US embassy cable - 05AMMAN7602

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 007602 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, JO, IZ 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD PROMOTES ELECTION FOCUS IN 
MEETING WITH KEY IRAQI SUNNI TRIBAL LEADERS 
 
Classified By: DANIEL RUBINSTEIN, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, REASONS: 1.4 (B &D 
) 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
1.  (C) Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad outlined recent 
compromises in the Constitution drafting process and promoted 
the need to focus on the December elections during a 
three-hour meeting in Amman with Iraqi Sunni Arab tribal 
leaders.  The meeting included several major Sunni Arab 
tribal figures, including the brother-in-law of the King of 
Saudi Arabia and the paramount Sheikh of one of Iraq's 
largest tribes.  Baghdad political figures Iyad Allawi, Adnan 
al-Janabi, and Izzat Shabinder also attended the meeting. 
The meeting saw active give and take on issues ranging from 
federalism and the status of Kirkuk, to the need to maximize 
Sunni Arab political participation and form a broad-based new 
government after the December elections.  Alleged continued 
growth in Iranian influence and presence inside Iraq, and 
alleged pro-Iranian activities of the current government, 
were also major issues. Ambassador Khalilzad put the latter 
issue in the context of the need to maximize Sunni political 
participation.  Opposition to the insurgency and terror and 
support of building a strong Iraq will help defeat Iran's 
strategy of keeping Iraq weak and dependent.  Initial 
reaction to the meeting was very positive, and many of the 
Iraqi Sunni attendees asked for future follow-up.  In 
addition to directly promoting U.S. goals and expanding 
contact links, the meeting appeared to advance the 
coalition-building efforts of Iyad Allawi.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad met for 
three hours with a large group of influential Iraqi tribal 
and political leaders on September 21 at the U.S. 
Ambassador's residence in Amman.  While the group included 
former Iraq Prime Minister Iyad Allawi (a secular Sh,ia), 
eighteen of the twenty-one Iraqis present were Arab Sunnis, 
including leading Sunni tribal figures from Anbar, Mosul, 
Kirkuk, Tikrit, and the South  (see paragraph 18 below for an 
annotated list of Iraqi attendees). 
 
3.  (C) In his opening statement, Ambassador Khalilzad 
described his mission in Iraq as "working with Iraqis to help 
Iraq succeed" in becoming a democratic, stable, united, and 
prosperous country.  However, Khalilzad stressed, these goals 
cannot be achieved unless the various communities in Iraq 
come to an understanding and agree on certain principles with 
regard to the future.   This in turn requires realism, good 
will, and willingness to compromise. 
 
Working on the Constitution 
---------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Khalilzad outlined his intensive efforts since 
arriving in Iraq in late July to work with the Iraqi 
Constitution drafters and political leadership, including 
Sunni Arabs, to help craft a document that promotes 
achievement of the above goals and be acceptable to the large 
majority if not all Iraqis.  He noted that "a Constitution is 
not a political party platform," but a living document 
reflecting the broadest possible consensus on how a people 
wish to be governed.  Such a document cannot be achieved 
without compromise; no one group can expect to get everything 
it wants.  He observed that the recent Constitutional 
negotiations were difficult, and compounded by the tendency 
of most of the current political leadership (excepting ex-PM 
Allawi and his party) to overlook the cross-cutting interests 
and aspirations of Iraqis as a whole in favor of narrow 
ideological or ethnic interests.  Nonetheless, Khalilzad 
noted, several important compromises in the areas of 
Federalism, the role of Islam, ownership of energy and water 
resources, and Iraq's place in the Arab world, were achieved 
during the final weeks of drafting.  He outlined each of 
these compromises in some detail, and noted that discussions 
on additional "tweaking" of the Constitution are continuing. 
 
