US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3869

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003869 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, IZ, UN, Elections 
SUBJECT: CHARGE MEETS WITH VISITING UN/EAD PIRELLI 
 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DAVID M. SATTERFIELD FOR REASONS 1.4 ( 
b) AND (d). 
 
1. (U) This is an action message.  Please see para 6. 
 
2. (C) Summary.  Charge and UN Electoral Assistance Division 
(EAD) Chief Carina Pirelli agreed during a September 17 
meeting that Iraq's December 15 elections must be seen as 
credible.  Charge advised that the EAD and the IECI must seek 
to address Sunni perceptions of bias, real or imagined, 
through vigorous engagement in educational outreach; 
additional allocation of electoral resources; serious 
consideration of all options, including same-day registration 
and polling; and extensions to the voter and political entity 
registration periods.  Pirelli requested USG assistance in 
pressing UN leadership to allow her to remain longer in 
Baghdad, to grant UN Commissioner-designate LeChevalier a 
security training waiver, and to restore the UN electoral 
staff ceiling to 25 from its current 15 positions.  End 
Summary. 
 
3. (C) Charge and UN EAD Pirelli agreed during a September 17 
meeting that Iraq's December 15 elections will be held to a 
much higher standard of credibility than that of January 
2005.  Pirelli emphasized that no matter the outcome, the 
results of the election will certainly be challenged.  Charge 
agreed but told Pirelli that nonetheless the referendum must 
be credible and transparent.  He said that pre-election 
outreach efforts must target the Sunni areas.  He added that 
Sunni concerns need to be addressed, such as IECI staff 
composition, public education in Sunni areas, and extended 
voter support to provide the Sunnis every possible 
opportunity to participate in the elections. 
 
4. (C) Charge emphasized that the Independent Electoral 
Commission of Iraq (IECI) cannot wait until the last moment 
to request MNF-I assistance and support.  IECI needs to 
develop a good logistics and security plan now.  Similarly, 
Charge stressed that IECI needs to immediately develop a 
detailed budget that stands up to Ministry of Finance 
scrutiny and will allow donor countries to make contributions 
based on accurate numbers.  To further establish the IECI's 
credibility, Charge advised Pirelli that the IECI should look 
expeditiously into the unusually high numbers in the recent 
Kirkuk voter registration update.  Charge urged that UN EAD 
and the IECI be sensitive to Sunni perceptions of bias, real 
or imagined, through additional allocation of electoral 
resources if needed.  He suggested that the IECI should 
seriously consider all options to enfranchise Sunnis, 
including same-day registration and polling and extensions to 
the voter and political entity registration periods.  Similar 
IECI attention, Charge added, needs to go to the Christians 
in western Ninewa who were denied full ability to vote in 
January. 
 
5. (C) In response to Charge's question regarding specific 
USG support, Pirelli stated that the IECI is moving forward 
on work that previously had been languishing.  This includes 
budget preparation and drafting of regulations now that the 
election law is finished.  She said she was able and willing 
to remain in Baghdad until at least October 15 to allow 
overlap with UN IECI Commissioner-designate LeChevalier and 
prevent the IECI from losing momentum.  However, she said the 
UN Secretariat in New York is unwilling to support extension 
of her stay.  She also pointed out that UNAMI has a 90-person 
staff ceiling, with 15 of those positions filled by the 
electoral staff.  The UNAMI ceiling needs to be raised, she 
said, for the electoral staff to return to the same 25 
positions they enjoyed during the January elections. 
Finally, she requested USG backing, if possible, to shorten 
LeChevalier's security training period in Amman so he can 
arrive in Baghdad as soon as possible.  Any loss in training, 
she suggested, could be made up during his first break in 
Amman. 
 
6. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests that Department ask USUN 
to approach the UN Secretariat at an appropriate level to 
stress the need for a sustained high-level EAD presence in 
Iraq up through the December elections.  We should press the 
UN to get LeChevalier here as early as possible or ensure 
that an adequate substitute is in Baghdad in his stead.  We 
defer to our colleagues in New York as to whether the best 
substitute would be Pirelli or someone with comparable 
background in electoral matters.  Our bottom line is that 
there must be a senior UN representative with the appropriate 
skills in Iraq to help ensure the success of the referendum 
and the December elections.  Post also requests that we ask 
the UN Secretariat to increase the current electoral staff 
positions in Iraq from 15 to 25.  Finally, we should continue 
to press for LeChevalier's earliest possible arrival in 
Baghdad. 
Satterfield