US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2582

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002582 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, NA, NL 
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER ETIENNE YS' VISIT TO THE UNITED 
STATES: THE VIEW FROM THE DUTCH 
 
REF: THEHAGUE 02554 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CHAT BLAKEMAN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND ( 
D). 
 
 1. (C)  SUMMARY: The September 25-30 visit of Prime Minister 
Etienne Ys to the United States comes at a contentious moment 
in Dutch - Antillean relations.  Officials in The Hague have 
expressed frustration with the Ys government's handling of 
several sensitive issues (including managing the inflow of 
Antillean youth to the Netherlands), but still view Ys as 
their best hope for countering growing Venezuelan influence 
in the Antilles and promoting a stable transformation of the 
Netherlands Antilles into smaller, separate political 
entities.  Although Ys' resignation from the leadership of 
his party puts his political future in doubt, the Dutch 
believe he will remain a key figure in helping to redefine 
the constitutional relationship between the Netherlands and 
the islands over the next several months, at least.  All 
Dutch interlocutors argued that high-level "photo ops" for Ys 
in Washington and enhanced U.S.-Antillean economic and 
political relations would bolster Ys' position at home, 
potentially giving him more flexibility to support key Dutch 
and U.S. interests in the region.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Controversy in the "Kingdom" 
---------------------------- 
 
2. (C) EMBOFFS met with Rob Verschoor, Senior Policy Advisor 
at the Kingdom Relations Department of the Ministry of the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations, on September 16 to discuss 
Dutch perspectives on Netherlands Antilles' Prime Minister 
Ys' upcoming visit to the United States.  On September 19, 
EMBOFFS also met with Karel de vey Mestagh and Anton 
Schellekens in the Dutch MFA's division of Kingdom Affairs. 
All three Dutch interlocutors noted that Ys' visit came at an 
unusually volatile period in the relationship between the 
Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles.  While the Dutch 
have grudgingly accepted that the Netherlands Antilles will 
probably cease to exist as a political entity in the near 
future, the Dutch want to ensure that critical structural and 
economic issues (such as the Antilles' outstanding debt) are 
dealt with in an orderly fashion.  Unfortunately, Kingdom 
Affairs Minister Pechtold's somewhat undiplomatic efforts to 
steer the process have provoked negative reactions in the 
Antilles, earned him a mild rebuke from the Dutch parliament, 
and created the impression in the press of a serious rift 
within the Kingdom. 
 
3. (C) According to Verschoor, however, Pechtold's tough tone 
was not entirely accidental, as the minister felt it was the 
only way to focus the attention of Antillean leaders on 
legitimate Dutch concerns.  The Dutch do not want to discuss 
plans to restructure the relationship between the Antilles 
and the Netherlands without concurrently implementing 
economic reform measures, especially to deal with Antillean 
debt (now running at about 2 billion euros, an amount 
equivalent to Antillean GDP in 2005).  The Dutch are prepared 
to back up its rhetoric with action: an Interior Ministry 
Official told POLOFF and POLCOUNS that the Netherlands will 
provide the Netherlands Antilles "several million" euros in 
debt relief if the Antilles can produce a viable economic 
reform plan. 
 
4. (C) Another issue grabbing headline recently was Dutch 
Minister for Integration Verdonk's proposal that non-student 
Antillean youth living in the Netherlands without a clear 
source of support should be "deported" to the Antilles. 
(Note:  As the Antilles are part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, this would effectively be akin to "deporting" 
youth from one state to another within the U.S.)  During a 
June visit to The Hague, PM Ys held a public demonstration to 
protest the proposal and threatened to sue the Dutch 
government to prevent it from being implemented.  Dutch 
interlocutors confirmed that while these proposals have not 
been abandoned, questions about their constitutionality will 
have to be resolved before they are put to parliament, a 
process which can take months or even years.  Verschoor noted 
that he did not expect any public action on the proposals 
until early next year at the earliest -- well after the 
upcoming Antillean elections.  In the meantime, Verschoor and 
the other Dutch interlocutors stressed that the Dutch 
government will continue to work quietly with Antillean 
authorities to improve local conditions so that fewer youths 
are tempted to travel to the Netherlands without job or study 
prospects.  Pechtold, for example, agreed recently to help 
finance an Antillean program of mandatory community service 
for unemployed youth under 24. 
 
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BUT YS STILL DUTCH FAVORITE 
--------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Despite the recent dust-ups, all interlocutors agreed 
that Ys was someone with whom the Dutch felt comfortable 
working -- and that he was far better than the likely 
alternatives.  Unlike some of his rivals, they said, Ys 
valued having a productive relationship with The Hague and 
understood the importance of implementing structural changes 
rationally.  He also was not afraid to stand up to Chavez by 
chastising the Venezuelan Consul General in Curacao directly 
or forcing pro-Chavez politicians out of his coalition 
government. 
 
6. (C) Verschoor and de vey Mestagh separately volunteered 
that a "high level photo op" with the President or other 
senior U.S. officials would help strengthen Ys' bargaining 
position back home and urged that such an event be 
considered.  Similarly, any measures to boost U.S. tourism to 
the Antilles or otherwise to enhance economic relations 
should be encouraged.  Whatever his faults, they noted, Ys 
clearly shared Dutch and U.S. concerns about increased 
Venezuelan meddling in the region and also supported efforts 
to combat drug trafficking in the region.  If Ys returned 
from the U.S. without any demonstrable benefits, they added, 
his political rivals at home (such as Cova and Godet) -- and 
possibly Venezuelan President Chavez as well -- would seize 
upon this as evidence of his irrelevance. 
 
7. (C) Following the announcement of Ys' resignation from the 
leadership of the PAR party on September 19, POLOFF contacted 
Karel de vey Mestagh again to see if this development changed 
Dutch views of the visit.  De vey Mestagh confirmed that 
while the announcement had caught them by surprise, the Dutch 
expected (and hoped) that Ys would remain involved in 
Antillean politics in some capacity for some time to come, 
and reiterated his view that gestures of support during Ys' 
visit to the U.S. would have tangible benefits for U.S. and 
Dutch interests in the region. 
 
BLAKEMAN