US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA8664

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 008664 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, CASC, PGOV, CO 
SUBJECT: EMBASSY BOGOTA: HIJACK OF COLOMBIAN AIRLINE WITH 
FOUR EMBASSY EMPLOYEES ABOARD 
 
REF: (A) BOGOTA 08571 (B) BOGOTA 08586 
 
 
1. BEGIN SUMMARY: (SBU) On 12 September 2005 at 1218 pm, a 
Colombian airliner on a domestic flight to Bogota from 
Florencia was hijacked. Four Contract Employees from the 
Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), to include 1 US Citizen, 
were onboard.  As detailed in reftels, the flight landed 
safely in Bogota and negotiations ensued leading to the 
eventual release of all hostages unharmed and the arrest of 
the two hijackers at 1715 hours. Embassy officers were 
present at the airport and privy to the negotiations 
throughout the ordeal.  All four contractors were escorted to 
the Embassy where they were debriefed in detail by RSO. 
LEGATT conducted additional interviews of each contractor on 
13 September in connection with their criminal investigation 
of the incident. Complete details of the incident and RSO 
debrief follow below.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) On 12 September 2005, at or around 1218 hrs 
Colombian Aires flight 8081, a DASH 8-300, tail number HK 
4030 with 25 passengers and crew, originating from Florencia 
in route to Bogota, Colombia squawked the emergency signal 
for HIJACK on its transponder.  Once the hijacking was 
verified by Civil Aviation Authorities, the Regional Security 
Office (RSO) at Embassy Bogota was notified by Wade Chapple 
of the Embassy Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) at 1230 hours 
who maintain a permanent presence at Colombian Civil Aviation 
Headquarters.  RSO was informed that the aircraft was 
hijacked by unknown persons with explosives, possibly 
grenades, and that it was circling in the flight pattern on 
an approach to El Dorado International Airport in Bogota, 
awaiting permission to land.  Due to the unclear motive of 
the hijackers and the 11 September anniversary, RSO 
immediately stationed a DS Agent and Marine Security Guards 
to the roof to spot any potential incoming aircraft and began 
immediate notifications to Executive Office, Defense Attache 
Office (DAO), Narcotic Affairs Section (NAS), Public Affairs 
Office (PAO), Medical, and MILGRP. Noteworthy, is that the 
RCC played a crucial role throughout this crisis, relaying 
time sensitive information to include the passenger manifest, 
without which Embassy Bogota,s ability to assess and direct 
an appropriate response would have been seriously hampered. 
 
3. (SBU) At approximately 1247 RSO received notification of 
landing at the military side of El Dorado International 
Airport known as CATAM.  RSO then sent an Assistant Regional 
Security Officer (ARSO) and a DAO officer to the NAS hangar 
at the airport to start command center operations as detailed 
in Embassy Bogota,s section 400 of the Emergency Action Plan 
(EAP).  Roads to the  airport were impassable due to the 
tremendous amount of military, police and emergency personnel 
requiring ARSO to gain access via foot through various 
makeshift control points. 
 
4. (SBU) The Command Center at the NAS hangar was activated 
at 1400 hours, located approximately 1,000 meters from the 
hijacked aircraft. ARSO was designated on scene commander 
with technical, communication, and recovery support by the 
NAS Deputy Senior Aviation Advisor, NAS Intelligence Advisor, 
Acting Dyncorp Flight Manager, and NRCM/SAR (Non-rated crew 
member search and rescue advisor.) At this same time, Embassy 
confirmed that among the passengers were four Dyncorp 
contract employees of the Embassy Narcotics Affairs Section 
(NAS), to include 1 United States Citizen, (James R. Dyba), 
two Colombian national employees (Hugo Casallas and Diego 
Holguin), and one Peruvian national employee (Javier 
Changano). Additionally, the Embassy learned that two 
Colombian Congressmen were also on board as passengers. In 
the early minutes of the hijacking, several of the NAS 
employees received text messages from the Embassy hostages on 
the aircraft. The first text message was received at 1310 hrs 
from Hugo Casallas followed by a second text message at 1430 
from Javier Changano.  Likewise, five minutes before landing 
a Dyncorp supervisor was called by one of the contractors and 
alerted of the hijacking.  Messages were also directed to 
family members which all reflected that events on the 
aircraft were calm and orderly.  RSO and NAS officers 
directed several family members to go to the U.S. Embassies 
in Bogota and Lima to provide a positive active role for the 
family and to eliminate their further communication to the 
hostages. The ARSO on the scene directed that all 
communication to the hostages be ceased and that additional 
communication be filtered and directed by Colombian 
authorities handling the negotiations to minimize danger to 
the hostages.  ARSO and DAO were redirected by RSO to the 
CATAM Colombian Command Post to coordinate USG interface with 
the Colombian on scene commanders. These officers were later 
joined at CATAM by RCC, Consular Officer and LEGATT.  Embassy 
Agencies and Sections were subsequently notified of the 
events with the first of two Emergency Action Committee 
meetings of the day. 
 
