US embassy cable - 90MOGADISHU9903

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOGADISHU 09903 
 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: PREL, PINS, EAID, SO 
SUBJ:  NOVEMBER 11 MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
REF:  A) STATE 380832 (NOTAL)  B) MOGADISHU 09699 
 
1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
2.  SUMMARY:  THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE 
AS COHEN'S LETTER WELCOMING CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND 
ACCEPTED THE POINT THAT THE REGIME'S COMMITMENT NEEDS TO 
BE  DEMONSTRATED IN CONCRETE FASHION BEFORE IT COULD 
LEAD TO ADDITIONAL RESOURCE FLOWS.  THE MINISTER 
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GSDR HAS OFFERED TO SEND TROOPS 
TO JOIN COALITION FORCES BUT HAD NO WORD ON SAUDI 
REACTION.  HE REPORTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S TOUR 
OF GCC COUNTRIES IS GOING WELL BUT DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE 
OF SPECIFIC RESULTS.  HE ASKED FOR HELP PERSUADING THE 
REBEL MOVEMENTS TO ATTEND THE CAIRO CONFERENCE AND FOR 
PRESSURE ON THE ETHIOPIANS TO STOP PROVIDING THEM WITH 
SANCTUARY.  FINALLY, HE EMPHASIZED THE URGENT NEED FOR 
EMERGENCY FOOD SHIPMENTS TO MOGADISHU.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  INTRODUCTION: CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER 
AHMED MOHAMED ADEN NOVEMBER 11 TO DELIVER AS COHEN'S 
SECOND MESSAGE (REFTEL A) AS WELL AS THE LETTER I HAD 
PROMISED THE MINISTER ON THE BROOKE AMENDMENT (REFTEL B). 
ASSISTANT MINISTER BASI TOOK NOTES FOR ADEN.  I WAS 
UNACCOMPANIED. 
 
4.  AMERICAN ASSISTANCE:  AFTER READING COHEN'S LETTER, 
THE MINISTER ASKED IN EFFECT WHAT IT WAS ALL ABOUT.  I 
EXPLAINED THAT COHEN HAD BEEN CONCERNED BY AD/N'S 
VERY NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO HIS FIRST LETTER.  HE WANTED 
TO UNDERLINE THAT THE USG APPLAUDS THE GSDR'S INTENTION 
TO LIBERALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL LIFE.  HOWEVER, 
THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SKEPTICISM IN WASHINGTON ABOUT 
THE GSDR'S COMMITMENT.  BEFORE REFORM COULD LEAD TO 
RENEWED ASSISTANCE FLOWS, THERE MUST BE EVIDENCE THAT 
THE REFORMS ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED, E.G. POLITICAL 
PARTIES MUST HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO FORM AND INDEPENDENT 
NEWSPAPERS ALLOWED TO PUBLISH.  THE BROOKE PROBLEM 
ALSO MUST BE RESOLVED.  AT THAT POINT, I GAVE AD/N A 
LETTER THE USAID DIRECTOR AND I HAD PREPARED ON BROOKE 
AND ITS LOCAL CONSEQUENCES. 
 
5.  RESPONDING, THE MINISTER SAID HE ACCEPTED THE 
REASONABLENESS OF WASHINGTON'S SKEPTICISM, "CONSIDERING 
ALL THE HOSTILE PROPAGANDA THERE".  HE VOLUNTEERED 
THAT ON RE-READING COHEN'S FIRST LETTER HE HAD FOUND IT 
MORE UNDERSTANDABLE THAN ON FIRST REVIEW.  AD/N SAID 
HE REPEATED TO SIAD WHAT I HAD SALD ABOUT THE 
DIVISION OF LABOR IN RESPONDING TO IRAQI AGGRESSION, I.E. 
GCC COUNTRIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ADDRESSING THE ECONOMIC 
LOSSES EXPERIENCED BY STATES LIKE SOMALIA, WHILE THE 
USG TAKES ON MOST OF THE HUMAN, POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL 
COSTS OF THE MILITARY RESPONSE.  HE HAD NOT, THE 
MINISTER SAID, SHOWN COHEN'S FIRST LETTER TO SIAD. 
 
