
GCC consultation on this issue.  Al Noaimi said that Al 
Faisal's comment had not been made "in a vacuum," but that he 
was "exaggerating to have an impact."  Ambassador noted the 
need for the U.S. and the UAE to confer on strategies to 
pressure both Iran and Syria to respect Iraq's sovereignty. 
 
Constitutional Referendum Approaches 
------------------------------------ 
 
5. (C) In his September 20 discussion with Ambassador and the 
visiting U.S. delegation from the Business Executives for 
National Security, Al Noaimi said that he expected additional 
violence in the run-up to the referendum, but predicted the 
Iraqis would approve the Constitution.  He said that the 
UAE's leadership has tried to allay Iraqi Sunni fears about 
federalism by explaining its benefits, using the UAE as an 
example of a federal system that has not disintegrated.  The 
UAE, which has had a provisional Constitution for the past 
two decades, has also advised Iraqis that their new 
Constitution could be provisional without putting the country 
in jeopardy.  "The Constitution is a live document that can 
be developed," he said.  Al Noaimi cautioned against focusing 
"too much" on the insurgency.  "The insurgency will stay 
regardless. ... The more jobs you create, the higher the 
living standard, and the greater the security," the less 
Iraqis will want to "resist," he said. 
 
Iraq Needs U.S. to Complete Job 
------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Al Noaimi also declared that said a U.S. troop 
withdrawal from Iraq at this time "was not an option."  The 
U.S. should not withdraw until Iraq "possesses the political 
and security capacity" to maintain stability on its own.  "We 
have to be realistic.  The minimum goal for the U.S. should 
be a stable, unified Iraq.  You have to make sure (Iraq's) 
neighbors don't cause cracks in Iraq's body."  The U.S. also 
needs to engage Arabs, NATO, and the UN, he said. 
 
A Role for Other Arab States, Iraq's Neighbors 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
7. (C) In response to a question from the BENS delegation 
about other Arab states' and non-Arab Muslim forces on the 
ground in Iraq, Al Noaimi said Iraqis would possibly be 
receptive to the idea.  Troops from some GCC and North 
African states, as well as from Sudan and Egypt, might be 
acceptable, he said.  He said the Saudi-Iraqi power rivalry 
precluded placing Saudi troops in Iraq.  (Note: He did 
not/not raise the issue of UAE troops, although UAE Special 
Operations troops are deployed to Afghanistan in OEF.  End 
note.) 
 
8. (C) Al Noaimi argued that a stable Iraq would be seen as a 
defeat by Iran, Syria, and Turkey, all of which have an 
interest in destabilizing all or part of Iraq.  He said it 
would also mean defeat to Saudi Arabia, although to a lesser 
degree.  A stable Iraq would be stronger than Saudi Arabia, 
he stated.  The Saudis want to be the primary player on the 
oil market, but if Iraqi oil production capacity increases, 
that would increase the Iraqis' strength, he offered.  Iraq 
would also want to join Saudi Arabia and Iran as regional 
powers. 
 
Nature of the Insurgency 
------------------------ 
 
9. (C) Al Noaimi said the insurgency in Iraq was partly 
comprised of armed elements loyal to Saddam before he was 
ousted from power.  The insurgency would continue with or 
without the adoption of the new Constitution, as it is "an 
organized reaction to disrupt future plans," Al Noaimi said. 
He added that prior to the Iraq invasion, no one knew that 
Saddam had organized such a force.  Asked what should be done 
to counter the insurgency, Al Noaimi said the Coalition 
should continue building Iraq's military, security, and 
economic capacity.  He suggested engaging NATO, particularly 
on the issue of beefing up border controls. 
 
10. (C) Comment: Al Noaimi, like our other senior UAEG 
interlocutors, is convinced that Iran will be the winner in 
Iraq.  UAEG perceptions of Iran's growing influence and 
concerns over Shi'a ascendancy are likely to feature in each 
of the conversations Ambassador Jeffrey and team have here 
October 8, as is criticism of PM Jaafari's performance and 
alleged ties to Tehran.  End Comment. 
 
11. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
SISON