US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV5705

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IRAN-IAEA: ISRAELI ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION THINKING ON NEXT STEPS

Identifier: 05TELAVIV5705
Wikileaks: View 05TELAVIV5705 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Tel Aviv
Created: 2005-09-16 11:09:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL KNNP AORC TRGY ENRG PARM IR IS GOI EXTERNAL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 005705 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/IPA, NP/RA (ODLUM, KESSLER), EUR/RUS, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KNNP, AORC, TRGY, ENRG, PARM, IR, IS, GOI EXTERNAL 
SUBJECT: IRAN-IAEA: ISRAELI ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 
THINKING ON NEXT STEPS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons: 1.4 (b, d). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (S) Senior Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) 
officials Gideon Frank and Eli Levite told the Ambassador 
September 8 that a renewed international push on Iran, 
including referral to the UN Security Council, is necessary, 
because, based on the response to date of the international 
community and the IAEA, Iran might otherwise get away with 
its nuclear weapons program.  Frank and Levite said that 
referring Iran to the UNSC will only be effective if (a) Iran 
and the IAEA are obligated to take well-defined interim steps 
while the UNSC deliberates Iran's case; and (b) the UNSC 
President's decision -- reflecting the UNSC's view -- 
incorporates both clear, mandated steps that Iran must take 
by dates certain, and clear consequences for failure.  The 
Israelis intend to continue aggressive lobbying of Russia to 
exert more pressure on Iran.  Frank and Levite praised 
continued U.S.-Israel cooperation on Iran and the IAEA, and 
in countering nuclear terrorism, noting the recent successful 
visit of a DOE delegation to exchange information on the 
results of a hypothetical detonation of a radiological device 
in Israel (septel).  Frank and Levite said that cooperation 
has made it possible for the U.S. and Israel to avoid 
problems before they arise, and cited as an example 
previously diverging views on U.S. estimates of Iran's 
ability to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------- 
IAEC WELCOMES NEW PUSH ON IRAN ... 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (S) IAEC Principal Deputy Director General (Policy) Eli 
Levite told the Ambassador September 8 that his late August 
meetings in Washington gave him the impression that USG 
concern that the Iranians might get away with stalling is 
prompting the USG to make a new push for International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) action on Iran.  Levite was heartened by 
expectations that IAEA Director General ElBaradei's upcoming 
report on Iran -- in conjunction with the combined efforts of 
the EU3 and USG -- may result in Iran being referred to the 
UN Security Council. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
ADVISES HOW TO MAKE REFERRAL TO UNSC EFFECTIVE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3. (S) IAEC Director General Gideon Frank said he understands 
that a referral to the UNSC may not necessarily entail 
punishment for Iran, but might only start a new track of 
diplomacy with no guaranteed outcome.  Frank said a referral 
that merely opens up discussions with no concrete 
requirements might dispel the Iranians' anxiety and let the 
IAEA off the hook.  Iran could then use the time necessary 
for the UNSC to reach a common position on Iran to convert 
enough UF-6 to yield significant quantities of feed for the 
enrichment process.  He recommended two measures to ensure 
that this does not happen: 
 
(a) have the referral accompanied by a Board of Governors 
(BOG) resolution that requires Iran and the IAEA to take 
well-defined interim actions while the UNSC is deliberating 
Iran's case.  The BOG resolution needs to make it clear that 
Iran has "failed to yield reassuring answers to a variety of 
questions" to date, and must also make it clear to the 
Iranians what they must do to address uncertainties that have 
persisted over the last two and a half years. 
 
