US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK5965

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SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: AUG 29-31 VISIT OF STAFFDEL JANUZZI

Identifier: 05BANGKOK5965
Wikileaks: View 05BANGKOK5965 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bangkok
Created: 2005-09-16 09:18:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL PTER KPAO TH Southern Thailand Emergency Decree
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 005965 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, INR, S/CT, H 
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO), JICPAC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, KPAO, TH, Southern Thailand, Emergency Decree 
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: AUG 29-31 VISIT OF STAFFDEL 
JANUZZI 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 2351 
     B. 04 BANGKOK 6619 
 
Classified By: CDA Alexander A. Arvizu. Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY: From August 29-31 Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee professional staff member Frank Januzzi visited 
Thailand's southernmost Muslim majority provinces for a 
follow-up assessment of the violence affecting the region. 
The recently announced Emergency Decree -- which has not yet 
had a noticeable impact -- is looked at with fear and 
suspicion by local Muslims but appears to be welcomed by 
Buddhist-Thais.  Januzzi and poloffs heard mixed assessments 
from a wide range of interlocutors on the likelihood of 
success of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), 
criticism of the Thaksin administrations handling of the 
crisis, continued concern over inter-communal relations and 
suspicion of U.S. intentions.  Most local observers indicated 
that the situation appeared to have stabilized to a degree, 
providing space for reconciliation efforts.  However, the 
series of bombings on September 1, and the flight of 131 
local Muslims to Malaysia, demonstrates that the level of 
violence remains high and the security situation is 
uncertain. END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  From August 29-31 Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
professional staff member Frank Januzzi, accompanied by 
Embassy Bangkok poloffs, visited Narathiwat, Pattani and 
Songkhla provinces to assess the ongoing situation in 
Thailand's far South.  Januzzi met local Islamic leaders, 
politicians, academics, business leaders and government 
officials and participated in roundtable discussions with 
professors and students at Prince of Songkhla University in 
Pattani.  Januzzi also met with former Foreign Minister Dr. 
Surin Pitsuwan -- currently a Democrat Party MP and NRC 
member -- in Bangkok. 
 
EMERGENCY DECREE HAS FEW LOCAL SUPPORTERS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  The newly enacted Emergency Decree was a central 
topic of conversation during many of our discussions.  As of 
yet the Decree had not had a noticeable impact on the ground 
in the South.  However, many of our interlocutors expressed 
concern that the new law would worsen the situation and 
conflict with the work of the NRC.  Abdulroman Abdulsamad, 
Chairman of the Narathiwat Islamic Committee, said most 
Muslims disagreed with the Emergency Decree.  Democrat Party 
(DP) MP Cheaming Totayong from Narathiwat's Ruso district 
agreed, opining that the Decree could lead to government 
abuses both in the South and nationwide.  The harshest 
criticism was heard from Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, who called the 
Emergency Decree the "epitome of divisiveness," and said that 
Muslims saw the law as a measure designed to "suppress" them. 
 
 
4.  (C)  Predictably, we heard support for the Decree from 
members of the Buddhist/Sino-Thai communities and from 
government officials.  Pattani Vice Governor for Security 
Chanvit Vasayangkura claimed the Decree was an improvement on 
Martial Law and blamed the media for exaggerating the new 
law's potential impact.  Wirawat Wattanayakorn, from the 
Narathiwat Industrial Council, said that he and many 
Buddhist-Thais felt that the newly issued Emergency Decree 
was "good" and would "frighten" the separatists.  Although 
harshly critical of the Decree, Dr. Surin acknowledged that 
the new law was very popular among Buddhists in the South. 
 
NRC HAS SUPPORTERS...BUT WILL THAKSIN LISTEN? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
5.  (C)  The work of the NRC appears to have wide support in 
South, and Commission members -- particularly Chairman Anand 
Panyarachun -- are widely respected.  However, there appears 
to be growing pessimism about the likelihood of success of 
the NRC's efforts because of suspicion that Prime Minister 
Thaksin will ignore the forthcoming recommendations.  Surin 
noted the NRC was dealing with "fundamental issues of 
sovereignty" -- including the use of "Yawi" as the second 
official language -- which may be difficult for some Thais to 
accept.  He warned that Thaksin was using the NRC and Anand 
as a "shield" to deflect blame for the crisis.  Several other 
of our Muslim interlocutors agreed, saying that while Anand 
had the trust of the people in the South, they were doubtful 
that Thaksin would listen to or implement the NRC's 
recommendations. 
 
