US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV5716

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GAZA: SECURITY DETERIORATES, PA HESITATES BUT HAMAS CONSOLIDATES

Identifier: 05TELAVIV5716
Wikileaks: View 05TELAVIV5716 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Tel Aviv
Created: 2005-09-16 13:37:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV KPAL ECON EAID KDEM KWBG IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 005716 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KPAL, ECON, EAID, KDEM, KWBG, IS, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT 
SUBJECT: GAZA:  SECURITY DETERIORATES, PA HESITATES BUT 
HAMAS CONSOLIDATES 
 
Classified By: DCM Gene A. Gretz, for Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  A Norwegian diplomat who has covered the 
Gaza Strip for the past two years sees the security situation 
deteriorating even further in the coming months.  He believes 
that a variety of armed groups, including factions within 
Fatah, will continue to seek illicit financial and political 
gains in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal.  Although the 
GON continues to regard Hamas as a terrorist organization and 
remains concerned about the group's long-term objectives, it 
is coming to view Hamas as a potentially stabilizing 
influence in Gaza, at least in the short term.  Hamas members 
holding positions in Gaza municipalities tend to be well 
educated, effective, non-ideological, and uncorrupted, 
according to the Norwegian diplomat, who also remains highly 
skeptical that any amount of foreign assistance will 
significantly alter Gazans' negative opinions of the PA and 
its corrupt representatives.  He said he expects Hamas to 
secure between 30 and 40 percent of the seats in the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in the January 2005 
elections.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) On September 12, Norwegian Diplomat Dr. Jonas Jolle 
met with Econoff to discuss the current situation in the Gaza 
Strip and prospects for any improvement in the economic 
situation there.  As a First Secretary at Norway's 
Representative Office to the Palestinian Authority, Jolle has 
been responsible for covering the Gaza Strip for the past two 
years.  He regularly travels to Gaza and has spent most of 
the last five weeks there reporting on the GOI disengagement. 
 
-------------------------- 
Security:  Downward Spiral 
-------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Jolle, having left Gaza the day before after an 
extended stay, remarked that the security situation is 
deteriorating significantly and that he expects it to get 
worse in the coming months.   He assigned much of the blame 
to factions within Fatah, but also mentioned other groups, 
including some founded by militant Islamists.  According to 
Jolle, the perpetrators of killings, kidnappings, and other 
crimes are more interested in securing a share in the spoils 
of the Israeli departure than in any immediate political 
gains.   As political power is dependent on patronage 
systems, however, those who have gained the most financially 
will be better positioned to wield influence. 
 
4.  (C) Jolle characterized much of the violence and criminal 
activity as unorganized and sometimes random.  He said, for 
example, that those responsible for the recent kidnapping of 
an Italian journalist had initially intended only to set up a 
roadblock to protest the lack of jobs.  When this tactic 
failed to generate any response from the PA, they briefly 
detained the foreign journalist to demonstrate their 
seriousness.  In some instances, according to Jolle, an armed 
group may be comprised of friends and acquaintances who, over 
coffee and a shared water pipe, decide to work together to 
settle an old score or achieve some mutual financial gain, 
after which they quickly disband.  Jolle said he believes 
that the armed groups operating in Gaza know full well that 
the PA is incapable of holding them accountable for their 
acts, particularly when those responsible come from powerful 
families. 
 
5.  (C) Jolle acknowledged, however, that the assassination 
of former Gaza security chief Mousa Arafat was well organized 
and most likely involved larger and long-established groups. 
He said that, according to rumors circulating in Gaza, 
shortly after the attack on his home began, Arafat made 
several phone calls to senior PA officials who either 
declined to speak with him or were otherwise unresponsive to 
his pleas for help.  Jolle asserted that senior PA officials 
probably were not directly involved in the killing, but some 
may have been aware that another attempt on Arafat's life was 
being planned.  Jolle said he had met with Arafat two days 
before his death.  He described Arafat as someone who had 
apparently come to terms with his demotion and did not 
indicate any intention of challenging the PA or any of its 
leaders.  Jolle added that, due to his ruthlessness, Arafat 
had many enemies. 
 
