US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3931

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SHIA CONTACTS CONSIDER AYAD ALLAWI

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD3931
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD3931 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-09-22 11:49:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: IZ KDEM PGOV PINR Shia Islamists Elections
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003931 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2015 
TAGS: IZ, KDEM, PGOV, PINR, Shia Islamists, Elections 
SUBJECT: SHIA CONTACTS CONSIDER AYAD ALLAWI 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR 
REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Prominent Shia lamented to EmbOffs 
the lack of strong moderate Shia presidential 
candidates and revealed their concerns about 
supporting Ayad Allawi in the upcoming December 15 
elections. These politicians doubted Allawi would be 
strong enough to defeat the Islamists, citing his 
unprofessional staff and his insular and detached 
persona.  They requested USG assistance to transform 
Allawi into a more viable candidate.  End Summary. 
 
Shia predict referendum success 
------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) On September 21, Umma Political Party Head 
Saad Saleh al-Jabr, Iraqi Charge d'Affaires in Kuwait 
Hamid al-Sharifi, and religious teacher Sayyd Emad 
Kelanter met with PolOffs to discuss the upcoming 
elections.  All three Shia officials were emphatic 
that the referendum would pass, insisting that the 
average Shia does not care about the specifics of 
federalism and water.  They claimed that Shia would 
vote the way their leaders tell them to vote. 
Kelanter added that even Moqtada al-Sadr plans to vote 
yes.  PolOff encouraged Shia leadership to make public 
statements in support of the referendum. 
 
No depth or breadth 
------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Al-Sharifi explained that Shia leadership 
circles are more concerned with identifying moderate 
candidates and deciding how to support them.  PolOff 
applauded Shia efforts to identify moderate candidates 
and encouraged them to continue.  Al-Sharifi lamented 
that the Shia have not developed any political 
leaders.  He added that PM Jaafari is a "disaster" and 
argued that for lack of a better alternative, moderate 
Shia are left with Ayad Allawi.  Kelanter claimed that 
Allawi may be the strongest secular candidate, but he 
is not strong enough to defeat the Islamic parties. 
 
Downside of Allawi 
------------------ 
 
4.  (C) Al-Jabr had told PolOff on September 12, 
that he planned to solidly place his support behind 
Allawi in the upcoming elections.  But after several 
discussions with prominent Shia politicians, al-Jabr 
told PolOffs on September 21 that he now has serious 
reservations.  He elaborated that Allawi has insulated 
himself from the public and other Shia leaders. 
Kelanter added that in the last two years, Allawi has 
not made a single trip to the Southern countryside, 
held town meetings, or made an effort to reach out to 
other Shia leaders. 
 
Staffing Concerns 
----------------- 
 
5.  (C) Al-Jabr said Allawi relies far too much on 
his staff, which fails to give Allawi the true and 
complete picture on any subject. Al-Sharifi alleged to 
PolOffs that Allawi's Chief Political Aide Rasim al- 
Awadi is still a Baathist and an alcoholic.  Al- 
Sharifi said that Allawi accepts news and gossip from 
his advisors without question. The trio claimed to 
have approached Allawi and voiced their concerns but 
he flatly refused to make changes.  (Note: Al-Sharifi 
acknowledged a personal animus for Allawi's Chief of 
Staff Aqeel al-Saffar stemming from the friendship 
between al-Saffar's wife and al-Sharifi's ex-wife. End 
Note) 
 
Request for USG assistance 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Kelanter cautioned that Islamist political 
parties SCIRI and Dawa al-Islamiya are looking to 
start a "secular Islamist" movement, that he considers 
this a wolf in sheep's clothing. In order to make 
Allawi more competitive, Kelanter said the USG should 
tell Allawi to seek new advisors who can diagnose the 
needs of the people and launch an effective outreach 
campaign. This trio encouraged the USG to try to 
strengthen Allawi's candidacy. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (C)  Alone, none of these three Shia notables has 
much weight; Saad Jabr's party, for example, garnered 
precious few votes in January 2005.  Instead, what was 
interesting was the shared viewpoints of three men 
trying to see where the Shia mainstream would go in 
the December election and trying to identify their 
best hope of a centrist-dominated outcome.  Their 
sharp criticism of Allawi's INA advisors is widely 
voiced by many other contacts here. 
 
8.  (SBU) BIO NOTE: Sayyd Emad Kelanter runs a 
religious school in Najaf.  He is a relative of both 
al-Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr through marriage. 
Kelanter's mother is al-Sistani's sister-in-law. 
Kelanter's two brothers are married to Moqtada al- 
Sadr's sisters. END NOTE 
Khalilzad 

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