6.  (C)  Not all southerners appreciate the NRC's 
accommodating approach.   Narathiwat businessman Wirawat, 
echoing complaints heard from other southern Buddhists, 
complained bitterly that the government was conceding too 
much to Muslims -- at the expense of "Thais" -- while at the 
same time failing to protect "Thais."  (NOTE: By "Thais" 
Wirawat was referring to Buddhist Thais only; he referred to 
ethnically Malay-Muslims as "Muslims." END NOTE) Abdulroman, 
an NRC Member, also acknowledged that local Buddhists were 
concerned the NRC was taking the side of the Muslim 
community.  Dr. Surin dourly noted that even with the NRC's 
efforts it would take "decades" to solve the problems in the 
South given the current deep divisions. 
 
HOW ARE RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNITIES? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  Januzzi heard anecdotal accounts about strained 
relations between the Buddhist and Muslim communities in the 
South.  Although we saw little outward evidence of tension we 
heard that an unspecified number of people -- both Buddhist 
and Muslims -- continue to leave the region out of fear. 
Views on the state of relations between the two communities 
differed widely.  Narathiwat businessman Wirawat 
characterized relations between the communities as "in a 
state of social breakdown," and noted that Buddhist continued 
to flee the rural areas of Narathiwat.  Chawalit Kalambaheti, 
a retired Yala District Chief and current Vice President of 
the Songkhla Chamber of Commerce, expressed concern over 
propaganda leaflets found in the region that urged violence 
against Buddhists.  Dr. Surin expressed deep concern, noting 
that he and former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai have been 
privately discussing for some time how "the delicate balance 
between the communities has been broken."  However, a Muslim 
NGO, the Pattani Vice Governor and the DP MP -- points across 
the political spectrum -- insisted that relations between the 
two communities remained close on the personal level. 
 
HOW DO LOCAL RESIDENTS VIEW THE SITUATION? 
------------------------------------------ 
 
8.  (C)   Many of our interlocutors, often lifetime residents 
of the South, reminded us that violence -- influenced by the 
inherent historical tension between the ethnically Malay 
population the Thai state -- had always been a fact of life 
in the far South.  However, most agreed that current 
situation was the worst seen in living memory and had changed 
in character -- with a more urban focus and Islam playing a 
more central role.  Narathiwat Islamic Committee Chairman 
Abdulroman said he and most southerners anticipated more 
violence on the horizon.  Cheaming Totayong, another lifelong 
resident of Narathiwat, spoke for many when he called the 
current level of violence "the worst he had seen."  Dr. Surin 
noted that increasing role of religion in politics in the 
South, particularly during the February 2005 elections. 
 
9.  (C)  We did hear, however, a number of optimistic 
assessments of the situation.  Vice Governor Chanvit said the 
situation on the ground had improved since Januzzi's last 
visit in March and claimed the government had been successful 
in efforts to reach out to local Muslims.  Songkhla Chamber 
of Commerce members agreed, saying the situation had been 
improving over the past few months and that the government 
was on the right track. 
 
WHY CAN'T THE GOVERNMENT GET THE JOB DONE? 
------------------------------------------ 
 
10.  (C)  During many of our discussions we heard complaints 
of how government mistakes and bumbling had worsened or 
failed to address the situation, including disparaging 
remarks about incompetent police, intelligence and forensic 
work, and concerns over frequent changes in the government's 
command structure.  Many of our interlocutors were also 
skeptical if the government had really developed a better 
understanding of the complex issues involved on the ground in 
the South.  Narathiwat Islamic Chairman Abdulroman said he 
believed that many in the RTG still do not understand the 
roots of the violence and were not willing to acknowledge 
that besides separatism there are other factors influencing 
the violence, including drug trafficking, political 
opportunism, and turf battles between security forces. 
 
11.  (C)  We heard some concern that government programs and 
poor police work were encouraging the over-reporting of 
violence as "separatist related."  Anusat Suwanmongkhon, a 
leading business man in Pattani, pointed out that government 
compensation programs for victims of "separatist violence" 
had created "a moral hazard" by creating a financial 
incentive for locals to blame "separatists" for any violence. 
 This phenomenon seems to be reinforcing the media's 
sensationalist tendency to label all violence in the South as 
"separatist related," and the inclination of the police to 
avoid the hard work of investigating crimes by blaming 
"separatists" for all the violence. 
DOES THAKSIN "GET IT?" 
--------------------- 
 
