US embassy cable - 05AMMAN7621

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AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD'S DINNER WITH EX-PM ALLAWI

Identifier: 05AMMAN7621
Wikileaks: View 05AMMAN7621 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2005-09-25 05:00:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL IZ JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 007621 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD'S DINNER WITH EX-PM ALLAWI 
 
Classified By: DAVID HALE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, REASONS: 1.4 (B &D) 
 
1.  (C) During an informal dinner with Ambassador Khalilzad 
on September 21 in Amman, National Assembly member Adnan 
al-Janabi, and Emboff, former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad 
Allawi proposed that Sunni Arab officers from the former army 
should be actively recruited to act as "advisors" to the MOD 
and the newly-formed Iraqi forces.  Ambassador Khalilzad 
asked Allawi for his opinion on proposals to recruit tribal 
irregulars into the Iraqi military.  Allawi said he opposed 
the formation (by the MOD or anyone else) of irregular 
military units organized by Sunni tribes as potentially 
destabilizing .  Instead, Allawi suggested that an active 
effort be made to encourage Sunni tribes to identify and 
provide recruits to serve as regular soldiers in the new 
Iraqi Army (e.g., for the Anbar division). 
 
2.  (C) Ambassador raised with Allawi Iraqi Head of Sunni 
Waqf Ahmed Sammarai's proposal to put 5,000-6,000 Iraqi 
clerics on government payroll (ancient practice still 
followed in Jordan and most other Arab countries). 
Responding that he had done the same when he was PM, Allawi 
said it is a good idea that could promote stability, and keep 
clerics from making closer ties with extremists.  Regarding 
the draft Constitution, Allawi said he would support the 
draft Constitution in a public statement.  (Note: this 
occurred on September 22 on as-Sharqiyya television.  End 
Note).  Allawi offered that he would support making a few 
minor textual changes to the draft Constitution to expand 
Sunni buy-in. 
 
3.  (C) Turning to elections, Allawi said that he was 
planning to hold three conferences across Iraq (in Diwaniya, 
Tikrit, and Baghdad) to promote a moderate, cross-ethnic 
coalition for the December election.  All three conferences 
will host representatives from regional parties, the Arab 
League, and international observers. 
 
4.  (C) Allawi outlined plans for a trip he hopes to 
undertake soon to Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. to encourage 
political and financial support for formation of a moderate 
coalition of Iraqi political parties to contest the upcoming 
December election.  In a related development, he agreed to a 
proposal by Ambassador Khalilzad to review how 
de-Ba'athification has been carried out and to consider 
evolving the de-Ba'athification Commission into a 
"Reconciliation and Accountability Commission" that would 
facilitate putting the Ba,ath period behind Iraq, and pave 
the way for comprehensive re-integration into Iraqi society 
and government of former Ba,ath party members not guilty of 
crimes. 
 
5.  (C) In a separate conversation with Emboff, Adnan 
al-Janabi stated that winning the December election is more 
important for him than the fate of the Constitution, and 
agreed that Sunni Arabs should focus on this point rather 
than on their unhappiness over aspects of the proposed 
Constitution, which he deemed to be "85 percent" good. 
Janabi also agreed that the election rules specified in the 
proposed Constitution (e.g., voting by Governorate) are more 
advantageous to Sunni Arabs and the opposition generally than 
the TAL rules (used in the January 2005 election) that will 
be applied if the Constitution is defeated.  Janabi raised a 
red flag over reported efforts by SCIRI and others to 
postpone the election of new Governing Councils in the 
governorates until after the December election.  According to 
Janabi, SCIRI and its allies are worried they will lose 
nationally in December, and do not want to also risk their 
current majorities in the southern governorates which could 
offer them a potential platform for resistance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HALE 

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