5. (SBU) Government of Colombia (GOC) operations center was 
located at CATAM approximately five hundred meters from the 
NAS hangar. The on scene commander for the GOC was the 
Minister of Defense and the CATAM Base Commander, Col. 
Puerta. The GOC delegation was also comprised of several 
high-ranking cabinet level members to include the Fiscal 
General, Director of the National Police, General Castro 
Castro, and eventually Colombian President Uribe.  Telephone 
negotiations to the hijackers were conducted by Colombian 
Senator Moreno de Caro, Senator Gustavo Petro and the Defense 
Minister.  Two GOC officials, Head of Human Rights for the 
Office of Vice-President, Carlos Franco (an ex M-19 guerrilla 
himself) and a representative of the Prosecutor General's 
Office were actually dispatched to the plane for face-to-face 
negotiations with the Hijackers. DAO informed RSO that the 
Deputy Minister of Defense wished to view the Embassy's 
Hijacking Section of the Emergency Action Plan 
(unclassified), which facilitated the ARSO entry to the GOC 
Command Center.  The ARSO was later able to gain access for 
DAO, LEGAT, NAS, CONOFF and RCC Liaison into the GOC Command 
Center. Embassy officers did not initially gain access to the 
actual negotiations, however, at approximately 1515 hrs the 
team eventually gained full access and established liaison at 
appropriate levels. At approximately 1545, several male 
passengers were released by the hijackers.  At 1549 ARSO 
physically confirmed that all four Embassy employees were 
released. 
 
6. (SBU) All former hostages, to include the four Embassy 
Bogota employees, were held at CATAM for questioning by GOC 
investigators; under the watch and supervision of the ARSO. 
Noteworthy is that the actual grenades that were used in the 
hijacking were placed in the same room as the hostages as a 
form of securing the evidence.  After questioning by 
Colombian investigators, GOC representatives told the ARSO 
that the hostages were still required to remain at the 
airport.  The ARSO, however, was able to gain their release 
and the Embassy team transported them back to the Embassy. 
The group arrived at the Embassy for final debrief at 1840 
hrs. Embassy Medical Unit was standing by for medical review 
which was declined by all four hostages who were obviously 
fatigued but in perfect health with no apparent injuries. 
 
7. (SBU) The Debriefing was conducted in the RSO conference 
room. RSO, DAO, MILGRP, RCC debriefer Chapple and LEGAT were 
present. ARSO SA Keith, DRSO SA Mills and LEGAT SA Luna led 
the debriefing in English and Spanish. The hostages gave a 
play-by-play of the events before, after, and during the 
events as detailed below. 
 
8. (SBU) The four hostages described the two hijackers as one 
young Colombian man in his twenties with a skin shaved 
haircut on the sides and an older man who was in a 
wheel-chair.  The hijackers were later identified as Porfirio 
RAMIREZ ALDANA, 42 years old, and Ussynhaver RAMIREZ 
RENINOSO, 23 years old. The hostages stated that during 
security screening at the airport in Florencia, security 
expedited one of the hijackers around a metal detector and 
did not search a fanny pack he had on his lap. The four U.S. 
employees recounted seeing the two hijackers in the airport 
waiting area looking around and appearing slightly worried 
before the flight. The flight conducted pre-boarding and the 
older hijacker was hand carried out of his wheelchair on to 
the plane by the younger hijacker and a member of the flight 
crew. 
 