 
Defeating Iran's Strategy 
---------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) In addition to noting that the Constitution is 
subject to amendment, Khalilzad stressed that decisions on 
implementation and parameters of many key governance issues, 
including the precise form and nature of Federalism in Iraq, 
have been consciously left for decision by the next National 
Assembly and government, to be formed after the December 2005 
elections.  He emphasized that this, plus the probable 
multi-year longevity of the next government, makes widespread 
participation in these elections by Sunni Arabs who care 
about the future of Iraq absolutely essential.  Khalilzad 
described the Sunni Arab boycott of the January 2005 
elections as a "huge mistake" that crippled Sunni Arab 
influence and promoted Iran's strategic and tactical 
objectives of achieving a weak and dependent Iraq.  He 
forcefully encouraged those present to promote the largest 
possible participation and voter turnout by their communities 
in the December election. 
6.  (C) Allawi followed up on several of Khalilzad,s points, 
arguing that, despite its shortcomings on federalism, 
religion, and other issues, the Constitution is largely 
acceptable and should be regarded as a way station to the 
December elections, which, more than the Constitution itself, 
will determine Iraq's future.  Formation of a 
forward-looking, nationalistic and democratic coalition after 
this election will defeat the agenda of Iran and Syria and 
finally put Iraq on the right track for the future.  It will 
also permit revision through amendment or interpretation of 
some of the current problematic portions in the Constitution. 
 
 
Dealing with Federalism 
------------------------ 
 
7.  (C) Most attendees clearly took on (albeit sullenly in 
some cases) Khalilzad's and Allawi's key points on the need 
to look past the Constitution draft and focus on the December 
election.  Several attendees agreed that the January 2005 
Sunni election boycott was a mistake.  Khalilzad and 
Allawi,s stress on the importance of the December election 
and the call for massive Sunni Arab participation was not 
challenged, nor did anyone argue that the Constitution was 
completely unacceptable.  The only Constitutional issue that 
was actively pursued by attendees was federalism.  Abdullah 
Khorbit, Rafaa Sahab al-Kubaisi, Majid al-Suliman, (all from 
Anbar) and Gazi al-Hanesh (paramount sheik of the al-Taie), 
among others, raised several concerns over federalism, and 
especially its implications for a strong and cohesive Iraq, 
and as a possible Trojan horse for rising Iranian ambitions. 
 
 
8.  (C) Ambassador Khalilzad responded that "like it or not," 
the reality is that federalism cannot be avoided in any Iraq 
that includes Kurdistan.  Kurdistan has been effectively 
separated from Iraq for nearly 15 years, and cannot be 
peacefully re-integrated with the rest of Iraq outside of a 
federal structure.  The implications of federalism for the 
rest of Iraq will be decided by the next Iraqi government; 
options run the gamut from no federal structure outside of 
Kurdistan to a wide variety of other options.  Asked if the 
US really favors a unified Iraq, Khalilzad reiterated that 
the U.S. has no position on federalism per se (other than 
recognizing the realistic need for it in order to 
re-integrate the Kurds), but is committed to formation of a 
united, strong, democratic, and prosperous Iraq that cannot 
be divided or turned into a dependent by neighboring 
countries, as Lebanon formerly was by Syria. 
 
9.  (C) Sheikh Wasfi al-Asi al-Obeidi made a long and 
sometimes emotional comment on alleged Kurdish leadership 
efforts to unfairly deprive Arabs and Turkomen of political 
power in Kirkuk, including allegations that large numbers of 
Iranian Kurds are entering Iraqi Kurdistan and being lodged, 
presumably as potential new voters, in Kirkuk.  He also 
recounted several allegations about Kurdish leadership abuses 
during the January 2005 election, including alleged 
widespread transportation of Kurdish voters in support of 
multiple voting inside Kurdistan and the Kirkuk region.  He 
said that Arab and Turkomen voters do not want be victims of 
fraudulent elections, and are sure that this "pattern" will 
continue unless there is comprehensive U.S. and/or UN 
supervision of the election voting and the final count.  He 
explicitly rejected reliance on Kurdish or Sh,ia-dominated 
Iraqi security forces in the Kirkuk area as guarantors of 
voting security. 
 
10.  (C) Ambassador Khalilzad recognized al-Obeidi,s 
concerns and assured him the USG firmly supports the 
residency rights of Kirkuk,s Arab citizens; however, 
Khalilzad warned, all of Kirkuk,s residents need to be wary 
of outside manipulation.  Khalilzad seconded the need for 
voters to have confidence in the "fairness" and legality of 
the voting process.  He suggested working with the Election 
Commission to ensure that fairness and voting rights are 
protected. 
 
