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| Identifier: | 05AMMAN7621 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05AMMAN7621 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Amman |
| Created: | 2005-09-25 05:00:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL IZ JO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 007621 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, IZ, JO SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD'S DINNER WITH EX-PM ALLAWI Classified By: DAVID HALE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, REASONS: 1.4 (B &D) 1. (C) During an informal dinner with Ambassador Khalilzad on September 21 in Amman, National Assembly member Adnan al-Janabi, and Emboff, former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi proposed that Sunni Arab officers from the former army should be actively recruited to act as "advisors" to the MOD and the newly-formed Iraqi forces. Ambassador Khalilzad asked Allawi for his opinion on proposals to recruit tribal irregulars into the Iraqi military. Allawi said he opposed the formation (by the MOD or anyone else) of irregular military units organized by Sunni tribes as potentially destabilizing . Instead, Allawi suggested that an active effort be made to encourage Sunni tribes to identify and provide recruits to serve as regular soldiers in the new Iraqi Army (e.g., for the Anbar division). 2. (C) Ambassador raised with Allawi Iraqi Head of Sunni Waqf Ahmed Sammarai's proposal to put 5,000-6,000 Iraqi clerics on government payroll (ancient practice still followed in Jordan and most other Arab countries). Responding that he had done the same when he was PM, Allawi said it is a good idea that could promote stability, and keep clerics from making closer ties with extremists. Regarding the draft Constitution, Allawi said he would support the draft Constitution in a public statement. (Note: this occurred on September 22 on as-Sharqiyya television. End Note). Allawi offered that he would support making a few minor textual changes to the draft Constitution to expand Sunni buy-in. 3. (C) Turning to elections, Allawi said that he was planning to hold three conferences across Iraq (in Diwaniya, Tikrit, and Baghdad) to promote a moderate, cross-ethnic coalition for the December election. All three conferences will host representatives from regional parties, the Arab League, and international observers. 4. (C) Allawi outlined plans for a trip he hopes to undertake soon to Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. to encourage political and financial support for formation of a moderate coalition of Iraqi political parties to contest the upcoming December election. In a related development, he agreed to a proposal by Ambassador Khalilzad to review how de-Ba'athification has been carried out and to consider evolving the de-Ba'athification Commission into a "Reconciliation and Accountability Commission" that would facilitate putting the Ba,ath period behind Iraq, and pave the way for comprehensive re-integration into Iraqi society and government of former Ba,ath party members not guilty of crimes. 5. (C) In a separate conversation with Emboff, Adnan al-Janabi stated that winning the December election is more important for him than the fate of the Constitution, and agreed that Sunni Arabs should focus on this point rather than on their unhappiness over aspects of the proposed Constitution, which he deemed to be "85 percent" good. Janabi also agreed that the election rules specified in the proposed Constitution (e.g., voting by Governorate) are more advantageous to Sunni Arabs and the opposition generally than the TAL rules (used in the January 2005 election) that will be applied if the Constitution is defeated. Janabi raised a red flag over reported efforts by SCIRI and others to postpone the election of new Governing Councils in the governorates until after the December election. According to Janabi, SCIRI and its allies are worried they will lose nationally in December, and do not want to also risk their current majorities in the southern governorates which could offer them a potential platform for resistance. HALE
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