US embassy cable - 05AMMAN7597

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007597 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: THE BAATH PARTY IN JORDAN: SHORT ON FUNDS AND 
MEMBERS 
 
REF: AMMAN 6240 
 
Classified By: CDA Daniel Rubinstein for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Once a potent force in Jordanian politics, 
the Baath party in Jordan (as opposed to traditional Baathist 
ideology) is widely viewed as irrelevant.  The main Baathist 
party, discredited by close identification with Saddam 
Hussein, is short on both cash and membership.  The GOJ can 
be expected to stop any serious attempt to use the Baathist 
parties in Jordan as a platform to fund or coordinate 
cross-border activities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U) BACKGROUND: The Baath Party in Jordan was first 
established in 1948.  Its core support came from educated 
citizens in urban areas, including cities in the 
then-Jordanian controlled West Bank.  Adhering to a pan-Arab 
doctrine of secular socialism, the party quickly grew in 
popularity.  It joined an alliance of nationalist-leftist 
parties that dominated parliament after the 1956 elections. 
However, like other parties (though not the Muslim 
Brotherhood), it was officially banned by King Hussein in 
1957 after he prevailed in a power struggle with Nasserite 
Prime Minister Nabulsi.  It then continued as an unofficial 
movement - with many party members actively working 
underground despite the real threat of imprisonment - riding 
the wave of Arab nationalism sweeping the region.  Baathist 
ideology peaked locally in the 1960s, with many adherents in 
Jordanian universities among both faculty and students, but 
then began to diminish in influence.  Local political 
observers attribute this decline to the loss of the West Bank 
to Israel in 1967 and, more importantly, disillusionment with 
the policies of ruling Baathist parties in Syria and Iraq. 
 
3.  (SBU) After King Hussein legalized political parties in 
1992, two separate Baathist parties gained official 
recognition in Jordan: the Baath Arab Progressive Party which 
took its cue from Syria, and the Jordan Arab Socialist Baath 
Party which followed the line from Iraq.  Both gained little 
popular support, according to post contacts, because they 
were widely seen as apologists for the regimes in Damascus 
and Baghdad respectively, rather than as true standard 
bearers for traditional Baathist ideals.  Thanks to its links 
to Iraq, the Jordan Arab Socialist Baath Party was able to 
garner a limited degree of attention by helping to finance, 
over the course of a decade, thousands of scholarships for 
students to study in Iraqi universities.  This program came 
to a sudden end in 2003 with the ouster of Saddam Hussein, 
and the party was nearly forced into bankruptcy as angry 
Jordanians demanded that it help finance the return of 
students sent to Iraq. 
 
4.  (SBU) In August 2005, the leadership of the Jordan Arab 
Socialist Baath Party (JASBP) held its first party conference 
since U.S.-led Coalition military action in Iraq.  While 
party leaders held a press conference afterwards to publicize 
an alleged letter from Saddam Hussein delivered to a 
Jordanian contact by the Red Cross, Jordan's press largely 
ignored the actual party gathering.  Post contacts assert 
this lack of media coverage reflects the fact that the JASBP 
is widely considered irrelevant in the Jordanian political 
arena.  The JASBP has no members in parliament, and like 
almost all of Jordan's 30-plus political parties (with the 
notable exception of the Islamic Action Front), it is very 
short on resources  - its headquarters consists of a shabby 
apartment - and lacks public credibility.  Religious 
Jordanians, and particularly Islamists, decry its secularism, 
while East Bank nationalists are wary of its emphasis on 
pan-Arab unity. 
 
5.  (C) Some of post's contacts in academic and political 
punditry circles sometimes describe themselves as "former 
Baathists," and some claim to profess allegiance to 
historical Baathist ideas.  None of these contacts, however, 
even thought to join the JASBP as they considered it a 
propaganda tool for the former Iraqi regime.  Dr. Husni 
Shiyab, a former member of parliament and professor of 
political science who actively supported the Baath party as a 
young adult, told poloff that blind allegiance to Saddam 
Hussein had discredited the JASBP from the start in the eyes 
of traditional Baathists.  As a result, he stated, "there are 
far more real Baathists outside the party than inside." 
Shiyab said that the JASBP was trying to increase its popular 
appeal by reflecting current trends, including Islamic 
conservatism (comment: notwithstanding the inherent 
contradiction).  He noted, for example, that the party was 
stressing "the role of Islam in forming the Arab identity" to 
counter its secular bent, but to little avail. 
 
6.  (C) COMMENT:  Given its lack of resources and membership, 
the JASBP is likely incapable of financing or otherwise 
providing real support for insurgents in Iraq.  (For an 
assessment of the activities and capabilities of Saddam's 
relatives here in exile, see reftel.)  As with other 
Jordanian political parties, the Baath is prohibited from 
having formal ties with organizations outside the country or 
accepting direct foreign funding.  The GOJ can be expected to 
use these and other legal restrictions to shut down attempts 
by Baathists, or supporters of Saddam Hussein elsewhere, to 
use Jordanian political parties as a platform to fund or 
coordinate cross-border activities.  END COMMENT. 
RUBINSTEIN