-------------------- 
Hamas to the Rescue? 
-------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Jolle said that, despite its rhetoric and the 
celebratory displays of its gun-toting members, Hamas has had 
a stabilizing influence on the security situation in Gaza. 
Hamas denied involvement in Arafat's assassination and has 
generally refrained from other acts of violence, according to 
Jolle.  While this approach may be only temporary, Jolle 
asserted that Hamas's ability to discipline members who 
deviate from the leadership's instructions has helped 
mitigate the extent of the lawlessness. 
7.  (C) Jolle said he has been impressed by the caliber of 
Hamas members serving in municipal positions in Gaza.  He 
said that Hamas members generally tend to be effective 
bureaucrats.  For example, Hamas members serving the 
municipalities of Beit Hanun and Deir al-Balah are well 
educated, non-ideological, uncorrupted and responsive to the 
needs of their constituencies.  In one instance, according to 
Jolle, newly elected Hamas members immediately impounded and 
then sold municipality vehicles previously given out on the 
basis of personal connections to those in power rather than 
professional need.  Hamas members elected to professional 
associations in Gaza have proven to be competent and 
committed to democratic practices in governing these 
organizations.  Nevertheless, Jolle said he and his 
government are still wary of Hamas's intentions and remain 
uncomfortable attributing anything positive to what they 
still consider to be a terrorist organization. 
 
----------------------- 
Absence of Alternatives 
----------------------- 
 
8.  (C) The challenge, according to Jolle, is how to deal 
with Hamas given its political ascendancy and spreading 
popularity among Palestinians, who increasingly regard it as 
the only real alternative to a corrupt and ineffective PA 
leadership.  He asserted that the occupation was responsible 
for "an ossified political system" in the West Bank and Gaza. 
 In the past decade, Palestinians have grown increasingly 
tired of the same wasteful and corrupt officials.  Abbas has 
not sufficiently altered the status quo to change those 
views.  Jolle identified only two Palestinian leaders as 
representing a "new generation:"  Minister of Interior Dahlan 
and Marwan Barghouti.  He added, however, that Dahlan may not 
be any less corrupt than the others. 
 
9.  (C) Jolle said that Dahlan and others who may wish to 
challenge the current leadership are biding their time, in 
part to avoid a civil war within Fatah.  For example, 
contrary to what most observers would expect of a political 
party, Fatah will not be holding a party conference until 
after the January 2006 PLC elections.  In the meantime, Hamas 
continues to gain supporters, even among non-religious, 
western-educated Palestinians.  He said he expects Hamas to 
secure between 30 and 40 percent of the seats in the PLC, and 
holds out little hope that a viable secular party will emerge 
to challenge Hamas anytime soon.  Despite his favorable 
impressions of several Hamas members  -- including some who 
had stepped down after losing professional association 
elections --  Jolle said Hamas might harbor a "one vote, one 
time" hidden agenda.  It may hope to take control of the PA 
by democratic means but may never cede power thereafter. 
 
----------------- 
Wishful Thinking? 
----------------- 
 
10.  (C) Jolle was skeptical that any near-term improvement 
in the Gazan economy will foster greater support for the PA 
in the January 2006 elections.  He said that the USG, the EU 
and his own government are hoping that international 
assistance flowing into the area will help stabilize the 
situation and create a groundswell of support for Abbas and 
the PA.  Jolle said he is convinced that no matter how much 
money is provided, "you can't buy votes" for the PA.  PA 
officials are discredited, if not despised, and no amount of 
money, foreign aid, or infrastructure projects will change 
that, certainly not by January 2006, he added.  He also 
questioned the PA's ability to absorb and responsibly manage 
a significant increase in foreign assistance. 
 
11.  (C) Jolle characterized the economic situation in Gaza 
as grim.  Citing Gaza's high birthrate, massive unemployment, 
weak government institutions, corruption and lack of security 
that will continue to scare off potential investors, Jolle 
said he is pessimistic about any significant improvement. 
Conditions in Gaza would constitute an almost insurmountable 
challenge for any developing country.  Beyond that, Gaza has 
the additional and unique handicap of not being able to 
control its own borders and operate an airport or seaport. 
Jolle said he doubts that Gaza can achieve the economic 
growth necessary to transform the area into a model for 
anything. 
 
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KURTZER 

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