9. (SBU) The four recounted that the hijackers were seated on 
the third row on the left hand side of the DASH-8.  American 
James Dyba was seated on the six row aisle several rows 
behind the hijackers with Casallas and Holguin in the two 
seats on the right. Javier Changano was seated at the window 
on the right side of aircraft in the fifth row. The hostages 
reported approximately 30 minutes into the flight seeing the 
younger man get out of his seat and get the attention of a 
flight attendant.  The flight attendant came to the location 
of the older hijacker seated in the third row. A conversation 
took place for about three to five minutes with the flight 
attendant taking notes.  It is believed by the witnesses that 
the older man displayed the grenades to the attendant but 
they did not have a clear view and only thought that the 
situation was odd. The flight attendant used an internal 
phone at least three times to communicate to the pilot.  The 
younger man went to the phone and spoke to the pilot for 
three to four minutes.  The pilot subsequently announced on 
the public address system that there was a special situation 
on board and that all passengers were to remain in their 
seats with their seatbelts fastened. Witnesses noticed a 
sudden and dramatic change of altitude and a change in 
direction of travel.  The pilot then announced that they were 
going to Bogota and that he would provide more information 
later.  Several minutes later the pilot announced that, 
"There are explosives on board", "everyone remain calm", 
"move to the rear of the plane." At that time the younger 
hijacker moved to a rear facing seat at the front of the 
plane apparently to watch the passengers.  Witnesses stated 
that everyone moved calmly to the back seats of the plane as 
the aircraft made two wide circles and then made a straight 
approach for landing at El Dorado International Airport in 
Bogota. The mood of everyone was reportedly calm. The 
original flight attendant that spoke to the older hijacker 
stayed seated at the front of the plane. 
10. (SBU) The Captain did not open the cockpit door until 
after the landing and taxi of the aircraft to the CATAM ramp. 
The Captain was the intermediary for the hostage negotiations 
throughout the ordeal and used both his personal cellphone 
and aircraft radio to communicate the hijacker's demands. 
Witnesses stated that at no time did the hijackers speak to 
the passengers or command them to do anything.  After twenty 
to thirty minutes, the Captain reportedly requested and was 
told by the hijackers that the women and children were 
allowed to leave. At least three times the Captain came to 
the back of the plane and told the passengers to be calm and 
not to do anything.  A priest subsequently entered the plane 
and also assisted in the negotiations.  According to 
witnesses, two people from President Uribe,s office entered 
the plane to further the negotiations.  Conversations were 
overheard that the Minister of Defense was talking directly 
to the hijackers. During one point the younger hijacker made 
a cell phone call, presumably to check on a wire transfer and 
even exited and reentered the aircraft at a point for a few 
minutes.  Witnesses stated that this was the first time he 
was smiling. They heard the Captain state to the older 
hijacker "can you put the pin back in", in reference to the 
suspected grenade that was in the hand of the older hijacker. 
 
11. (SBU) Once an agreement was reached between the GOC and 
the hijackers the Captain organized the manner of the release 
of the rest of the hostages in groups of two and three. 
During the initial release the older hijacker was scared and 
ordered everyone back to their seats.  The older hijacker 
demanded that the priest, the crew, and the two 
representatives from President's Office stay on board. 
Shortly thereafter, at approximately 1545, the hostages were 
released.  The Captain stated to the hostages upon departure, 
"Do not do anything, just exit."  All four employees reported 
that they were loaded in a Hilux Toyota truck and taken to 
the military terminal where they were searched and put into a 
holding room and subsequently greeted by the Embassy 
officers. All four contractors stated that they were 
considering means of escape from the aircraft through the 
emergency exits, but were reassured by the Captain not to 
take action and that the situation was under control. 
 
12. (SBU) In summary, the GOC peacefully concluded this 
incident, despite the chaos and disorganization of the 
negotiation efforts, as witnessed by Embassy officers on site 
and later described by Vice-Minister of Defense Penate in a 
discussion with Embassy officers after the event.  Penate 
indicated that the only positive GOC efforts were the actions 
of the Minister of Defense, who eventually assumed control of 
the situation upon his arrival, and the negotiations 
conducted by Carlos Franco.  Penate further expressed an 
interest in obtaining USG training for the GOC in crisis 
management.  Perhaps coincidentally, the DS Anti-Terrorism 
Training Program (ATA), through the RSO, had earlier in this 
month, already offered the GOC a formal class in hostage 
negotiations for 30 students in November of this year and a 
crisis management seminar for high-level GOC representatives 
in Spring 2006. (Post expects to receive a positive response 
from the GOC to these training opportunities in the near 
future.)  RSO learned that concurrent with the negotiations, 
a Colombian Air Force counter-terrorism unit was rehearsing a 
potential assault on another DASH-8 aircraft on the other 
side of the airport, in the event that diplomacy would not 
bring the desired resolution.  Contrary to the GOC's 
emergency planning efforts, the information flow to the 
Embassy was quick and actionable due to the excellent 
coordination and communication between the RCC and the 
Regional Security Office.  Post EAP was also put the test 
with the activation of the NAS Command Post at the airport, 
however, access to the Embassy response team was hampered by 
the disorganization mentioned above and the traffic jam that 
ensued at the airport entrance due to the haphazard police 
efforts to control vehicular access to the area. RSO will 
lead an after action review with all participating Embassy 
offices and adjust Post emergency action plans accordingly. 
DRUCKER