US embassy cable - 05SOFIA1639

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001639 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2015 
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, IZ, BU, NATO, Bulgaria-Iraqi Freedom 
SUBJECT: BULGARIANS REACT TO IRAQ FOLLOW-ON MISSION 
PROPOSALS 
 
Classified By: DCM Jeffrey Levine for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  A Washington engagement team presented 
Bulgarian security officials September 21 with three possible 
follow-on missions in Iraq. The expert-level Bulgarian 
interagency group was receptive and positive, but repeatedly 
noted the difficult political decision that awaits the 
government. The group also outlined its understanding of the 
most important criteria affecting the decision and reaffirmed 
Bulgaria's commitment to remain engaged in Iraq. Earlier in 
the day, Bulgarian CHOD General Kolev told the team he would 
officially ask the government to extend the current Mission 
until March 2006.  Post will follow-up with government 
leaders early next week.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) The Bulgarian interagency group was led by MFA 
Director for International Security Plamen Bonchev and 
consisted of representatives of the MFA, MOD, General Staff, 
Presidency and Prime Minister's Office. According to Bonchev, 
the criteria most affecting the ultimate decision will be: 
 
The Mission (i.e. a "non-combat" mission is preferred) 
The risk faced by soldiers 
The number of soldiers required to complete the mission 
Public Acceptance of the mission (i.e. NATO Mission more 
acceptable) 
 
3. (C) Valentin Radomirski, security advisor to the Prime 
Minister, explained that Bulgaria was seeking "an option to 
show that we are a solid partner" while causing as few 
political problems as possible.  He feared a Parliamentary 
struggle regarding the follow-on mission would divert 
attention from urgent legislation required for EU membership. 
He also raised the high number of Bulgarian casualties in 
Iraq and said that any "combat-like" mission will give 
government critics, the ultra-nationalist Ataka party in 
particular, ammunition to undermine the three-party 
government coalition. 
 
4. (C) In a separate meeting with CHOD Kolev prior to the 
team's presentation, Kolev said he would ask the government 
to delay withdrawing the Bulgarian contingent for three 
months. A morning newspaper headline reported that the 
General's action was requested by the United States.  The GOB 
team stressed the likelihood that Bulgaria would meet the 
December 31 withdrawal deadline mandated by Parliament. 
While ruling out the extension of this mission beyond 
December 31, they also ruled out an early withdrawal stating, 
"There will be no repeat of the Spanish model" and that 
leaving the coalition "was not an option."  DCM and other 
members of the U.S. team noted that an extension of the 
Bulgarian contingent would be welcome, but it was not the 
reason for the briefing. 
 
 
MEK MISSION AT CAMP ASHRAF 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The Bulgarian working group responded to the MEK 
mission with questions and concern.  They were specifically 
interested in the risks, the internal dynamics of the refugee 
population in the camp and the security situation outside the 
camp.  The contact team noted that of the three missions, the 
MEK mission was the lowest risk and stressed the humanitarian 
nature of the operation and its scalability. The group was 
concerned both by the appearance of the mission (i.e. still 
providing a security force) and public response to Bulgarians 
guarding a refugee camp maintained for a former Iranian 
insurgency group. 
 
NTM-I FORCE PROTECTION MISSION 
------------------------------ 
 
6. (C) While agreeing that the NTM-I force protection mission 
was potentially more dangerous than the MEK mission, the NATO 
flag had appeal.  The Bulgarians noted their current 
participation in the training mission (one trainer presently 
participating, four more on the horizon) and said this would 
continue. 
 
MNSTC-I TRAINING MISSION 
------------------------ 
 
7. (C) The Bulgarians were interested in the small numbers of 
troops that this mission required, but were unfamiliar with 
the risks associated with accompanying Iraqi security forces 
on operations.  The contact team also described options for 
Bulgarians to train Iraqi headquarters units, which would not 
involved accompanying Iraqi units into the field. 
 
8. (C) The Bulgarians specifically asked about possible 
training missions in the area they currently occupy.  Bonchev 
had previously noted to DCM their desire for a follow-on 
mission that would allow them to benefit from their contacts 
and experience in Diwaniya Province. 
 
9. (C) Comment: The day's discussions highlighted the 
delicate situation facing the new Socialist-led government. 
There is no easy way to reconcile campaign commitments and 
Parliamentary mandates with their desire to continue as a 
credible coalition partner. The Bulgarians appeared 
apologetic about their dilemma and noted the difficulty they 
will have in making a fast decision. Members of their group 
will be reporting back to their respective political leaders 
immediately - although today begins a four-day holiday.  Post 
will follow up with decision makers early next week. 
BEYRLE