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| Identifier: | 05PARIS6391 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05PARIS6391 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Paris |
| Created: | 2005-09-20 11:56:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | KNNP PREL PARM Non |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006391 SIPDIS STATE FOR T (TIMBIE), P, NP, EUR, EUR/WE, NEA/SA, DOE FOR R. GOOREVICH E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2010 TAGS: KNNP, PREL, PARM, Non-Proliferation SUBJECT: U.S. PROPOSALS TO ENABLE CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA BY THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP - FRENCH ONBOARD REF: SECSTATE 166864 Classified By: Economic Affairs Minister Counselor Thomas J. White for reasons 1.4, B & D 1. (C) The French govenment supports the U.S. initiative to achieve civilian nuclear cooperation with India. In that regard, Foreign Ministry officials urge fastidious cooperation with the U.S. in advance of the upcoming Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting to be in the best position to address concerns of several likely skeptical country members. They could not be more emphatic that the more India commits to, the better the result in the coming NSG meeting. In that regard, the GOF will pressure India and it hopes the U.S. will do so, too. End Summary. ----------------------------------------- France has a clear public stance in favor ----------------------------------------- 2. (C) On September 16, Economic Minister Counselor and ESTH Counselor separately presented points contained reftel to Philippe Carre, Director, Security and Disarmament Strategic Affairs (A/S equivalent) and Hugues de Longevialles, Deputy Director, Disarmament Division and Nicholas Roche, NSG expert in the same division. While Mr. Carre has yet to respond, de Longevialles and Roche highlighted French government support for the U.S. initiative. They commented that the GOF had publicly expressed this position during the visit to France earlier in the week by Indian PM Singh (see Paris 6342). 3. (U) Comment: The Foreign Ministry website www.diplomatie.gouv.fr contains the Chirac/Singh Joint Declaration in French. In part, it states that France recognizes "the necessity" of full international cooperation with India in the field of civilian nuclear energy. To achieve this, France will engage other member countries of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Joint Statement also noted that France and India plan to conclude a bilateral agreement in the civilian nuclear field. End Comment. --------------------------------------------- ---------------- Building a clear, precise strategy; India needs to be "pressured" --------------------------------------------- ---------------- 4. (C) De Longevialles and Roche stressed that France was "highly supportive" of the U.S. initiative and that the key next step would be the next meeting of the NSG consultative group. They said that the U.S. and France would need to work very closely to prepare for the meeting as "there may be concerns and opposition from some partners." Germany, for example, may have questions, they opined. Other non-nuclear countries within Europe may object and the French want to avoid "a deadlock" in the NSG over India. The strategy of those favoring bringing India into nuclear cooperation will need to argue with precision India's nuclear plans. A joint U.S.-French strategy must demonstrate to all NSG members that the initiative will "add value" to the NSG's underlying goal of nuclear disarmament. "Our (U.S. and French) work must show that civilian cooperation will negatively impact Indian nuclear weapons efforts." 5. (C) In particular, Indian steps to separate civilian and defense nuclear facilities will be critical. It will not be enough for India to simply claim that certain facilities will be used for civilian purposes and others for defense. The Indians must develop "convincing arrangements" to assure these facilities are indeed separate, and irreversibly so, said the French officials. Moreover, the sooner they do this the better, said Roche. The U.S. needs to apply pressure on India, suggested de Longevialles and Roche. They understand that U/S Burns is planning a visit to India in order to engage the Indians. This visit, they suggested, can help convince the Indians to make their nuclear commitments "fully credible." The French independently plan to apply pressure to the Indians. --------------------------------------------- - U.S./France must speak in the same language... --------------------------------------------- - 6. (C) De Longevialles and Roche claimed that the U.S. statement did not mention "a moratorium by the Indians on creating fissile material." This, they claimed, will be another key issue of debate within the NSG. Reviewing the non-paper contained reftel, the officials argued that the statement that the Indians "support the conclusion of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty" will not be sufficient. Cutting off fissile material production, they claimed would serve to put a cap on India's military program. They mentioned that in bilateral talks with India, the French have urged the Indians to cease fissile material production. 7. (C) French interlocutors also suggested that in the U.S.-French common approach the two countries be clear regarding definitional terms: They mentioned that the phrase "full civil nuclear cooperation" is unclear. The French do not/not envisage at this time sharing with the Indians certain sensitive fuel cycle technology, e.g., that associated with separation and reprocessing, and would make that clear to French nuclear suppliers and operators. De Longevialles and Roche - talking to each other - mentioned that another sensitive area of concern to the French would likely involve heavy water technologies. ---------------------- Study team to the U.S. ---------------------- 8. (SBU) Following the India topic, de Longevialles took the occasion to note that the Ministry planned to send instructions to the French Embassy in Washington in the coming days regarding a proposed visit to Washington of a French team focused on nuclear, chemical, and biological disarmament issues in the November/December timeframe. STAPLETON
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