6.  PRIME MINISTER'S MISSION:  ADRN REPORTED THAT HE HAD 
HEARD BY TELEPHONE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE 
LATTER'S TOUR OF GCC STATES IS GOING WELL.  HOWEVER, 
HE SAID, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD NOT BEEN MORE SPECIFIC. 
I THEN ASKED ABOUT THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION'S PUBLIC 
OFFER TO HAVE SOMALI TROOPS SERVE ALONGSIDE OTHER 
COALITION MILITARY UNITS, AND AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT 
THE SAUDIS HAD ACCEPTED THIS OFFER.  ADEN SAID HE KNEW THE 
OFFER HAD BEEN MADE BUT HE HAD HEARD NOTHING ABOUT ITS 
ACCEPTANCE.  COMMENTING THAT THE GSDR COULD ONLY SEND A 
FEW HUNDRED SOLDIERS, HE ASKED WHAT DIFFERENCE SUCH 
A SMALL NUMBER COULD MAKE.  I RESPONDED THAT THE ACTIVE 
PARTICIPATION OF ANOTHER ARAB LEAGUE STATE IN THE COALI- 
TION'S MILITARY FORCES WOULD UNDERLINE THAT SADDAM'S 
AGGRESSION IS ANATHEMA, EVEN TO THOSE OTHERWISE CLOSEST 
TO HIM.  AFTER ASKING A FEW NEUTRAL QUESTIONS ABOUT 
THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL US MILITARY FORCES, THE 
MINISTER EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE CONFLICT CAN 
BE RESOLVED WITHOUT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 
 
7.  RECONCILIATION:  STATING THAT PEACE IS NECESSARY 
FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION, THE FOREIGN MINISTER 
SAID THE GSDR NEEDS THE HELP OF THE ITALIAN, 
BRITISH AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS.  HE ASKED THAT ALL 
THREE MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE SOMALI REBEL MOVEMENTS 
TO ATTEND THE CAIRO CONFERENCE AND OTHERWISE ENGAGE IN 
RECONCILIATION WITH SIAD'S REGIME.  HE ALSO ASKED THAT 
PRESSURE BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE ETHIOPIANS TO STOP 
PROVIDING TO THE REBEL MOVEMENTS THE SANCTUARY WHICH 
ALLOWS THEM TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE. 
 
8.  FOOD AID:  THE MINISTER DESCRIBED HUNGER IN MOGADISHU 
AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO PEACE.  NOTING THAT HE HAD BEEN 
INFORMED BY HIS MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES OF MY DISCUSSIONS 
WITH THEM ON THE SUBJECT, HE PLEADED FOR FASTER AMERICAN 
ACTION.  THE FRENCH, HE SAID, HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE 
3,000 TONS OF WHEAT, AND THE ITALIANS ARE TO FURNISH 4,000 
TONS OF RICE.  I EXPLAINED THAT PREPARATION OF OUR 
PROPOSAL HAS BEEN DELAYED BY THE TIME IT HAS TAKEN TH/ 
RED CRESCENT TO ENGAGE IN SURVEY AND ORGANIZATIONAL WORK 
WITH WHICH IT HAS HAD LITTLE PRIOR EXPERIENCE.  AD/N 
TOOK THE POINT BUT STRESSED THE URGENT NATURE OF THE 
FOOD CRISIS IN THE CAPITAL AND ITS DESTABILIZING POTENTIAL. 
 
9.  APO:  AS THE MEETING ENDED SO THAT THE MINISTER COULD 
MEET WITH SIAD ON THE BROOKE ISSUE, I GAVE HIM THE 
TEXT OF A LETTER REQUIRED AS PART OF OMC'S PROPOSAL FOR 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN APO IN MOGADISHU.  I POINTED OUT 
THAT AN APO IS AUTHORIZED BY THE MILITARY ACCESS 
AGREEMENT.  ADEN MADE NO COMMITMENT BUT SEEMED WELL 
DISPOSED. 
 
BISHOP