US embassy cable - 05CAIRO7423

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 007423 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, KPAL, EG, IS, Gaza 
SUBJECT: RAFAH-GAZA BORDER: EGYPT STRUGGLES TO SUPPORT 
PALESTINIANS WHILE PROTECTING ITS OWN SECURITY 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 7418 
     B. CAIRO 7323 
     C. CAIRO 7297 
     D. CAIRO 7210 
     E. CAIRO 7158 
 
Classified by Charge Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) The recent chaos on the Rafah-Gaza border laid bare 
Egypt's dilemma of trying to balance its strong support for 
Palestinian statehood with its efforts to prevent extremism 
in Egypt.  Clearly caught unprepared by the influx of people 
into Egypt from Gaza, Cairo's "humanitarian" response to the 
crisis averted political and security fallout that a stiffer 
response might have provoked.  Cairo also chose not to 
publicly criticize Israel for prompting the episode with its 
earlier-than-expected departure from the Philadelphi Strip. 
With the border now officially closed, and Egypt's new Border 
Guard Force in place, attention has reverted back to the 
complex negotiations over how people and goods will transit 
between Egypt and Gaza.  The GOE understands that it must 
work hand-in-hand with Israel as it endeavors to resolve Gaza 
border issues.  The GOE's primary objective throughout the 
crisis has been to support and strengthen Abu Mazen 
domestically, while maintaining channels of communication 
with the Israelis.  End summary. 
 
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Gaza:  The Sharp End of the Horn 
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2.  (C) Having had the sole responsibility of administering 
Gaza at several points over the past half-century or so 
(i.e., 1949-1956; 1957-1967), Egypt fully understands the 
risks involved in trying to manage the passions and 
aspirations within the world's most densely-populated piece 
of real estate.  Among the most daunting and complex 
challenges for Egypt is the balancing act it must pursue in 
leading Arab support for the eventual attainment of 
Palestinian statehood, while also seeking to prevent 
Palestinian extremism from seeping across its borders. 
 
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What Happened at the Gaza-Rafah Border? 
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3.  (C) Israel's September 11 withdrawal from the Philadelphi 
Corridor and the ensuing influx of Gazans into Egypt took the 
Egyptians by surprise.  The GOE expected the IDF to pull out 
in conjunction with the start of its planned September 15 
deployment of a new 750-man Border Guard Force (BGF).  The 
absence of adequate border forces on both sides of the 
no-man's zone during the intervening period was the 
prinicipal factor leading to the crisis.  The shooting death 
of a young Gazan (details remain murky) by GOE forces during 
the initial confusion also was reportedly used as an excuse 
by Palestinian militants to justify blowing up sections of 
the Israeli-built concrete and metal barriers.  A day after 
Israel's September 11 withdrawal, PA and Egyptian forces 
could only watch as tens of thousands of Palestinians and 
Egyptians flowed freely across what had long been one of the 
most tightly controlled crossing points in the region.  The 
meager GOE police force, we understand, was instructed to 
monitor the flow of people and try to stop the most obvious 
attempts to smuggle weapons and drugs across the border. 
 
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Putting the Cork Back in the Bottle, "Humanely" 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4.  (C) Once the controls along the Philadelphi zone had 
collapsed, Cairo ordered its security forces at the border to 
adopt a "humanitarian" approach rather than try to resist the 
enormous crowds.  Photos of GOE forces shooting Gazans along 
the border would have damaged Egyptian and PA political 
interests both at home and abroad.  As thousands of Ministry 
of Interior riot police were rushed to the scene, local 
security elements sought to establish a presence in order to 
at least visually monitor who was coming and going from Gaza. 
 While foodstuffs, cigarettes, and other highly sought-after 
consumer goods comprised the majority of the smuggling, some 
drugs and arms apparently also crossed the border during this 
hectic period. 
 
5.  (C) It wasn't until the evening of September 19 that the 
border was finally sealed, with numerous barricades repaired, 
PA forces ensconced on their side of the border, and Egypt's 
armed BGF deployed along the full 14-kilometer long zone.  In 
conversations with the Embassy, Egyptian officials assured us 
that action would be taken to contain the situation and seal 
the border.  Significantly, they never over-promised, and in 
a relatively methodical manner succeeded in bringing the 
situation to a close.  During the fracas, the MOD-controlled 
BGF was careful to avoid armed confrontation with 
Palestinians.  However, should there again be large-scale 
attempts at infiltration by throngs of Palestinian civilians, 
it is not clear if the BGF would use force or continue to 
respond in a "humanitarian" manner. 
 
6.  (C) On a positive note, despite strong misgivings within 
the GOE over the way the IDF managed its departure from the 
Philadelphi Corridor, public criticism of Israel was 
carefully contained in the Egyptian media throughout the 
episode.  Egyptian state media essentially made a virtue of 
necessity by warmly welcoming the Palestinian "brothers," who 
it said had jubilantly crossed the border to reunite with 
long-separated family members.  Nevertheless, some opposition 
papers did not shy away from emphasizing the dangers of entry 
by Palestinian extremists (particularly Hamas) into Egypt. 
Only with the September 23-24 exchange of violence between 
Israel and Gaza militants, have Egyptian officials commented 
critically on the situation in Gaza, calling for restraint on 
all sides.  Egypt's policy remains focused on strengthening 
Abu Mazen and the PA in their struggle against Hamas and 
other Islamic extremist groups. 
 
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Whither the Rafah Terminal? 
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7.  (C) At present, the border between Egypt and Gaza remains 
formally closed.  Since September 19, however, two managed 
exchanges of Gazans and Egyptians reportedly took place, with 
several thousand Palestinians (with valid ID) permitted to 
return to Gaza and several hundred Egyptians (also with valid 
ID) returned to Sinai September 20.  Similarly, another 
exchange took place over 48-hours September 23/24 for Gazan 
students and urgent medical cases requiring entry to Egypt, 
and several hundreds of Palestinians departing Egypt for 
Gaza.  Stragglers on the wrong side of the border may be 
stuck for some time as the priority now has turned to the 
difficult negotiations between Israel, Egypt, and the PA to 
determine the future of the Terminal and other border 
crossings between Israel and Gaza. 
 
8.  (C) The GOE's primary objective throughout the Rafah 
border crisis was to support and strengthen Abu Mazen 
domestically, while maintaining channels of communication 
with the Israelis.  The weekend missile attacks and violence 
between Israelis and Gazan militant groups underscores the 
urgency of reaching agreement on all of the Gaza crossings 
quickly before events spin out of control there.  Israel's 
recent sealing of the West Bank and Gaza following the recent 
spate of violence prevented a planned September 25 GOE-PA 
Ministerial meeting in Cairo and may hinder the scheduled 
visit to Egypt of Abu Mazin on September 29. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
 
JONES