US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1680

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MALDIVES: DEMOCRACY STRATEGY

Identifier: 05COLOMBO1680
Wikileaks: View 05COLOMBO1680 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2005-09-22 11:40:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PHUM PGOV PREL EAID MV Maldives
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001680 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR G, DRL, S/P, AND SA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2015 
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, EAID, MV, Maldives 
SUBJECT: MALDIVES: DEMOCRACY STRATEGY 
 
REF: A. STATE 169895 
     B. COLOMBO 1669 
     C. COLOMBO 1530 
     D. COLOMBO 1469 
     E. COLOMBO 1449 
     F. COLOMBO 1295 
     G. COLOMBO 1212 
     H. COLOMBO 1097 
     I. COLOMBO 997 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d 
) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Although Maldives was not listed as a focus 
country in Reftel A, assisting Maldives in a peaceful 
transition to multi-party democracy would serve broad USG 
interests in promoting democracy and advancing human rights. 
Maldives is a moderate Islamic country where both the 
government and the citizens are favorably disposed to the US. 
 In the past six months, the Government of the Republic of 
Maldives (GORM) has implemented important democratic reforms, 
including codifying the establishment of a national human 
rights commission, improving judicial procedures,  permitting 
prison visits by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, and legalizing political parties (Reftels B-G).  Since 
June 2, four parties have registered in Maldives.  In 
chronological order by date of party registration, they are: 
the Maldivian Democratic Party (known as the MDP, it is the 
major opposition party), the DRP (the government's party, the 
title of which translates from the local language as 
"Maldivian People's Party"), the Labor Party (which favors 
democratic reforms), and the Adalath, or Justice Party (a 
party made up primarily of fundamentalist Muslim clerics who 
oppose democratic reforms).  (Note:  Despite the emergence of 
four parties, most everyone in Maldives speaks exclusively 
about "the Government" and "the Opposition," referring to the 
MDP.  End note.) 
 
2. (C) Neither the GORM nor the major opposition MDP has the 
political maturity or experience necessary to establish a 
strongly functional multi-party democracy without some 
external assistance  Right now the desire for political 
change of some kind is widespread in Maldives.  The US can 
play a critical role in helping ensure that this desire is 
channeled productively-- toward support for democratic values 
and respect for human rights rather than toward a more 
fundamentalist and oppressive form of government.  On 
numerous occasions, GORM representatives, members of the 
Maldives Human Rights Commission (MHRC), members of the 
security forces, and Maldivian citizens have all asked 
Emboffs for technical expertise in democracy building and 
human rights in order to improve their own system of 
government.  Providing this much-needed--and 
much-sought--assistance at this crucial juncture would 
greatly benefit the Maldives while furthering our own 
democracy-building objectives.  End summary. 
 
3. (C) The format of this cable is keyed to the questions 
posed in Reftel A. 
 
a. The key area of democratic deficit in Maldives is an acute 
lack of awareness, at all levels --whether that of the 
government, opposition party, the fledgling civil society, or 
the general public-- as to how a multi-party democracy 
functions effectively.  Although the Government of the 
Republic of Maldives (GORM) legalized political parties on 
June 2, its ossified leadership, which has ruled the country 
unchallenged for more than 25 years, does not yet understand 
that a multi-party system must accommodate a diversity of 
views and opinions-- including some opposed to the Government 
(Reftel C).  President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom and many of his 
close advisors seem unclear on the distinction between legal 
(even if obstreperous) criticism of the government, as 
opposed to illegal, violent protest.  It appears that Gayoom 
often equates dissent with sedition, as is evidenced by the 
August 12 arrest of Mohamed Nasheed, the chairperson of the 
main opposition group the Maldives Democratic Party (MDP), on 
that very charge (Reftel C).  (Note: On August 12 Nasheed was 
arrested for holding a peaceful sit-in.  He is now awaiting 
trial on one charge of terrorism and one charge of a crime 
against the State, ostensibly for inciting people against 
Gayoom and for his role in orchestrating pro-democracy 
demonstrations August 12-14.  End note.)  Although the 
President announced an ambitious reform agenda in mid-2004, 
his obvious desire to control the process --and the 
excruciatingly glacial pace of its progress-- have undermined 
popular confidence in the sincerity of his commitment. The 
police were formally separated from the military (known as 
the National Security Service or NSS) only last year.  Over 
time, the NSS developed the reputation of sometimes serving 
Gayoom's political purposes and being quick to use force. 
That said, the NSS and the new police force clearly are eager 
to improve their capabilities and to adapt to the new 
atmosphere of greater respect for human rights and democratic 
processes. 
 