12.  (C)  Several of our interlocutors were quick to blame PM 
Thaksin for the government's failures.  Narathiwat MP 
Cheaming said that Thaksin still does not understand the 
problem in the South and that he refuses to listen to others. 
 Dr. Worawit Baru, Vice Rector at Prince of Songkhla 
University and NRC member, said he was worried that Thaksin 
was isolated and was not receiving the full information about 
what is going on in the region.  He said that he and other 
NRC members are attempting to communicate directly with the 
PM about the situation.  Surin blamed Thaksin's poor handling 
of relations between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur -- which he 
characterized as being at an all time low -- for contributing 
to the worsening situation; "trust has broken down between 
the leadership of the two countries." 
 
SEPARATISM VERSUS ALIENATION 
---------------------------- 
 
13.  (C)  As in past trips, many of our interlocutors 
downplayed the role of separatism as the principle factor 
behind the renewed violence, while reminding us of the deep 
alienation felt by many Malay-Muslims towards the Thai 
government.  Surin Pitsuwan believes that there are 
10,000-15,000 people in the South who actively support 
separatism.  Abdulroman from the Narathiwat Islamic Committee 
said most Muslims in the far South do not support the goals 
of the hard-core militants, but cautioned that the majority 
of Muslims in the South do feel a deep sense of "injustice" 
and noted that deep cultural divisions remained between 
southern Muslims and the government officials. 
 
14.  (C)  Narathiwat MP Cheaming opined that the numbers of 
members in "operational" separatist groups remained very 
small -- and said their influence was minimal -- but 
cautioned that there is widespread sympathy amongst the 
larger Muslim population for "the separatist cause" because 
many locals had been personally affected by violence from 
state sources.  A Muslim employee of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross agreed that many fellow Muslims do 
have serious disagreements with the RTG, but would not resort 
to violence and wanted to remain part of the Thailand. 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. -- STILL A CONCERN 
------------------------------------------ 
 
15.  (C)  Januzzi heard oft repeated rumors about U.S. 
involvement and intentions in the region.  Surin Pitsuwan 
said he was very worried about rumors of U.S. involvement in 
violence in the South, claiming, "people say the CIA is all 
over the South."  He warned that these rumors could lead to 
increased anti-U.S. sentiment in the region; "the entire 
South could turn against the U.S. if the rumors continue." 
During meeting with a group of undergraduate students from 
PSU Pattani we heard larger concerns about U.S. relations 
with the Muslim world.  Several students -- while 
acknowledging how much they liked American movies and music 
-- said they believed that the U.S. is "anti-Muslim" and that 
the Iraq war had reinforced these perceptions. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
16.  (C)  Following a reporting trip to the far South in 
September 2004, post commented that "Southern Thailand is not 
burning."  One year later that remains the case.  Despite the 
daily reports of shooting, bombing and arson attacks, life 
continues for the people in the South.  It remains easy to 
travel throughout the region, with only the occasional 
roadblock -- often nominally manned -- to hinder the way. 
Even flash-points such as the Krue Se Mosque in Pattani 
remain open and accessible for obviously foreign visitors, 
with both local shop-owners and soldiers posted to watch over 
the scene eager to chat with rare "tourists."  We recognize 
that the appearance of "normality" in the areas we visited 
may be deceiving.  Things are more unsettled in more rural 
locales -- some Muslim villages have become "no-go" areas for 
RTG officials -- and the relative quiet we witnessed may 
signify little more than a populace that has grown inured to 
current levels of violence after over a year and a half of 
cyclical attacks and reprisals.  The series of bombings on 
September 1 is a reminder of the uncertainty in the security 
situation.  But the appearance of relative "calm" does give 
some context to the situation and provides room for some 
optimism that hope has not been abandoned. 
 
17.  (C)  COMMENT, CONT. That being said, many people do 
clearly live in fear.  There is recognizable tension between 
the government and Muslims -- and more disturbingly -- an 
increasingly stressful relationship between the Buddhist and 
Muslim communities, both of which lay legitimate claim to be 
longtime southern residents.  However, while relations have 
been tested between the two communities, there are no 
indications of any direct confrontations.  The fact that this 
hasn't happened suggests that the traditional communal 
harmony of the region is still resilient in the face of 
deliberate attempts to create strife between neighbors in the 
South -- giving some guarded hope for the reconciliation 
efforts currently underway.  END COMMENT 
 
18.  (U)  Staffdel Januzzi did not have the opportunity to 
review this message 
ARVIZU 

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