US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3804

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DRAFT CONSTITUTION GOES FORWARD

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD3804
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD3804 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-09-14 17:49:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PHUM IZ Parliament
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003804 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, IZ, Parliament 
SUBJECT: DRAFT CONSTITUTION GOES FORWARD 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 3783 
 
Classified By: (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES 
DAVID SATTERFIELD, REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
 1.  (C)  Iraqi National Assembly Deputy Speaker Shahristani 
told Charge September 14 evening that he had given the UN 
earlier that day the official version of the Iraqi draft 
constitution for public dissemination.  Shahristani and 
Kurdish negotiator Fuad Masum announced this to the press 
earlier in the day.  The National Assembly would use this 
text in its public outreach efforts on national television 
and in meetings around the country, Shahristani confirmed 
to us. 
 
2.  (C)  Shahristani implied that additional small changes 
to the text might be made if they would bring support from 
Sunni Arab political groups, such as the Iraqi Islamic 
Party.  These could be justified under a loose 
interpretation of the transition law text that sought 
public input into the draft text.  Shahristani said that he 
knew of no discussions between the Shia Coalition and Sunni 
Arab negotiators, however.  He cautioned that some of the 
changes the Sunni Arabs seek, such as making it harder to 
secure the next assembly's approval of a law enabling the 
establishment of new regional entities would not be 
acceptable to his Shia Coalition.  Charge welcomed leaving 
the door open to other small adjustments that might win 
Sunni Arab public support, but he commended the decision to 
move forward with the draft text now. 
 
3.  (C)  Shahristani perceived that former Prime Minister 
Ayed Allawi's Iraqiya List bloc was largely in support of 
the draft text.  The Iraqiya senior representative on the 
Constitution Committee, Adnan al-Janabi, had signed the 
final draft on behalf of his bloc, he said.  Shahristani 
conceded that al-Janabi had declined to appear at the 
September 14 press event because he did not want to defend 
the draft publicly.  Shahristani said that, nonetheless, 
most Iraqiya members would support the text.  Similarly, he 
thought most of current Prime Minister Jafari's Da'wa party 
would also support the text, including Jafari himself. 
 
4.  (C)  Charge urged Shahristani to seek a statement from 
the National Assembly when it reconvenes September 18 that 
welcomes the draft and urges it be approved in the October 
15 referendum.   Sharistani said this would have to be done 
carefully.  If the floor was opened to discussion of the 
draft text, deputies who disagreed with a single article 
here or there would feel compelled to air those differences 
on the television.  It would confuse the public and give 
the appearance that the draft has less support than it 
really does.  By contrast, he said, he could issue a 
statement as Acting President of the Assembly.  Charge 
urged that Shahristani find a formula that would lend 
maximum support from the Assembly to the draft text. 
 
5.  (C)  Two of the Sunni Arab negotiators told Poloffs in 
separate conversations September 14 that the Sunni Arab 
political groups held in-house meetings on the night of 
September 13 to fix their individual parties' positions on 
the draft constitution.  They said the parties would meet 
together on the night of September 14 to discuss a common 
Sunni Arab position.   Neither of our sources thought it 
likely the text would gain public support from Sunni Arab 
leaders without changes to the identity language in Article 
3 and the federalism language in Article 114 at least. 
Satterfield 

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