a.  (cont.)  The MDP, for its part, interprets its new role 
as the major opposition party somewhat too literally, viewing 
its primary function as opposing anything and everything the 
President does without proposing an alternative vision of its 
own.  Both the GORM and the MDP lack the historical 
perspective or experience to develop their respective 
political parties as democratic institutions capable of 
attracting popular support on the basis of principles and 
programs, rather than on personalities and patronage.  The 
general public remain open to --even enthusiastic about-- 
reform, but are wary of joining political parties because 
they are unsure how the bodies function or what useful 
purpose they serve.  Civic education remains essential in 
Maldives, especially in light of the fact that government or 
social studies classes are not/not offered in primary or 
secondary schools.  Within the next six to eight months, 
desired outcomes in the Maldives would include: 
 
--Greater public awareness of how democracies function and 
the role of political parties within a democratic system; 
--Adoption of a notional timeline for reform that includes 
specific, verifiable benchmarks; 
--Growth of political parties as democratic institutions 
(development of party platforms, constitutions, a system for 
selecting party leadership; public outreach; inter-party 
dialogue and debate); 
--Improved awareness of and respect for human rights within 
both the police and NSS and continued evolution of the police 
as a civilian force; 
--Trials of opposition leaders detained after August 12-14 
unrest proceed in a manner consistent with international 
judicial standards. 
 
b. Six-month diplomatic and programmatic strategy: 
 
Present:  Embassy urges GORM to demonstrate more convincing 
commitment to reforms proposed by Gayoom in 2004; streamline 
Special Majlis (the legislative body elected to consider 
changes to the constitution) procedures; engage in dialogue 
with MDP and other parties; ensure "safe passage" back home 
to MDP activists living in self-imposed exile abroad; 
monitors progress of trials of political detainees; 
encourages MDP to develop its own political platform (other 
than "we're against Gayoom"); continues DRL-funded program to 
strengthen capacity of nascent Maldivian Human Rights 
Commission; broadens inclusion of Maldivian candidates for 
US-sponsored training and International Visitors Programs; 
first-ever US-Maldives Friendship Week (September 23-27) 
stresses respect for human rights, political diversity. 
 
November-December:  DRL-funded labor seminar encourages 
adoption of worker rights legislation; Embassy visits to 
detention facilities, monitoring of opposition trials help 
ensure better treatment, more credible judicial process; 
Embassy presses Gayoom to proceed with moves toward more 
independent judiciary; Embassy supports speakers on judicial 
reform; Department funds grant to begin civic/voter education 
programs in each atoll; a group International Visitor program 
for pro-government and opposition party members focuses on 
party outreach activities, consensus-building. 
 
January-March:  DRL funds grant to assist in party-building 
activities; parties develop internal organizations and seek 
voter input into platforms and manifestos; Embassy-funded 
conflict resolution specialist guides Government/opposition 
consultations and consensus on timeline for reform; Embassy 
engagement with Atoll Development Minister helps advance 
steps to democratize appointment of atoll chiefs; Embassy 
sponsors speaker program on investigative journalism to 
stimulate thinking on media independence and responsibility. 
 
c. To achieve the outcomes listed above, the following 
resources would be highly beneficial: 
 
--Department, through a grant to the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), or 
a similar organization, could provide technical assistance in 
helping parties strengthen and democratize their incipient 
institutions.  NDI visited Maldives in 2004 and was well 
received by both Government and opposition supporters.  A 
grant to The Asia Foundation or a similar organization to 
assist in developing a comprehensive civic education program 
would also be helpful.  (Note:  USAID/Sri Lanka has no 
program in Maldives and no bilateral agreement with the GORM 
to permit it to conduct programs there.  End note.) 
--High level visits and discussions could focus on 
encouraging the GORM to maintain its forward momentum in the 
reform process with special emphasis on asking the GORM to 
outline measurable benchmarks and a general timeline. 
--Expanded slots for Maldivian International Visitor Program 
and Fulbright participants would augment exposure to U.S. 
society and democratic values. 
--An ECA-funded workshop on investigative 
journalism/professionalization of media would prompt broader 
discussion of the role of the media in promoting democracy. 
(Note:  This could be done relatively inexpensively by 
piggybacking on to an already-funded program scheduled for 
Sri Lanka.  End note.) 
--An ECA-funded speaker program on building an independent 
judicial system could help shape steps, now under 
consideration, to give judicial authority greater autonomy. 
--The police need training in investigative techniques and 
methodologies to ensure respect for human rights. The 
Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative 
Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) could branch into 
Maldives from its current base in Sri Lanka by organizing 
training sessions in Male' and by inviting Maldivian police, 
security, and MHRC officials to participate in Colombo-based 
training sessions.  ICITAP could also provide classes such as 
Community Policing, Basic Criminal Investigation, and Civil 
Disorder Management courses.  At the same time, the 
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program could provide 
Critical Incident Management classes and the Senior Crisis 
Management Seminar as well.  Not only will these and similar 
classes increase the professionalism of the police, each 
class also includes training in human rights, thereby helping 
the police force transition to a police service.  A 
well-trained police service with a firm grounding in human 
and civil rights will have a strong and productive influence 
on the evolution of a fully participatory democracy. 
 
