US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI4049

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UAE DEMARCHE: CUTTING OFF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE WITH NORTH KOREA

Identifier: 05ABUDHABI4049
Wikileaks: View 05ABUDHABI4049 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abu Dhabi
Created: 2005-09-26 08:17:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PARM MNUC KNNP IR CH KN TC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
null
Diana T Fritz  08/28/2006 03:55:40 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 04049

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   P/M AMB DCM POL

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MJSISON
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: NONE

VZCZCADI110
OO RUEHC RUEHDE RHEHNSC
DE RUEHAD #4049 2690817
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 260817Z SEP 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1707
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 5431
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 004049 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T - U/S BOB JOSEPH; T - PATTY MCNERNEY 
ALSO FOR NP/RA - CAROLINE RUSSELL 
NSC FOR DAVID STEPHENS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2015 
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, KNNP, IR, CH, KN, TC 
SUBJECT: UAE DEMARCHE: CUTTING OFF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE 
WITH NORTH KOREA 
 
REF: A. STATE 173768 
     B. ABU DHABI 3804 
     C. ABU DHABI 3050 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
 1. (U) This message contains an action request at the end of 
para 2. 
 
2. (S) Summary: Reminding MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid Al Noaimi 
of the UAE's commitment to working with the United States on 
shutting down proliferators and targeting their assets (refs 
A and B), Ambassador highlighted the need to work together to 
ensure that North Korea was not in a position to export 
nuclear and nuclear-related technologies on September 24. 
She urged that the UAE formally renounce any military trade 
with North Korea and noted in particular possible North 
Korean use of UAE's ports as transshipment points for vessels 
carrying North Korean conventional and missile related 
shipments.  In the course of the discussion, Abdullah Rashid 
shared the UAEG's concerns not only about North Korea and 
Iran, but also about China's possible role in facilitating 
North Korea's transactions with Iran.  Action request: We 
would recommend that U/S Joseph be prepared to address the 
issue of possible Chinese involvement in such transactions 
with his UAEG interlocutors on an "if asked" basis during his 
Oct. 1-2 visit to Abu Dhabi and Dubai.  End Summary. 
 
3. (S) Ambassador made the points in ref A, noting our 
concerns that items originating from North Korea -- both 
conventional and missile-related shipments )- could be 
transshipped through UAE's ports.  She thanked the UAE for 
its past nonproliferation cooperation, and noted USG desire 
to deepen engagement on all North Korean arms trade.  She 
also noted USG concerns about the Korean Mining Development 
Trading Organization (KOMID), which is identified in the new 
U.S. Executive Order as a key entity that is subject to 
penalties, including freezing of its assets.  The UAE should 
refrain from purchasing any dual use items from KOMID and the 
UAEG should prohibit KOMID's presence in the country, 
Ambassador added.  Ambassador had provided Abdullah Rashid 
with copies of E.O. 13382 on July 5 and September 4; emboffs 
provided copies of E.O. 13382 to the Central Bank, UAE 
Federal Customs and Dubai Customs (refs B and C).  (Note: The 
focus of these previous discussions had been Tanchon 
Commercial Bank accounts in the UAE.  End note.) 
 
4. (S) Abdullah Rashid replied that the UAE was "well aware" 
of the North Korean role in "spreading weapons of mass 
destruction materials."  He said that the North Koreans had 
long expressed an interest in having an "official presence" 
in the UAE.  He later switched the term to a "cover."  The 
UAEG, unconvinced about the North Koreans' real intentions, 
had "always said no" to such requests.  "We don't think they 
are a positive player in the international community yet," 
Abdullah Rashid said. 
 
5. (S) Transactions between North Korea and Iran cannot be 
fully understood without knowing the role China plays, 
Abdullah Rashid argued.  "When we want to focus on North 
Korea, we need to focus on China as well," he said.  The 
North Koreans and Iranians conduct "a lot of their meetings" 
in China, he added.  The UAE intelligence services had "some 
information" about what the Iranians and North Koreans were 
doing through China.  However, "China is a big dragon," he 
added, and the UAEG did not have enough manpower "to cover 
everything" the Chinese were doing. 
 
6. (C) Ambassador then previewed U/S Joseph's Oct. 1-2 visit 
to the UAE, noting that Iran's nuclear program, the need to 
develop comprehensive export controls and enforcement 
capabilities, the need to address proliferation financing 
issues, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and specific 
proliferation cases would likely be on the agenda. 
SISON 

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