US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3933

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003933 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2025 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PINS, IZ, Terrorism, Security 
SUBJECT: (S/NF) BRITISH DATT SHARES REPORT ON BASRA INCIDENT 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford 
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY.  The British decision to use force 
to extract eight UK soldiers being held by the Iraqi 
Police (IP) in Basra was taken only after the British 
became convinced that the national and local Iraqi 
governments were not in control of the situation and 
that the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) Shia militia had taken 
physical custody of two of the service members.  The 
initial incident, which led to the arrest of the 
servicemen, in which one or two IP were killed by two 
undercover UK soldiers, is under investigation.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (S/NF) British Defense Attache Colonel Alastair 
Campbell met with PolOff and PolMilOff to share the 
HMG's "Secret-Eyes Only" report on the September 19 
Basra incident which resulted in the forced extraction 
from Iraqi custody of eight UK nationals. 
 
3. (SBU) COL Campbell confirmed the general sequence 
of events to have been as follows:  Two UK soldiers 
working undercover were involved in a shootout at 
10:20 am with Iraqi Police (IP), resulting in the 
death of one IP and the wounding of another.   The two 
UK soldiers were arrested by IP and taken into 
custody.  Several more UK soldiers arrived at the IP 
station to negotiate the release of the soldiers while 
UK military units secured the immediate area.  At 3:30 
pm, a crowd of several hundred people gathered and 
began to throw gasoline bombs and rocks at the UK 
vehicles.  One UK armored personnel carrier was burned 
and a number of UK soldiers were injured in the 
process.  At 10:00 pm that evening, UK forces broke 
down a wall to the IP station and extracted the six- 
member negotiating team.  Still later that evening, a 
UK team raided a nearby home and extracted the two 
soldiers. 
 
Who Started Shooting? 
--------------------- 
 
4. (S/NF) Based on the UK internal report, the 
specific incident that prompted the shooting is yet 
unknown.  The two UK SAS soldiers spoke no Arabic and 
were dressed in local Arab garb.  They were confronted 
by two IP who were also in civilian clothes.  The UK 
report suggests that the soldiers may have thought the 
two IP were bandits.  It is not yet known who shot 
first nor is it known if the IP shot at all.  It is 
known that one IP was killed and the other wounded. 
(Note: A number of reports indicated that two IP were 
killed during the day suggesting that the wounded IP 
may have died.  End Note.)  Following this shootout, 
the UK soldiers hijacked a car and left the scene. 
They came upon an IP checkpoint and identified 
themselves to the IP as UK soldiers.  They were taken 
into custody at the Al-Jameat IP Headquarters in Basra 
City. 
 
The Negotiation Process 
----------------------- 
 
5. (S/NF) Six UK military personnel were dispatched to 
the IP station to negotiate the release of the 
soldiers.  They argued that CPA Order 17 required that 
the men be turned over the British no matter what they 
had allegedly done.  The six were prevented from 
leaving the premises by the IP.  Sometime in the 
afternoon, the UK military placed a cordon around the 
area to secure it.  The Commander of the UK 12th 
Mechanized Brigade Brigadier John Lorimer contacted 
Governor Mohhamad Al-Waili and the Basra Chief of 
Police (CoP) Major General Hasan al-Saad.  A mechanism 
was devised by which a local Judge would issue a 
release order based on CPA Order 17.  The Judge 
requested a letter from the UK military saying the two 
were indeed UK soldiers.  A letter was provided at 
6:30 pm but the order was never issued.  The Judge 
later claimed he never got the letter. 
 
6. (S/NF) UK Ambassador Patey contacted Minister of 
Interior (MOI) Bayan Jabr Solagh.  The MOI issued an 
order at 7:30 pm to the Chief of Police and the 
Governor to release the men.  The order was not 
executed.  Sometime during the day communications 
between the negotiating team were lost.  The UK cordon 
around the IP station was pulled back after a 3:30 pm 
mob attack on a Warrior armored personnel carrier 
(APC) which resulted in 19 UK injuries (none life 
threatening.)  During that incident, UK troops fired 
warning shots above the heads of the 2-300 rioters and 
per the UK report, there were no reports of any Iraqi 
casualties in this exchange.  At 8 pm, the UK forces 
received approval (not specified by whom) to forcibly 
extract their troops.  At 8:12 pm, Brigadier Lorimer 
and the Governor/CoP came to agreement that the UK 
could quietly extract the eight soldiers from the rear 
of the IP station at 10 pm to avoid exciting the 
crowd.  At 9:35 pm, the Governor told Lorimer that the 
2 SAS soldiers were "removed" by members of Moqtada 
al-Sadr's JAM militia who "overwhelmed the local 
police."  UK forces were aware from signals 
intelligence that the 2 soldiers were, in fact, moved 
earlier by unknown persons to another location. 
 
The Decision to Forcibly Extract 
-------------------------------- 
 
7. (S/NF) COL Campbell said that the decision to 
forcibly extract the UK soldiers was taken for the 
following reasons:  the loss of communication with the 
negotiating team; the information that the two 
soldiers were in the custody of JAM members; the fact 
that the two soldiers had been moved to another 
location; and indications that the IP was no longer in 
control of the situation.  COL Campbell noted that 
lack of progress on the negotiating front and fear for 
the safety of their troops was the main motivation to 
the decision to act. 
 
8. (S/NF) At the previously arranged time of 10 pm, 
the British sent several Warrior APCs to the back of 
the IP station.  According to the UK report, they 
broke through an exterior wall of the compound 
reportedly because the gate could not accommodate the 
vehicles.  The team extracted the six-member 
negotiating team and searched the police station to 
verify that the two SAS soldiers were not present. 
Contrary to press reports, no walls of the building 
itself were breached and no prisoners escaped from the 
building.  The IP fled the building when the UK troops 
arrived - no shots were fired during the exercise. 
 
9. (S/NF) At 11:10 pm, a second location in the 
Hayannah area of Basra (about 1 kilometer from the IP 
station), were raided by UK troops.  The British 
forces encountered no resistance from the five JAM 
guards who fled the approaching troops.  The two UK 
SAS soldiers were located and returned to the UK base. 
They did not have serious injuries though they were 
"roughed up" by the IP when they were arrested. 
 
Loose Ends 
---------- 
 
10. (S/NF) Sometime during the negotiation process, 
Amb. Patey also contacted Deputy Prime Minister 
Chalabi who expressed readiness to use his contacts 
with Sadr to secure the release of the soldiers. 
Events moved so quickly that the offer was not 
utilized.  The UK military is conducting an 
investigation into the incident and expects to issue a 
report to the GOI (and a public statement) by 
September 22.  The two SAS soldiers are being 
debriefed and will be removed from Iraq on September 
21. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11.  (S/NF)  Other channels' reporting suggests that 
Muqtada Sadr wanted to disassociate himself from this 
affair and that the Basra Governor himself often did 
not understand events on the ground.  Also notable was 
how little control the central government authorities, 
including the Minister of Interior, had over the local 
police authorities in Basra. 
 
 
Khalilzad