US embassy cable - 05PARIS6391

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U.S. PROPOSALS TO ENABLE CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA BY THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP - FRENCH ONBOARD

Identifier: 05PARIS6391
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS6391 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-09-20 11:56:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: KNNP PREL PARM Non
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006391 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T (TIMBIE), P, NP, EUR, EUR/WE, NEA/SA, DOE FOR 
R. GOOREVICH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2010 
TAGS: KNNP, PREL, PARM, Non-Proliferation 
SUBJECT: U.S. PROPOSALS TO ENABLE CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION 
WITH INDIA BY THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP - FRENCH ONBOARD 
 
REF: SECSTATE 166864 
 
Classified By: Economic Affairs Minister Counselor Thomas J. White for 
reasons 1.4, B & D 
 
1. (C)  The French govenment supports the U.S. initiative to 
achieve civilian nuclear cooperation with India.  In that 
regard, Foreign Ministry officials urge fastidious 
cooperation with the U.S. in advance of the upcoming Nuclear 
Suppliers Group meeting to be in the best position to address 
concerns of several likely skeptical country members.  They 
could not be more emphatic that the more India commits to, 
the better the result in the coming NSG meeting.  In that 
regard, the GOF will pressure India and it hopes the U.S. 
will do so, too.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
France has a clear public stance in favor 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  On September 16, Economic Minister Counselor and 
ESTH Counselor separately presented points contained reftel 
to Philippe Carre, Director, Security and Disarmament 
Strategic Affairs (A/S equivalent) and Hugues de 
Longevialles, Deputy Director, Disarmament Division and 
Nicholas Roche, NSG expert in the same division.  While Mr. 
Carre has yet to respond, de Longevialles and Roche 
highlighted French government support for the U.S. 
initiative.  They commented that the GOF had publicly 
expressed this position during the visit to France earlier in 
the week by Indian PM Singh (see Paris 6342). 
 
3.  (U)  Comment: The Foreign Ministry website 
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr contains the Chirac/Singh Joint 
Declaration in French.  In part, it states that France 
recognizes "the necessity" of full international cooperation 
with India in the field of civilian nuclear energy.  To 
achieve this, France will engage other member countries of 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group.  The Joint Statement also noted 
that France and India plan to conclude a bilateral agreement 
in the civilian nuclear field.  End Comment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
Building a clear, precise strategy; India needs to be 
"pressured" 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
4.  (C)  De Longevialles and Roche stressed that France was 
"highly supportive" of the U.S. initiative and that the key 
next step would be the next meeting of the NSG consultative 
group.  They said that the U.S. and France would need to work 
very closely to prepare for the meeting as "there may be 
concerns and opposition from some partners."  Germany, for 
example, may have questions, they opined.  Other non-nuclear 
countries within Europe may object and the French want to 
avoid "a deadlock" in the NSG over India.  The strategy of 
those favoring bringing India into nuclear cooperation will 
need to argue with precision India's nuclear plans.   A joint 
U.S.-French strategy must demonstrate to all NSG members that 
the initiative will "add value" to the NSG's underlying goal 
of nuclear disarmament.  "Our (U.S. and French) work must 
show that civilian cooperation will negatively impact Indian 
nuclear weapons efforts." 
 
5.  (C)  In particular, Indian steps to separate civilian and 
defense nuclear facilities will be critical.  It will not be 
enough for India to simply claim that certain facilities will 
be used for civilian purposes and others for defense.  The 
Indians must develop "convincing arrangements" to assure 
these facilities are indeed separate, and irreversibly so, 
said the French officials.  Moreover, the sooner they do this 
the better, said Roche.  The U.S. needs to apply pressure on 
India, suggested de Longevialles and Roche.  They understand 
that U/S Burns is planning a visit to India in order to 
engage the Indians.  This visit, they suggested, can help 
convince the Indians to make their nuclear commitments "fully 
credible."  The French independently plan to apply pressure 
to the Indians. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
U.S./France must speak in the same language... 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
6.  (C) De Longevialles and Roche claimed that the U.S. 
statement did not mention "a moratorium by the Indians on 
creating fissile material."  This, they claimed, will be 
another key issue of debate within the NSG.  Reviewing the 
non-paper contained reftel, the officials argued that the 
statement that the Indians "support the conclusion of the 
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty" will not be sufficient. 
Cutting off fissile material production, they claimed would 
serve to put a cap on India's military program.  They 
mentioned that in bilateral talks with India, the French have 
urged the Indians to cease fissile material production. 
 
7.  (C)  French interlocutors also suggested that in the 
U.S.-French common approach the two countries be clear 
regarding definitional terms: They mentioned that the phrase 
"full civil nuclear cooperation" is unclear.  The French do 
not/not envisage at this time sharing with the Indians 
certain sensitive fuel cycle technology, e.g., that 
associated with separation and reprocessing, and would make 
that clear to French nuclear suppliers and operators.  De 
Longevialles and Roche - talking to each other - mentioned 
that another sensitive area of concern to the French would 
likely involve heavy water technologies. 
 
---------------------- 
Study team to the U.S. 
---------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Following the India topic, de Longevialles took the 
occasion to note that the Ministry planned to send 
instructions to the French Embassy in Washington in the 
coming days regarding a proposed visit to Washington of a 
French team focused on nuclear, chemical, and biological 
disarmament issues in the November/December timeframe. 
 
STAPLETON 

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