US embassy cable - 05OTTAWA2768

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 002768 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, KNNP, IN, CA 
SUBJECT: U.S. PROPOSALS TO ENABLE CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION 
WITH INDIA BY THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP 
 
REF: STATE 166864 
 
Classified By: POL M/C BRIAN FLORA.  REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) In a meeting on September 14, Pol M/C and polmiloff 
solicited Canada's engagement and support to advance civil 
nuclear cooperation with India by the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group; they emphasized that this was a top priority of 
President Bush.  Emboffs left reftel non-paper outlining 
obligations that Indian Prime Minister Singh pledged to 
undertake with DG for International Security Paul Chapin and 
Nuclear Affairs Deputy Director Ron Stansfield. 
 
2. (C) In a separate conversation the day before, DCM raised 
the issue with Political Director and Assistant Deputy 
Minister Jim Wright, who noted that India's Foreign Minister 
would visit Ottawa at the end of the month (September 26-27). 
 Wright said that Canada looked forward to India's read-out 
of the Singh visit and was eager to talk to the Indian FM 
about Canadian proposals (NFI) on this matter.  He welcomed 
USG thinking on engaging India in light of the new agreement. 
 
 
CANADA WANTS IN-DEPTH BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS 
 
3. (C) Chapin expressed appreciation for the briefing.  He 
noted that while some of Canada's "major questions" in the 
process of being addressed, the Canadian government still 
sought information regarding the general time frame, the 
importance of some of the undertakings, and "expectations" of 
the Indians.  As proposed during Washington consultations in 
July, Chapin asked that USG consider meeting bilaterally in a 
small group, in Washington or Ottawa, to review our mutual 
nuclear nonproliferation agenda.   Notionally he thought that 
early October might be ideal, coming on the heels of the 
Indian Foreign Minister's visit and in advance of the 
anticipated visit to Ottawa later that month of Secretary 
Rice.  Canada was thinking seriously, he said, about how the 
Secretary's visit could help the government to address 
 
SIPDIS 
outstanding concerns. 
 
CABINET APPROVAL NEEDED TO CHANGE POLICY 
 
4. (C) Stansfield acknowledged that while the U.S. was moving 
ahead with helping India to "burnish its nonproliferation 
credentials," Canada still never wanted them to become a de 
facto nuclear weapons state (NWS) in the first place.  His 
Bureau and others in the Department of Foreign Affairs 
recognized that it was a case of having to "surrender to 
reality."  At the same time, the broader Canadian public had 
not gotten over a sense that it was betrayed by India in 
1974, after which Canada suspended its civil nuclear 
cooperation program.  Public sentiment about Canada's 
commitment to nonproliferation ran high, and given the 
domestic political predicament of the Martin government, 
Chapin said, Canada would have to proceed with great care to 
address such a dramatic change in policy.  It almost 
certainly would require Cabinet approval, Chapin concluded. 
 
5. (C) Pol M/C underscored that in pursuing its commitments 
in the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation initiative the 
U.S. has no intention of assisting India's nuclear weapons 
program; of recognizing India as a nuclear-weapons state; or 
of seeking to amend the NPT.  Chapin welcomed the 
clarification. 
 
IMPACT ON OTHERS AND NEXT STEPS 
 
6.  (C) Canada particularly is concerned about the effect of 
the changed policy on other countries -- in the immediate 
vicinity and beyond -- that will be encouraged by India's 
perceived success in "gutting it out."  For example, Chapin 
said, India's approach on Iran at the upcoming IAEA Board of 
Governors meeting would be of interest.  The nonproliferation 
community needed to sustain integrity in the region. 
 
7. (C) The GOC was exploring how to leverage the U.S.-India 
agreement to "draw in" the Indians, Stansfield said, and what 
the nonproliferation community might do to "make them do 
more."  For example, India had made no commitment to a 
moratorium on production of fissile material, as pledged by 
the P-5.  Canada envisions a phased approach.  How the U.S. 
sees the evolution of civilian cooperation would be critical 
to strategizing, Chapin added.  Based on Indian public 
statements to date, it seemed that India "expects the U.S. to 
make the first move." 
 
8. (C) Pol M/C thanked Chapin and Stansfield for Canada's 
willingness to work with the U.S. to bring India into the 
nonproliferation community.  He once again underscored the 
importance of this stragetic initiative to the U.S. 
government and the engagement of senior USG officials in 
advancing its objectives. 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
DICKSON