(b) coordinate with the UNSC President so that his decision 
-- reflecting the UNSC's view -- makes it clear what Iran has 
to do by a date certain in order to avoid punishment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
NEXT STEPS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE IN THE UN AND AT THE IAEA 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
4. (S) Frank observed that the next milestone will be Iranian 
President Ahmadinejad's appearance before the UNSC the week 
of September 12.  Frank said that the Israeli UN mission will 
likely be preoccupied with high-level visits and focused on 
other issues, and would probably find it difficult to 
respond.  He said he is trying to notify "the right people" 
within the MFA and Prime Minister's office so that the 
appropriate response can be delivered quickly.  Frank praised 
FM Silvan Shalom's recent discussions on the Iran-IAEA issue 
with the Spanish and French foreign ministers, saying Shalom 
made all the right points.  The Ambassador advised that PM 
Sharon should try to connect the Iran nuclear threat issue 
with Israeli disengagement in his speech at the UNGA by 
arguing that the risk Israel took for peace through 
disengagement can only pay off if the heightened existential 
threat posed by Iran's nuclear program is mitigated.  In 
effect, Sharon would be saying, "I have paid my dues, and yet 
I still face an over-the-horizon threat in the form of Iran's 
nuclear ambitions." 
 
5. (S) Regarding IAEA Director General ElBaradei's 
anticipated report on Iran -- which the Israelis understand 
may be released on September 14 -- Frank said Israel wants to 
ensure that the report is accompanied by an explanation of 
what it contains.  If the Israelis get what they want, 
readers will be led "through a process of guided reading" to 
certain conclusions that ElBaradei appears reluctant to draw, 
based on his reports to date.  Frank said the IAEA says it is 
"not in a position to be able to write about undeclared 
activities."  Frank termed "regrettable" the IAEA's inability 
to hold Iran accountable, citing its silence in reaction to 
Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Rohani's recent statement 
that whatever activity Iran had recently suspended, it did so 
because Iran had no need for the activity.  Frank said he was 
pleased that the French expressed outrage, but lamented that 
there should have been more outrage from the international 
community, observing that the French reaction never made the 
press. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
NEXT STEPS IN ISRAEL'S DIALOGUE WITH THE RUSSIANS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
6. (S) Levite said PM Sharon is definitely meeting with Putin 
on the margins of the UNGA.  Frank will meet with the 
Russians in Vienna during an upcoming IAEA conference there. 
Frank said he is also trying to arrange a meeting between the 
Israeli and Russian National Security Councils as soon as 
possible, possibly on September 25 in Moscow.  Israel's goal, 
he clarified, is to "hit every single guy in their system." 
The Ambassador observed that Putin seems curious about what 
he will be able to achieve as G-8 President when Russia 
assumes the presidency.  This gives the U.S., Israel and 
other like-minded countries the opportunity to say, "If you 
want to be a player in the Middle East, you need to be 
responsible in your relations with Iran."  Levite wondered 
aloud what Russia's motives are in its relations with Iran. 
The Ambassador suggested that much of what Russia does with 
Iran has to do with recovering old financial debts that 
extend back to Soviet relations with the Middle East. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
ISRAEL GRATEFUL FOR COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR ISSUES 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
7. (S) Frank assessed U.S.-Israel cooperation on dealing with 
Iran's nuclear program -- in capitals and in Vienna -- as 
very good and expressed his hope that it would remain that 
way.  The Ambassador agreed, observing that such cooperation 
allowed the U.S. and Israel to deal with differences before 
they could turn into problems.  One example was how the two 
sides treated the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on how 
long it would take Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability.  Levite said that based on inquiries in 
Washington, the GOI now assesses that Iran is currently five 
years away from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, but 
that beyond that, there are many uncertainties. 
 
8. (S) Acknowledging difficulty in assessing the situation in 
Iran, Levite asked the Ambassador what the U.S would do to 
try to understand Iran better if it were in Israel's 
situation.  The Ambassador replied that Israel might consider 
looking to the Gulf States -- particularly the United Arab 
Emirates -- as barometers for assessing Iran.  Unlike Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia, their domestic situations allow their 
governments to react to developments in Iran that can provide 
useful indicators.  The Ambassador observed that the USG 
watches Iran from the Gulf, and that Israel's assets there 
are reliable as well. 
 
9. (C) Levite praised U.S.-Israel cooperation on other 
nuclear-related projects, noting a successful visit by a DOE 
delegation in early September (septel) to exchange 
information on the results of a hypothetical detonation of a 
radiological device in Tel Aviv.  He expressed his hope that 
the level and content of the cooperation would continue. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
KURTZER 

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