d.  The major impediment to democratic progress in Maldives 
is a lack of political maturity on the part of both the GORM 
and the major opposition party, the MDP.  The problem is 
exacerbated by the complete absence of civic education. 
While Maldivian citizens are aware of and engaged in 
political debates, they lack basic knowledge about how a 
party system functions or how democratic processes are 
carried out (Reftel D). 
 
e. More than 70 percent of Maldivians are under the age of 
35, and the GORM is unable to provide adequate educational 
and employment opportunities for its burgeoning younger 
population.  Because there are no institutions of higher 
learning in Maldives, ambitious young Maldivians are either 
sent to the west (primarily UK and Australia) to university 
or to Saudi Arabia or Pakistan to madrassahs.  GORM officials 
have expressed concern that Islamic fundamentalist influences 
from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan may endanger the moderate 
strain of Islam indigenous to Maldives.  One newly formed 
political party, the Adalath, or Justice Party, is comprised 
of Islamic scholars, and the party tends to encourage 
religious fundamentalism as an alternative to democracy. 
While the party appears to have garnered only minimal support 
so far, GORM officials remain concerned.  Dependent on 
revenues from Western tourists, the GORM has generally been 
responsive to pressure from the international community, 
including the USG, the EU, and the Commonwealth.  GORM 
officials and MDP representatives have both expressed 
disappointment that the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) and its member governments have not taken 
a greater interest in Maldives. 
 
f.  The GORM has undertaken a number of democratic reforms 
over the past six months, including legally recognizing and 
registering political parties and codifying the MHRC (Reftels 
F and B).  Opposition parties were allowed to meet publicly, 
albeit with prior permission from the GORM (Reftel C). 
Furthermore, following a 2004 Criminal Justice Action Plan 
drafted by the Attorney General's Office, the prison system 
improved and a system of bail was instituted in 2005. 
Moreover, the GORM permitted both visiting diplomats and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct prison 
visits.  The GORM was fully cooperative and provided 
unfettered access to all of the prisoners and detention 
centers.  According to ICRC, the police and NSS readily 
acknowledge their need for more extensive human rights 
training, and ICRC is examining ways to provide that 
expertise.  In addition, the International Committee of 
Jurists sent an observer to opposition leader Mohamed 
Nasheed's pre-trial hearing on August 25, and the GORM 
provided logistical support, including a court-appointed 
translator.  In sum, the GORM has been more cooperative and 
open to international concern about human rights in Maldives 
than at any time in the recent past.  In September, the GORM 
signed the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.  Despite this progress, however, the opposition 
leader is currently in jail pending charges of terrorism and 
a crime against the State, raising concerns amongst human 
rights groups that his prosecution is politically motivated 
(Reftel C).  Freedom of assembly also remains constrained, as 
does press freedom, which is limited de facto by GORM control 
over the only local television and radio stations. 
 
g.  Consequences of pursuing this agenda:  There is a strong 
sense that Maldives is at a crossroads, and our timely 
assistance, if keyed to the critical needs mentioned before, 
could make a big difference in the direction this moderate 
Muslim nation decides to take.   As noted above, average 
Maldivians are eager for political reform but unsure how to 
proceed to achieve that change.  Both Government and 
opposition actors have requested U.S. technical assistance in 
strengthening democratic institutions.  The U.S. is, in 
general, favorably perceived by the GORM, the opposition, and 
by average Maldivians.  What we say in Maldives matters, and 
the GORM takes seriously our recommendations.  (For example, 
prison conditions for detainees improved dramatically last 
year after the Ambassador pressed the GORM to allow access to 
legal counsel, exercise, reading materials, etc.)  Moreover, 
because we have no presence in Maldives, we do not believe 
that we run the risk of "over-exposure" or being accused of 
western meddling/cultural imperialism.  There is some 
backlash in more conservative segments of society against 
GORM-proposed reforms to allow female judges and to permit a 
woman to run for President.  Some of our efforts, if 
perceived as furthering those aims, could come in for similar 
criticism on religious grounds.  There is no/no religious 
freedom in Maldives; any effort to introduce discussion of 
reform in that sensitive area would not be well received by 
either the GORM or the local population. 
 
 
 
LUNSTEAD 

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