US embassy cable - 05CAIRO7418

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 007418 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, KPAL, MOPS, EG, IS, Gaza 
SUBJECT: EGYPT-GAZA BORDER: GOE UPDATE SEPTEMBER 24 
 
 
Classified by ECPO Minister Counselor Michael Corbin for 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  During a September 24 meeting, NEA Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Elizabeth Dibble and General Emir and 
Colonel Osama of the Liaison Agency with International 
Organizations (LAWIO) discussed the situation at the 
Egypt-Gaza border, the reason for the confusion following IDF 
withdrawal, and plans for building a new terminal at Kerem 
Shalom. General Emir confirmed that the GOE reopened the 
Rafah terminal to allow approximately 1,000 Palestinians to 
return to Gaza and to allow Egyptians to return home, but 
said the GOE intended to close the terminal at 0600 on Sunday 
September 25.  Thereafter, General Emir said, the GOE will 
consider on a case by case basis Palestinian requests to 
enter Egypt for humanitarian reasons.  Colonel Osama said 
that the GOE is waiting for Israel to fix the location of its 
Kerem Shalom crossing before it begins planning a terminal in 
Egypt.  End summary. 
 
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Border update-September 24 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) General Emir and Colonel Osama of LAWIO advised DAS 
Dibble during their September 24th meeting that the GOE 
opened the gate outside the Rafah Terminal on Friday and 
would close it at 0600 on September 25 after allowing 
Palestinians who were able to prove their identity with a 
passport or identification card to return to Gaza and 
Egyptians to return to Egypt.  (Note:  In a follow-up 
conversation on September 25, a LAWIO officer said the GOE 
closed the gate on September 24 at 1830.  End note.)  General 
Emir noted that representatives from the Palestinian 
Authority, the GOI, and the Egyptian General Intelligence 
Service (EGIS) would be present at the Rafah terminal to 
coordinate this effort.  General Emir said that following the 
"reclosure" of Rafah, the GOE will consider on a case by case 
basis Palestinian requests to enter Egypt for humanitarian 
reasons, such as medical treatment, and will treat as 
criminals any Palestinians remaining in Egypt illegally.  It 
is in the GOE interest, Colonel Osama stressed, to preserve 
stability in Egypt and ensure that there is no smuggling. 
 
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Plans for the future unclear 
---------------------------- 
 
3. (C)  The DAS noted that Palestinian contacts had cautioned 
that closing Rafah would increase tension in Gaza.  General 
Emir agreed but explained that negotiations on reopening the 
border would be conducted on a political level -- through 
General Soliman of EGIS. From LAWIO's perspective, according 
to General Emir, the reopening may come in phases.  First, 
the Rafah crossing could be reopened to traffic from Gaza to 
Egypt.  Next, General Emir said he could foresee third party 
monitoring of a Rafah crossing for both people and goods. 
General Emir predicted that in a final stage, Kerem Shalom 
would be opened for three way (Gaza-Egypt-Israel) traffic. 
Colonel Osama acknowledged that the GOE has not yet started 
to construct any new facilities opposite Kerem Shalom. 
Colonel Osama said that when he asked his Israeli counterpart 
about GOI plans for the crossing, he said they are still in 
the "drafting on paper" phase. Until the Israelis fix the 
location of their terminal, Colonel Osama noted, the GOE will 
not start planning their own.  Colonel Osama confirmed that 
the Kerem Shalom crossing will be for goods only, and Rafah 
will be for people because it would not be right for the 
Palestinians to have to use the Kerem Shalom crossing to 
enter Egypt. 
 
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The cause of the confusion 
-------------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Colonel Osama blamed the recent border confusion on 
the sudden departure of the IDF on September 11-12.  The 
deal, Osama said, was that the GOE would begin deploying its 
Border Guard Forces (BGF) on September 15 and have them in 
place by October 15.  Osama said that his IDF counterpart 
told him that the IDF was to remain in the Philadelphi strip 
until the end of 2005, but definitely would not leave before 
the end of October.  The IDF pull-out took place without any 
coordination with the GOE, Colonel Osama and General Emir 
said.  This left the GOE with two options to control the tide 
of Palestinians entering Egypt -- they could fire on them and 
provoke public outrage or exercise self control, increase the 
number of police in the area, and allow the Palestinians a 
period of celebration. The GOE opted for the second option, 
Colonel Osama explained, because they believed the bulk of 
the Palestinians were coming to celebrate the "end of 38 
years of oppression," to reunite with family members living 
in Egypt, and to buy goods both for resale in Gaza and for 
Ramadan.  "We do not," Colonel Osama stressed, consider such 
people "infiltrators." 
 
5.  (C) Colonel Osama said that, in his opinion, the IDF 
withdrew without notice and before the BGF deployment in 
breach of their agreement in order to embarrass the 
Egyptians.  The IDF, he said, also wanted to show that the 
Palestinians have no control over their people and prove to 
the international community that the IDF needs to remain in 
the Philadelphi strip to prevent smuggling and preserve 
security.  As for smuggling, Colonel Osama said that there 
was some sign that arms and ammunition smuggling occurred 
before the BGF deployment.  However, the Israeli allegation 
that seven missles were smuggled into Gaza was unsupported by 
evidence, according to Colonel Osama.  There are not even 
seven such missles on the open market, he observed, so they 
would need to come from the MoD directly. 
 
6.  (C)  Israeli press criticism of the GOE handling of the 
border situation, Colonel Osama said, was both confusing and 
frustrating.  He noted that cooperation with Israeli liaison 
has always been good, and the condemnation of the GOE was 
inconsistent with the messages exchanged privately between 
the parties.  The DAS agreed that the press coverage of the 
matter did not square with the comments she had heard from 
GOI officials regarding the excellent cooperation between the 
GOI and GOE on this issue. 
 
7.  (U) The DAS did not have an opportunity to clear this 
message. 
 
 
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JONES