US embassy cable - 05ANKARA5499

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005499 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR APNSA HADLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MNUC, TU, US, IZ, SY, IR, EU 
SUBJECT: NSA HADLEY VISIT TO TURKEY: ANCHORING THE 
PARTNERSHIP 
 
 
Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney; reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Your arrival in Ankara comes at an extraordinarily 
difficult moment between Turkey and the EU.  Your presence 
and the message of solidarity that you convey will provide 
much-needed solace to the Turkish government and to the 
broader population -- both of whom are feeling abused and 
humiliated by the EU debate.  Bilateral relations are at a 
better point than they have been since the onset of the Iraq 
war, though we still lack the shared strategic vision that is 
necessary to propel us toward genuine collaboration within 
the region and throughout the world.  The Turks will hit you 
hard on the PKK in northern Iraq -- they want concrete 
(albeit not military) action in the near term -- and will 
respond gratefully to assurances of USG commitment to 
tackling this problem when possible.  As the senior-most USG 
official in Turkey since Secretary Rice's stop here early in 
the year, your dialogue with the government and members of 
the media will send a major -- and much needed -- signal of 
enduring American support for and solidarity with this 
crucial ally. 
 
2. (C) Since Erdogan was last in Washington in June, the 
Turks have -- as you and the President challenged them to -- 
taken ownership of the relationship publicly.  They have 
spoken out in support of the U.S.-Turkish partnership and 
have helped subdue the firestorm of media criticism that was 
sparked by the onset of the Iraq war.  That said, there 
remains widespread opposition to USG policies throughout the 
Turkish population and, as recent polling has shown, we still 
have some very heavy lifting to do on public diplomacy. 
 
The EU - Counsel Calm 
--------------------- 
 
3. (C) The Turks deeply appreciate our support on the EU, but 
they are furious with both the process and the outcome of the 
EU,s counter-declaration.  They see it as a thoroughly 
demoralizing public debacle and fear that the opposition 
parties will use their "concessions" to weaken voter support 
for the AKP government.  We have urged the Turks to remain 
calm and to refrain from retaliating with angry statements, 
but they are unlikely to be able to control themselves. 
Points for you to stress: 
 
-- Events of the day should not cloud long-term objectives. 
 
-- Turkey is on the threshold of an historic achievement. 
Becoming a candidate for full EU membership is in Turkey's 
interest and the EU,s interest. 
 
-- Essential now not to react with a counter-counter 
declaration and to await the Negotiating Framework. 
 
-- After October 3, the political reality changes.  The EU 
process is exposing the ugly side of Europe, not/not of 
Turkey - the Turks need to hold the line for 10 more days. 
 
The PKK - Patience and Cooperation 
---------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) The major irritant in our relationship today is the 
PKK in northern Iraq.  Turks love conspiracy theories and 
this topic generates some of the wildest.  But even the most 
sober and pragmatic of Turks is convinced that the USG is 
refusing to take action against the PKK as a way to punish 
Turkey.  Our recent efforts to expand intel sharing and to 
shut down PKK financing in Europe have helped, but there are 
still anguished mourners at funerals who chant "Damn America" 
along with "Damn the PKK."  The Turks will want to hear from 
you that: 
 
-- There is no place for terrorism -- of any kind -- in Iraq 
and we are determined to do everything possible to eliminate 
the terrorist threat there. 
 
-- We condemn PKK terrorism just as we condemn al Qaida. 
 
-- We are engaged in a difficult fight against the insurgency 
in Iraq but are developing a plan for joint action on a 
variety of fronts with the Turks against the PKK, including 
information sharing in Turkey, and shutting down PKK support 
groups in Europe. 
 
-- You should ask the PM and TGS what they hope to achieve at 
next week's interagency council on terrorism.  We need the 
Turkish government to convey to the nation that America is 
helping Turkey in the struggle against terrorism.  We are 
part of the solution, not part of the problem. 
 
-- Any further steps that you can offer to undertake on this 
issue will have a tremendously positive impact. 
Iraq, Syria and Iran 
-------------------- 
 
5. (C) Iraq is a major preoccupation for Turks, apart from 
the PKK.  Turkey and the U.S. now share common goals for 
Iraq: a secure, stable, democratic country that is united and 
territorially whole.  While Turkey has provided valuable 
assistance and cooperation in the global war on terrorism, 
our actions in Iraq remain highly unpopular with the Turkish 
public, 95 percent of which opposed the war; many in 
government share the public's perceptions.  They worry about 
Kurdish desires for independence, the ethnic balance and 
future of Kirkuk, and perceived discrimination against 
Turkmen in northern Iraq.  We know the Turkish concerns; you 
can usefully remind them just how important our shared goals 
are. 
 
6. (C) On Syria, PM Erdogan is unlikely to markedly alter his 
government's policy of engagement.  You can press Erdogan in 
particular on this to gain a detailed understanding of what 
concrete results he believes his policy can achieve.  You can 
counter that Syria's current tack is hurting the security 
situation in Iraq and helping prevent achievement of our 
common goals.  If, as we suspect, Erdogan remains adamant 
about engaging, you can press him to take a tough line with 
Assad and Syria, both in private and -- just as importantly - 
in public. 
 
7. (C) The Turks will also continue to engage Iran, another 
strategic neighbor.  For Ankara, this as a delicate balance 
-- they want to continue recent joint action against the PKK 
(Note: TGS claims Iran turned over 40 suspected PKK members 
in recent months and the two countries have regular meetings 
on the border to share information on PKK activities. End 
Note.) and benefit from trade, including in energy.  So while 
the Turks are concerned about Tehran's nuclear program, they 
acknowledge Iran's "right" to pursue nuclear energy.  Erdogan 
met with President Ahmadinejad in New York on September 15. 
You can ask him about the session and press him on Iran's 
nuclear agenda, which the Iranians themselves made crystal 
clear in New York. 
 
Regional Partnerships 
--------------------- 
 
8. (C)  There is no shortage of regional issues and potential 
flashpoints with the Turks.  We want, above all, to elevate 
this dialogue -- to help the Turks see what we can accomplish 
together through BMENAI, in Central Asia and elsewhere.  As a 
neighbor to many difficult countries, they have much to 
offer, but they need to take the broader view. 
 
Community Youth Center Event 
---------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Your brief visit to a municipal youth center, which 
Ankara mayor Gokcek recently established in an impoverished 
neighborhood of Ankara, will send a strong and very positive 
signal that we care not just about policy, but about people 
as well.  This center has had astounding success in getting 
kids off the streets, away from crime, and into computer 
classes and sports activities.  You will have plenty of 
opportunity to interact with the children.  Your message 
should be: 
 
-- We care not just about policy and relations between our 
countries - we care about people and building a better future 
for your children and ours. 
 
-- Children are the future; these centers that Mayor Gokcek 
(Gook-check) has championed provide Turkey's future with 
skills and better opportunities. 
MCELDOWNEY