US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA1494

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NKUNDA: LOTS OF SMOKE, LITTLE FIRE

Identifier: 05KINSHASA1494
Wikileaks: View 05KINSHASA1494 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kinshasa
Created: 2005-09-15 10:06:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV MARR PREL CG RW
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 001494 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, MARR, PREL, CG, RW 
SUBJECT: NKUNDA: LOTS OF SMOKE, LITTLE FIRE 
 
REF: A. KINSHASA 01432 
 
     B. KINSHASA 01452 
 
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
 1. (C)  General Nkunda's return to North Kivu apparently is 
a non-event.  Changed circumstances in the province have left 
Nkunda between a rock and a hard place.  Reportedly fleeing 
Rwanda in advance of an anticipated arrest warrant, and 
evidently lacking financial or military support from Kigali, 
Nkunda also finds himself without a support network in the 
province (reftel A). 
 
2. (C) During last year's build-up to the seizure of Bukavu, 
Nkunda benefited from Governor Eugene Serufuli's turning a 
blind eye to his recruiting activities -- and, even more 
importantly, he had the active assistance of then-regional 
military commander General Obed.  Now, however, Serufuli (who 
believes, probably correctly, that he can continue to be 
governor of North Kivu after the elections) is interested in 
enhancing his electoral positioning and credibility by 
maintaining provincial security, which means opposing 
Nkunda's activities and, possibly, trying to capture and/or 
kill him. Likewise, current regional military commander 
General Amisi (aka Tango Fort) is not one to stand idly by 
while a rogue military officer attempts to poach his troops. 
Despite exaggerated rumors that he has up to 17,000 troops, 
most here (MONUC, Congolese politicians, FARDC and even NGOs) 
believe that Nkunda actually has closer to about 300-500 men 
maximum, and even those are not necessarily highly committed 
followers but disgruntled and opportunistic ex-ANC troops who 
probably won't stay long in the bush if Nkunda can't pay them. 
 
3. (C)  Nkunda himself seems to be looking for some way out 
of his situation.  Serufuli told PolCouns on September 13 
that he sent his two senior security advisors (Kamanzi and 
Hitimana, both Hutus) to talk to Nkunda and explain that he 
has either to leave or be arrested (reftel B).  Nkunda told 
them he has nowhere to go.  Minister of Agriculture Paul 
Musifiri (an MLC politician from North Kivu) told PolCouns he 
has heard that Nkunda is once again putting out feelers, 
trying to find a third-country willing to take him in -- 
perhaps, he speculated, South Africa. Meanwhile, Serufuli is 
coordinating with MONUC and General Amisi on a strategy to 
dispatch FARDC troops by MONUC helicopter to arrest Nkunda. 
(Note:  MONUC Head of Office confirmed to PolCouns that these 
discussions are indeed underway and that MONUC is prepared to 
support an operation against Nkunda.  End Note.)  Minister of 
Defense Adolphe Onusumba told PolCouns September 13 that he 
is briefed on, and fully supports, this potential operation. 
 
4. (C)  Comment:  While it would be foolhardy to dismiss 
Nkunda's potential to cause problems, particularly in the 
fragile dynamic of North Kivu, it would be equally foolish 
and wrong to overestimate his current capabilities. 
Serufuli's spin is always open to question. In this case 
however, it appears that Serufuli now would prefer that 
Nkunda simply disappear again, whether into neighboring 
Rwanda or anywhere else.  This would eliminate a thorny 
political problem for him personally, and the RCD in general. 
 However, it seems likely that Nkunda truly does not have 
another viable option and therefore is likely to try to 
remain in the DRC.  RCD politicians such as Onusumba, Tresor 
Kapuku and Serufuli himself, all of whom maintain close links 
to Kigali, say that Nkunda is no longer welcome in Rwanda. 
Even with only 300-500 men he could certainly cause problems, 
particularly to the ongoing voter registration process.  More 
troubling is the possibility that he could join forces with 
other rogue elements at large in the province. In many 
respects, Nkunda's fate may be in Governor Serufuli's hands. 
Serufuli not only controls political machinery in the 
province, he exerts de facto control over a substantial 
military force as well. If Serufuli decides that Nkunda's 
usefulness really is at an end and that he should be arrested 
-- or killed resisting arrest -- we would put our money on 
the Governor. 
MEECE 

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