US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3894

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003894 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/5015 
TAGS: IZ, KNNP, PGOV, PREL, IAEA 
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) PHYSICAL 
INVENTORY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF THE TUWAITHA NUCLEAR 
MATERIALS STORAGE COMPLEX 
 
REF: A. STATE 151568 
     B. STATE 167787 
 
Classified By: Acting Counselor for Political-Military Affairs Evan G. 
Reade for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (U)  An IAEA Safeguards team out of Vienna conducted 
their required safeguard physical inventory verification of 
the Tuwaitha nuclear materials storage facility from 17-18 
September, in coordination with Iraqi Ministry of Science and 
Technology officials and scientists. The team consisted of 
five inspectors from the IAEA Department of Safeguards, 
accompanied by Alexander Riedy, Technology Integration 
Manager for the Nuclear Science and Technology Division of 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
 
2.  (U)  As directed by reftels, PolMilOff coordinated with 
MNF-I Corps Chemical Officers, UNAMI officials and MNF-I 
Liaison Officers to UNAMI to ensure that all security, 
transport and miscellaneous exigencies were taken care of. 
PolMilOff accompanied the inspection team and Mr. Riedy to 
the Tuwaitha Storage Complex to ensure that any unforeseen 
issues could be resolved. Poor planning by Iraqi officials 
from the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) made 
coordination difficult, especially because they were not 
prepared for the visit. 
 
3.  (C)  Upon arrival at the storage facility, PolMilOff and 
the IAEA delegation discovered that the Iraqi government had 
placed 12-foot high concrete barriers around the two storage 
facilities, such that no one could enter. It was apparent 
that the Iraqi government had not properly maintained the 
facility, and had made no preparations for the IAEA 
inspection. Their failure to have machinery available to move 
the concrete barriers was a delay to the inspection. 
Additionally, their lack of upkeep of the facility was shown 
because several of the locks for the storage facility doors 
were rusted shut.  MNF-I assets provided the generator, which 
powered lights still within the facility, because the Iraqis 
claimed that they had no resources for electricity to the 
site. 
 
4.  (C)  In addition to verifying the inventory located at 
Location C, another goal of the inspection was to make 
progress toward ultimately transitioning control of the 
Tuwaitha storage facility to Iraqi officials.  The Iraqi MoST 
delegation of 7 persons included personnel from the National 
Monitoring Directorate and the Hazardous Materials 
Directorate, as well as a photographer with a video camera. 
The seven gentlemen from MoST did very little in the way of 
interacting with the team, predominantly sitting off to the 
side in the shade and smoking cigarettes. At one point they 
decided to assist the IAEA team, but disregarded all safety 
precautions and did not dress in protective clothing.  At the 
end of the inspection the head IAEA representative 
purposefully reprimanded the head of the MoST team for the 
general state of disrepair of the facility, as well for the 
unwillingness of the Iraqi officials to take part in the 
inspection. The head of the Iraqi MoST team protested that 
the general state of disrepair was not his fault as he had 
pushed for funding, but none had been received. 
 
5.  (U)  The mission was a success despite the lack of 
assistance from the Iraqi MoST team, and the IAEA team was 
able to conduct their verification inspection, replace the 
seals to the facility and collect sufficient information for 
their mandatory report about the state of Iraq,s nuclear 
material in storage at the Tuwaitha storage facility. 
Satterfield