Ex-Ba,athi Reintegration 
------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Several speakers, including Rafaa Sahab al-Kubaisi, 
Abdul Jabar al-Kubaisi, and Adnan al-Janabi, criticized 
continued efforts to deprive ex-Baathis of a political role 
and to prevent the re-emergence of a "democratic" Ba,athist 
party that could compete in future elections.  The 
al-Kubaisi,s were the most strident in this regard, Rafaa 
noting that he "has been authorized" by the Ba,athist party 
(in exile?) to speak for it in this regard.  Ambassador 
Khalilzad asked how many other attendees agreed that a 
(non-Saddamist)  Ba,athist party should be allowed to 
re-emerge, but few responded. 
12.  (C) While agreeing that the large majority of Ba,athist 
party members were not criminals and should be allowed to 
fully participate in Iraqi society, Khalilzad stated 
categorically that the USG will not cooperate with those who 
nostalgically desire to recreate an old-style Ba,athist 
regime.  "The old regime is dead and it is never coming 
back," he stated.  That being said, Khalilzad outlined an 
idea that he said would be crystallized over coming months to 
initiate a comprehensive accountability and reconciliation 
process that will re-integrate most ex-Ba,athis with 
parallel, active prosecution of Ba,athist criminals.  Allawi 
added that there were three kinds of Ba,athists: criminals 
("very few"); honest true believers; and opportunists.  The 
last two categories (though not the Ba,athist party per se) 
should be fully reintegrated into the Iraqi political system, 
he opined. 
 
Sunni Arabs: "Iran is Taking Over" 
 ---------------------- 
 
13.  (C) The large majority of speakers made reference to 
alleged massive Iranian infiltration into Iraq, and/or 
control over much of the current Iraqi government.  "Baghdad 
is about to fall again," warned Sheikh Sa,ad Abdullah Kharo 
al-Nasiri from Tikrit.  Sheikh Mutashar al-Saadoun from 
Nasiriyyah and Basra shook with anger as he alleged rampant 
Iranian migration, intimidation, and takeovers in the south. 
Some speakers wondered if this indicates a secret U.S. desire 
to strengthen Iran. 
 
14.  (C) After several such comments, Khalilzad set the 
record straight by energetically stating that the U.S. 
regards Iran as a dictatorship led by liars and extremists, 
that the U.S. resolutely opposes Iranian and Syrian 
infiltration and destabilization activities, and that the 
U.S. will never agree to allowing Iraq to become an Iranian 
satellite.  While agreeing with the Sunni Arab questioners 
that the Iranians are a "big problem," Khalilzad reminded 
them that their community must also shares partial 
responsibility for the growth in Iranian influence.  For 
example, their promotion of the Sunni Arab election boycott 
brought Iranian allies to power (only 150, 000 additional 
votes for Sunni parties of Allawi,s coalition would have 
blocked them), and the cooperation of some in their community 
with Iran,s surrogate Syria insurgents advanced Iranian 
goals.  While agreeing that the Iranian problem requires 
attention, Khalilzad reiterated that the most powerful way to 
repel the Iranian threat is through the ballot box - i.e., by 
electing a responsible, nationalistic government that will 
create stability and help Iraq develop its economy.  This in 
turn will eventually win over most of those currently 
cooperating at some level with Iran, he predicted. 
 
Praising Sheik Sabah of al-Qaim 
-------------------------- 
 
15.  (C) Prior to the conclusion of the meeting, Talal 
al-Gaaod from Anbar rose to extend special recognition to 
Sheikh Sabah from al-Qaim, who was recently forced out of 
al-Qaim after several days of fighting Zarqawi forces, due to 
lack of ammunition. "Sheikh Sabah, alone among us (tribals), 
has actually done something" al-Gaaod noted to the assembled 
sheikhs.  Sheikh Tariq al-Abdallah (seconded by Allawi) 
proposed that a group of Sunnis go on a speaking tour to the 
USA and meet with USG officials to show that "we are not 
against the goals of the United States."  The Iraqi attendees 
thanked Khalilzad for meeting with them and many asked that 
the USG contact be strengthened.  Ambassador Khalilzad agreed 
that he meeting had been very helpful and promised to find 
ways to continue exchanging views with Iraq's tribal 
leadership, whether in Iraq or Amman. 
 
