US embassy cable - 05PARIS6335

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EUR/RPM DIRECTOR CONSULTATIONS -- FRENCH CONCERNS RE NATO RESPONSE FORCE AND NATO FUNDING; AGREEMENT ON OSCE

Identifier: 05PARIS6335
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS6335 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-09-16 15:53:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MARR PREL MOPS FR NATO OSCE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006335 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2015 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, FR, NATO, OSCE 
SUBJECT: EUR/RPM DIRECTOR CONSULTATIONS -- FRENCH CONCERNS 
RE NATO RESPONSE FORCE AND NATO FUNDING; AGREEMENT ON OSCE 
 
REF: PARIS 6125 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, Reason 1 
.4 B/D 
 
1. (C) Summary: French MFA and MOD NATO experts told EUR/RPM 
Director Jim Warlick that closer cooperation with the U.S. 
was needed in order to resolve issues at NATO before they 
were turned over to the Military Committee.  The French 
welcomed U.S. efforts to expand our transatlantic dialog, as 
expanded on by the EUR/RPM Director.  They expressed 
understanding that NATO was the instrument of choice for the 
U.S., but cautioned that the EU should be viewed as an 
important partner in its own right by the U.S. and not just 
another framework, among others, for discussion.  For better 
or worse, the EU was the framework for its members to reach 
unified decisions.  On NATO transformation goals, the French 
emphasized their continued support for interoperability of 
forces and NATO's crisis response capabilities.  They stated 
that the NATO Response Force (NRF) should handle "high-end" 
operations rather than stabilization and reconstruction. 
Additionally, NATO must not lose sight of the NRF's intended 
purpose and not use it to cover force planning gaps.  The 
Alliance also needs to better integrate costs of operations 
in NATO planning. 
 
2. (C) On OSCE issues, the discussion centered on ways to 
address Russia's role within the organization, with France in 
favor of giving Russia appropriate political gestures in 
recognition of its concerns as a means of increasing Russian 
engagement.  On the potential OSCE chairmanship of 
Kazakhstan, the French shared USG concerns, but said no 
unified position existed among EU members.  End Summary. 
 
The EU and Transatlantic Dialog 
------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) On September 14, EUR/RPM Director Warlick called on 
MFA DAS-equivalent director for NATO issues Francois 
Carrel-Billiard and his MOD counterpart Colonel Antoine 
Creux.  At the beginning of the meeting, A/S-equivalent 
Director for Strategic Affairs Philippe Carre dropped by 
briefly to reiterate his request (made reftel to EUR A/S Dan 
Fried) for closer consultations with the U.S., especially at 
NATO.  Carre noted both sides are not always in agreement, 
but that he looked forward to discussion and resolution of 
issues through early and informal consultations in order to 
avoid difficult debates at the Military Committee.  Carre 
again expressed appreciation for A/S Fried's presentation on 
U.S. efforts to promote a better transatlantic dialog 
(reftel). 
 
4. (C) Carrel-Billiard expressed support for closer 
consultations with the U.S. and noted that all sides needed 
to define issues and priorities before turning to discussions 
on institutional roles.  He cautioned, however, that the EU 
should not be seen as just another optional framework for 
dialog.  France understood that NATO was the instrument of 
choice for the U.S., given our common membership in the 
organization, but we should not lose sight of the EU as a 
major partner.  The EU, he added, provides the single 
framework for sovereign states to share competencies, take 
decisions affecting the internal affairs of member states, 
and reach decisions on Europe. 
 
NATO Transformation and the NRF 
------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) On specific issues, Creux turned to upcoming NATO 
summit planning and transformation goals.  He expressed 
concern over the inadequate state of readiness of some NATO 
members, adding that all members should be prepared to act 
when necessary and ought to develop a full range of 
capabilities.  NATO members need to focus on preparing for 
future crises and not to count on others to operate as ad hoc 
coalitions.  The question is how to help new members to do 
more, he mused.  Carrel-Billiard expanded on Creux's comments 
by saying that, for France, one of NATO's major functions was 
to deploy forces, hence, the importance of interoperability 
efforts.  The NATO Response Force (NRF), he recalled, allowed 
NATO members to act together; it is a means for members to 
cooperate on specific missions.  Carrel-Billiard then 
expressed a French concern that NATO is losing its ability to 
take on "high-end jobs," and that it risks diluting its focus 
through stabilization operations, such as the past proposal 
to use the NRF for election monitoring in Afghanistan. 
Additionally, NATO must not be misperceived as a tool for the 
ready disposition of SACEUR, but rather the latter should be 
prepared to request the NRF only when it is truly needed.  To 
further explain French sensitivities, Carrel-Billiard 
recounted that initial French support for the NRF had been 
achieved with difficulty, as the French feel strongly that 
France must retain national control of its forces.  The 
French President, however, had made the political decision to 
support the NRF.  Any agreement to join a NATO decision to 
use the NRF would require explicit GOF approval.  NATO must 
take care to avoid using the NRF inappropriately to meet 
political agendas not collectively shared, Creux added. 
 
Concerns re Rising Costs, Afghanistan and Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
6. (C) Carrel-Billiard said France is also worried about the 
potential for growth in the number of NATO operations and the 
adverse impact that their higher costs would have on funding 
for transformation and modernization goals.  Additionally, he 
expressed concern that common funding could be viewed as a 
technical fix in cases where there was insufficient force 
generation.  France accepts common funding for support 
functions in Afghanistan, for instance, but cannot readily 
accept major increases in common funds, as this would impose 
an additional financial hardship on those members already 
financing national deployments (France has a significant 
number of such deployments overseas).  NATO must take care to 
better assess the financial implications of common decisions, 
Creux noted. Carrel-Billiard stated that these French 
comments were only intended to highlight the necessity of 
formulating "realistic agendas."  In a related vein, he said 
NATO must be mindful of the potential costs of NATO 
partnerships.  Citing Afghanistan as an example, he said the 
alliance must avoid turning NATO commitments into expensive 
assistance/development programs beyond its scope.  Warlick 
took the opportunity to explain the importance of an expanded 
NATO role in Iraq for our coalition members.  A NATO umbrella 
would prove useful to some as they seek to maintain a 
contribution to coalition efforts in Iraq, he noted.  Neither 
Carrel-Billiard nor Creux voiced any specific reaction. 
 
OSCE and Russia 
--------------- 
 
7. (C)  Warlick met separately with the MFA,s Deputy 
Director for Strategic Affairs Paul Dahan to discuss OSCE 
issues.  The discussion centered on ways to address Russia's 
involvement within the organization.  Dahan said France was 
in favor of giving Russia appropriate political "gestures" in 
recognition of Russian concerns, for instance on election 
monitoring and scales of assessment, but that anything else 
was a nonstarter, given the GOF belief that the OSCE was 
functioning well and that Russian proposals would serve only 
to weaken the organization.  Dahan added that France and 
Russia met twice yearly in working groups to address the OSCE 
under the auspices of the twice-yearly meetings of foreign 
and defense ministers.  On the potential chairmanship of 
Kazakhstan, Dahan said the GOF shared USG concerns, but that 
no unified position existed yet among EU members.  President 
Chirac's planned visit to Kazakhstan in the fall had been 
cancelled as a result of his recent illness.  Dahan expressed 
a hope that the USG would not insist on a highly critical 
reference to Russia's Istanbul commitments during the 
December OSCE ministerial.  The GOF believes it necessary to 
moderate any reference to Istanbul commitments with an 
acknowledgment of progress made. 
 
8. (U) EUR/RPM Director James Warlick did not have the 
opportunity to clear this message. 
 
 
STAPLETON 

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