US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3907

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003907 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2015 
TAGS: ECON, ENRG, EPET, MCAP, MOPS, PGOV, PINR, PTER, PREL, IZ, Energy Sector, Petrolium, Security, Reconstruction 
SUBJECT: IRAQI INFRASTRUCUTURE SNAPSHOT - SEPT. 21, 2005 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DAVID SATTERFIELD FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) 
AND (d) 
 
ENTIRE TEXT SECRET 
 
SUMMARY:  Protecting critical energy infrastructure remains a 
major challenge.  Critical nodes and thousands of miles of 
power and pipe lines present numerous opportunities for 
insurgents and criminals to attack.  In addition, the old and 
decrepit infrastructure found throughout Iraq continuously 
fails and is in need of constant emergency maintenance. 
Embassy is committed to doing all that is possible to assist 
the Iraqis to protect energy infrastructure and increase 
output.  Embassy's Infrastructure Security Task Force meets 
weekly and has drafted an action plan that will be presented 
to the Iraqi Transitional Government's National Energy 
Committee, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi 
(septel.)  Below is a snapshot of the infrastructure security 
picture as of September 21.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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ELECTRICITY 
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--  For the 24 hours ending at midnight September 20, the 
peak electrical output was 4923 MW.  This allowed the 
delivery of electricity to Baghdad for 14 hours, to Basra for 
17, and for a national average of 15.  This is an increase 
from the previous day and is the result of thermal generation 
units being brought back on line after a period of scheduled 
maintenance. 
 
--  Sabotage has continued. On September 20, 13 electrical 
towers on the Bayji to Baghdad West line collapsed for still 
undetermined reasons and the fallen equipment was found 
vandalized.  Rapid repair capability has been hindered by 
credible death threats against power company workers.  Two 
weeks ago, three workers from the Ministry of Electricity 
(MoE) were murdered for fixing downed power lines and others 
have been threatened. Repairs are estimated to take six 
weeks.  In addition, the redundant Bayji to Baghdad East line 
was interdicted today (Sept. 21) eliminating redundancy and 
1,000 MW of power, which will affect approximately 100,000 
homes in the Baghdad area. 
 
--  Although the MoE continues to replace towers as they are 
damaged, the country,s spare parts stocks continue to run 
low.  There are approximately only 10 towers remaining in 
stock with materials to replace four more. IRMO and PCO are 
working to help expedite replenishments for the MoE,s spare 
tower stocks. 
 
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OIL 
--- 
 
--  Oil production in the South has been stable and protected 
with exports averaging 1.6 million barrels per day over the 
past two weeks.  Production at the Basra refinery is close to 
90 percent and exports continue without incident. 
 
--  Oil production in the North and Central regions remain 
vulnerable to attacks.  Interdictions have reached 
unprecedented levels and are keeping repair crews at work 
trying to keep oil flowing throughout Iraq. 
 
--  In the North, the Bayji refinery has been shut down since 
September 16 due to lack of oil flow from the Kirkuk fields, 
with two of three pipelines to the refinery down (the 26 inch 
line came up on Sept. 21.)  The two downed lines are the 
result of leaks and corrosion, not attacks.   Exports from 
Kirkuk halted August 27 and are not expected to resume before 
October 1, with the goal of resuming exports to Turkey 
(previously peaked at about 150k bbl/dy) and increasing flow 
to 500k bbl/day as soon as possible. 
 
--  In the Central region, the Doura refinery in Baghdad is 
operating at 50 percent due to a reduced flow of oil 
resulting from pipeline interdictions.  Credible death 
threats have neutralized the rapid repair capability of these 
lines, thereby leading to critically low stocks of fuel 
throughout the country. 
 
--  Nationwide, fifteen pipeline sites are currently under 
repair.  Although tanker trucks are being used to deliver oil 
to refineries, these supplies barely keep pace with demand 
for petroleum products. 
 
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SECURITY POSTURE 
---------------- 
 
-- Approximately 10 battalions of Coalition Forces (CF) and 
Iraqi Army (IA), combined with Electrical Protection Security 
Service (EPSS) and Oil Protection Forces (OPF) are currently 
involved in patrolling or guarding Iraq,s 12,000 miles of 
linear infrastructure (powerlines and pipelines) and critical 
nodes. 
 
--  In addition, four units of newly raised Security 
Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) will be fully trained by 
October 15 and deployed to guard linear infrastructure mainly 
in the Baghdad-Bayji-Kirkuk corridors. The Ministry of 
Defense is also training additional battalions, with four 
more expected to be on line by December 2005. 
 
--  Additionally, regular IA and CF units are patrolling 
critical infrastructure corridors, while  Ministry of Oil and 
MoE protection forces stand guard over critical nodal 
facilities such as transmission hubs, refineries, and power 
plants. 
 
-- EPSS personnel currently guard the Dibis, Mulla, Abdulla 
and Taza powerplants. 
 
-- The Iraqi Army currently guards the 400 KV powerlines 
located between Kirkuk and Bayji, with the exception of the 
power line located at the Tigris River crossing which are 
guarded by SIBs. 
 
-- SIBs currently guard oil pipelines between Kirkuk and 
Bayji, power lines between Bayji and Tikrit, and protect oil 
pipelines in the Samarra region. 
Satterfield