Comment 
--------- 
 
16.  (C) This meeting promoted Sunni outreach and overall 
U.S. goals in Iraq.  It succeeded in moving the focus away 
from the resentment over the imperfect constitution to the 
need to work together to promote a large voter turnout in 
December.  The discussion became increasingly animated, and 
despite emotional moments, the atmosphere was positive 
throughout.  The Iraqis greatly appreciated the meeting and 
initial feedback from attendees has been positive.  Most but 
not all of the tribal leaders were first rank, and the guests 
were diverse in background.  Most of the attendees were not 
from Baghdad and have had limited or no contact with senior 
USG officials over the last two years.  As noted by 
Ambassador Khalilzad, to following-up this conclave with 
further sessions is needed to gain greater traction and 
foothold in the Sunni Arab community. 
 
17.  (C) Another apparent "winner" from the meeting was 
ex-Prime Minister Allawi and his coalition-building policy. 
Allawi conducted himself with dignity and calm throughout, 
and was surrounded by Sunni tribals for many minutes after 
conclusion of the meeting. 
End Comment. 
 
18.  Iraqi Attendees: 
 
1.    Ex-PM Iyad Allawi 
 
2.    Dari al-Fassal al-Jarba.  Key Shammar leader from 
Mosul, now living primarily in Amman.  Brother-in-law of King 
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. 
 
3.     Majid al-Suliman from Ramadhi.  Paramount Sheik of the 
Dulaime, his influence 
       has declined.  Working closely with Allawi. 
 
4.    Sabah Sattam al-Shargi from al-Qaim.  Fought bitterly 
over the summer against Zarqawi and his allies.  Pushed out 
of al-Qaim two weeks ago when his tribe ran out of 
arms/ammunition.  Hopes to form a tribal unit to be trained 
by US forces. 
 
5.    Gazi al-Hanesh.  Paramount Sheik of the Al-Taie.  From 
Mosul area. 
 
6.     Mutashar al-Saadoun.  Sunni tribal leader from South 
(Basra/Nasirriyah). 
 
7.     Talal al-Gaaod, originally from Heet. 
 
8.     Abdullah Khorbit from Ramadhi.  The young, &political 
face8 of the Khorbits. 
 
9.    Tarik al-Abdullah.  Wealthy businessman and tribal 
leader from near Fallujah.  He mainly shuttles between Amman 
and the Gulf 
 
10.    Abdul Jabbar al-Kubaisi.  A leading figure in this 
West Anbar clan. 
 
11.    Akram Zankana.  Wealthy Kurdish tribal chief and 
businessman based in Amman.  Close to Allawi. 
 
12.    Sa,ad Abdullah Kharo al-Nasiri.  Head of clan in 
Tikrit.  Opposed to Saddam, well connected in Salah )al-din 
Governorate. 
 
13.    Khalid Effan al-Eysawi 
 
14.   Daham Hamad al-Alwani 
 
15.   Rafaa Sahab al-Kubaisi.  Ex member of Ba,athist party 
from Anbar, willing to cooperate as a "Neo-Baathist" in the 
political process.  Supposedly authorized to speak to the USG 
for this group. Reportedly very influential in West Anbar. 
 
16.    Sa,ad al-Obaidi.  Influential in Kirkuk, Mosul, and 
Salah al-Din. 
 
17.    Saa,d al-Jabouri al-Mulla.  From Doura area (SE of 
Baghdad).  Shuttles between Iraq and Jordan. 
 
18.   Wasfi al-Asi al-Obeidi.  Key Sunni Arab tribal figure 
in Kirkuk. 
 
19.    Izzat Shabinder.  Iraqi nationalist Sh,ia close to 
Allawi.  Quasi-Islamist. 
 
20.    Adnan al-Janabi.  National Assembly member and chief 
of the al-Janabi,s. 
 
21.    Ahmed Abdul-Gaffur al-Samarrai.  Head of the Sunni 
Waqf. 
 
 
HALE