US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2565

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002565 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, AF, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: MOD STRATEGY FOR MOVING 
FORWARD WITH ISAF STAGE III DEPLOYMENT 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Chat Blakeman; 
reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: According to Lo Casteleijn (Director, General 
Policy Affairs, MOD), the Dutch government is expected to 
make a positive decision by the end of October to deploy 
1,000 - 1,2000 troops to Uruzghan province in Afghanistan in 
support of ISAF Stage III.  Casteleijn hoped that 
parliamentary approval of the decision would follow a few 
weeks later, but noted that prior fulfillment of certain 
"pre-conditions" would help obtain broad support in 
parliament, especially given concerns recently raised by the 
opposition Labor party.  Such pre-conditions include securing 
U.S. intelligence and logistics support, establishing a PRT 
partnership with Australia, and cost-sharing to renovate 
Kandahar airport.  The Dutch also are considering an 
intensive security review of security conditions in and 
around Kandahar.  Casteleijn suggested that a pitch by the 
USG might help convince Australia to team with the 
Netherlands in Uruzghan.  End summary. 
 
ISAF Stage III 
-------------- 
 
2. (C) In a meeting with Charge on September 15, Casteleijn 
outlined Dutch participation plans for ISAF Stage III in 
Uruzghan province.  He said the Dutch are well aware of the 
challenges posed by the decision to deploy in Uruzghan, a 
mountainous region "teeming with Taliban," and see the 
deployment as a "true test" of Dutch forces.  Casteleijn 
added that the security situation to the south along the 
border with Pakistan was worrisome, and the subject of 
intensive review. 
 
3. (C) Nevertheless, the Dutch government is leaning toward 
deploying to Uruzghan by May 2006.  Casteleijn expected a 
Dutch government decision in favor of the deployment would be 
announced by the end of October, followed by parliamentary 
debate.  He suggested parliamentary approval of the 
deployment could follow after one or two weeks, but added 
this was not an assured outcome.  The recent surge in polls 
by the opposition Labor Party (PvdA), he noted, might make it 
more eager to engage in a contentious debate on this issue as 
it looks to the national elections in 2007.  As in every 
military debate in parliament since the Srebrenica disaster, 
he noted, a key question in parliament will be whether or not 
the Dutch government has fully met the post-Srebrenica 
"conditions" set to ensure that Dutch troops are properly 
deployed and protected. 
 
U.S. Support 
------------ 
 
4. (C) Anticipating a vigorous parliamentary debate, 
Casteleijn said several factors should be considered 
"pre-conditions" to Dutch deployment to Uruzghan in ISAF 
Stage III.  One of the pre-set list of conditions following 
Srebrenica involves coordination with a greater power. 
Casteleijn noted that a guarantee of U.S. support -- through 
the provision of intelligence or logistics and transport -- 
would help meet this condition and could be useful in swaying 
skeptical members of Parliament. 
 
Partnering with Australia 
------------------------- 
 
5. (C) A second deployment "pre-condition" is finding an 
operational partner for the Dutch in the field.  Casteleijn 
confirmed that the Dutch are still actively engaged with 
Australia on this issue.  He explained that Parliament will 
limit the number of personnel for the PRT deployment to 1000, 
ramping up to 1200 once the Dutch assume the rotating 
regional command in Kandahar in November 2006.  Casteleijn 
said that this would not be sufficient to handle the Stage 
III PRT.  Australian provision of an additional 200-300 
soldiers, he said, would bring the PRT manpower level up to 
an acceptable number, and should also satisfy the concerns of 
Dutch parliamentarians.  An Australian partnership made sense 
for a number of reasons; Australian special forces, for 
example, are familiar with the region and have experience 
working closely with the UK, Canada, and the United States. 
 
6. (C) Casteleijn added that the Dutch will seek to continue 
their discussions with the Australians on the margins of the 
UNGA, and also have asked NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer to weigh 
in in favor of a Dutch-Australian Uruzghan partnership. 
Casteleijn suggested a USG pitch to the Australians would be 
helpful. 
 
Cost-Sharing for Kandahar Airport 
--------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Casteleijn said that the cost of repairing the runway 
at Kandahar airport has become a third "almost contentious" 
issue influencing the Uruzghan deployment.  Dutch F-16s out 
of Kandahar will support all PRTs involved in Stage III.  The 
Dutch believe that the cost of renovating the airport should 
not fall disproportionately upon themselves and the UK, 
Casteleijn said.  He suggested some form of cost-sharing or 
use of NATO common funds be employed to renovate the airport. 
 
8. (C) Casteleijn added that the Dutch were also looking into 
the possibility of transport assistance (C-130s) from the 
Canadians and Belgians.  (Note: The MOD announced September 
20 plans to buy two C-130s  and five Chinook helicopters from 
the USG.  The first C-130 will be operational at the end of 
2006; the second in 2007.  End note.) 
 
BLAKEMAN