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| Identifier: | 05BRASILIA2452 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BRASILIA2452 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Brasilia |
| Created: | 2005-09-15 16:16:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | EWWT EAIR KREC Transportation Issues |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002452 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR WHA/BSC STATE FOR EB/TRA/OTP - BMATTINGLEY HOMELAND SECURITY PASS TO TSA VICKI REEDER BUENOS AIRES FOR TSA USCG FOR MARIO MERCADO FAA FOR AGC-330 USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USCS/OIO/WH/RD/DDEVITO/DANDERSON/EOL SON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EWWT, EAIR, KREC, Transportation Issues SUBJECT: BRAZILIANS AGREE TO PARAMETERS FOR SECURITY ASSESSMENTS BY TSA AND COAST GUARD 1. (SBU) Summary. Recently Post and the Brazilian Foreign Ministry have agreed upon parameters for reciprocal visits to maritime ports and airports to assess security procedures. This accord allows the Transportation Security Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard to continue with their scheduled assessment visits, which the Foreign Ministry had placed on hold pending review. The Foreign Ministry's principal reason for seeking this review was its concern that the appropriate talking points be ready in case either the Brazilian press or Congress began to ask questions about whether such visits were violating "Brazilian sovereignty." Although the issue of TSA and USCG access has now been resolved, and the Foreign Ministry was impressively engaged, we still see some turbulence ahead on questions such as Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) data. End Summary. 2. (SBU) Both the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) have been seeking for a number of months to conduct visits to certain Brazilian airports and maritime ports, respectively, in order to conduct security assessments. Although the visits are referred to in official communications as "technical visits" and "exchanges of information," they are essentially U.S. mandated inspections. Both TSA and the USCG have historically had good working relationship with their GOB counterparts. However, as security requirements have been much greater since 9/11, this has placed greater demands on the GOB agencies; both TSA and USCG had their visits canceled or postponed by the Brazilians several times during the past year. Although Coast Guard had scheduled with their counterparts to visit a list of maritime ports from September 12 to 23, and TSA had scheduled with its counterparts to visit the Guarulhos airport in Sao Paulo from September 27 to October 10, in late August the Foreign Ministry refused to allow these trips to move forward until after a bilateral meeting to discuss the parameters and purposes of these visits. 3. (U) On September 2, the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy met to initiate such a bilateral review. DCM Phil Chicola led the U.S. side of the meeting, which included EmbOffs, TSA Americas Director Vicki Reeder, TSA Regional SIPDIS Representative Joe Ochoa (based on Buenos Aires), and USCG Regional Representative Mario Mercado. The Brazilian side was led by Under Secretary for Latin America, Ambassador Jose Eduardo Felicio, joined by diplomats from Office for Combat Against Illicit Transnational Activities (COCIT), the U.S. desk, and the maritime office. 4. (SBU) During the meeting, the DCM discussed the importance of continued cooperation on these security visits. Ambassador Felicio stated that under the current political circumstances, until the Foreign Ministry understood the programs better, neither TSA nor the USCG should come to Brazil under what may be easily interpreted as a unilateral inspection by the USG. When the DCM clarified that the visits programs are entirely reciprocal in nature and that the Brazilians were welcome to visit both U.S. airports and maritime ports, the Foreign Ministry officials became much more responsive. 5. (SBU) On September 6, the DCM, EmbOff, and TSA and USCG reps met again with Ambassador Felicio to discuss TSA and USCG visits. During this follow-up meeting, the officials responsible for security issues at the Brazilian Department of Civil Aviation (DAC) and Infraero were present, as well as a number of members from the Brazilian National Commission for Safety in Ports, Terminals and Navigation Channels (CONPORTOS). None of the GOB interlocutors expressed substantive disagreements on the technical aspects of the visits, and the Foreign Ministry did not appear interested in the details. Instead, the two sides walked through some proposed guidelines for the visits that would be applicable to both TSA and USCG. The guidelines were outlined not as a legally binding document that either party would sign, but rather as an assurance that both governments were on the same page -- and as "talking points" for the Brazilians in case either the press or Congress made inquiries about whether such visits were violating "Brazilian sovereignty." Ambassador Felicio clearly saw the value in the visits and was quite frank in admitting that they just needed to make sure that they had the "story" right. (A translation of the guidelines is included at the end of the cable.) 6. (SBU) Comment. The GOB appears to have taken the reciprocity offer seriously: CONPORTOS is scheduling with the DHS office in Brasilia for a visit to U.S ports during the first two weeks of December. We are mindful that not all of our transportation security issues covered by COCIT will be as easily resolved. For example, another TSA mandated data sharing requirement (APIS+) enters into effect on October 04. We anticipate that APIS+ will encounter at least the same resistance (both technical and political) we faced during discussions earlier this year regarding Personal Name Record (PNR) data-sharing. We anticipate that Brazil will request an extension of the deadline. Although we foresee some choppy waters ahead, we hope our future discussions with the GOB will be similarly pragmatic and results-oriented. End Comment. 7. (U) An unofficial translation of the guidelines follows. Begin text. GUIDELINES FOR RECIPROCAL VISITS OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES FROM BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO PORTS AND AIRPORTS TO ASSESS SECURITY PROCEDURES, AGREED TO IN A COORDINATION MEETING BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (SGAS, COCIT, DEUC, DMAE, DSF), CONPORTOS, DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION, INFRAERO AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (U.S. EMBASSY, TSA AND COAST GUARD) - SEPTEMBER 6, 2005 I. CONDITIONS OF RECIPROCITY Visits by Brazilian and U.S. authorities to ports and/or airports of the United States of America and Brazil will occur with strict observance of the principle of reciprocity. Authorities from both countries will have access to the same information and areas of ports and/or airports, in the two countries, during the visits. II. REQUESTING VISITS Requests for visits should be sent to the host country, by the visiting country, at least three months in advance. The request must include: name of the ports and/or airports to be visited, length of the visit and other pertinent technical details. III. CONTACTS WITH EMPLOYEES OF PORT AND/OR AIRPORT FACILITIES All visits to ports and/or airport facilities must be coordinated with federal representatives of the host government. Federal representatives of the host government will accompany representatives of the visiting country and participate in the dialogue with employees at the ports and/or airports visited. Prior to and following the visit, representatives of the visiting country should address any questions and/or comments to federal representatives of the host government. IV. CONTACTS WITH THE PRESS Representatives of the visiting country should not directly address the press of the country being visited, rather they should transmit their observations and/or comments to an employee designated by host country authorities. V. NON-DISCLOSURE COMMITMENT Any information obtained as a result of visits to ports and/or airports, or reports generated by the visiting country should be carefully protected, and not divulged or supplied to any other country or agency without previous consent by the competent authorities of the country visited. VI. TECHNICAL COOPERATION Using observations gleaned as a result of the reciprocal visits, both countries can establish programs for cooperation, training and other related activities for the purpose of improving security at their ports and/or airports. VII. PARAMETERS OF THE VISITS In terms of the realization of reciprocal visits, both countries will observe existing bilateral understandings and multilateral commitments assumed before competent international organizations: International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Visits will likewise be conducted respecting the ascribed authority of the designated governmental agencies of the two countries. End text. CHICOLA
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