US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3794

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003794 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2025 
TAGS: IZ, PGOV, PREL, Parliament 
SUBJECT: TNA TAKES A SWIPE AT MNF-I 
 
 
Classified By: (U) Classified by Pol Couns Robert Ford, 
reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY.  The Transitional National Assembly 
(TNA) Sovereignty Committee on September 13 
criticized MNF-I with issuance of its "sovereignty 
report." Committee members claim that an increasing 
number of MNF-I and security contractor attacks on 
civilians is a clear indication that Iraq is an 
"occupied," rather than a sovereign, state. 
Committee members may call for a new UN Security Council 
resolution that would confirm Iraq's sovereignty and call 
for MNF-I to be held accountable for its alleged misdeeds. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U) On September 13, TNA member Noori Kamel 
(also known by his pre-war nom de guerre: Jawad 
al-Maliki) presented the TNA Sovereignty 
Committee's report that claimed that Iraq is not 
sovereign due to the presence of American 
personnel in Iraqi ministries and intelligence- 
gathering services as well as MNF-I "control" of 
Iraqi city streets.  Al-Maliki said that the 
report seeks to compel the TNA to come up with 
recommendations to submit to the Presidency 
Council. 
 
3.  (C) On September 14, Maliki told PolOff that 
the Sovereignty Committee was quickly established 
two months ago as a result of a raid on a TNA 
members' home.  Maliki said tensions ran so high 
in committee meetings that issuance of the report 
had been delayed by a month.  Another committee 
member, Abid Faisel Ahmaid al-Sahlani, privately 
told PolOff that the Sadrists and SCIRI had 
forced the establishment of the committee in the 
face of "numerous reports" of "brutal attacks" on 
civilians by MNF-I and security contractors. 
Sahlani said that he had been appointed to this 
committee without any consultation while he was 
out of the country on holiday.  Sahlani asserted 
that he does not agree with the committee's 
findings.  He said his suggestion for the 
committee to seek dialogue with MNF-I before 
issuing the report was rejected.  According to 
Sahlani, Maliki had countered that the TNA was a 
legislative body and the executive branch should 
talk with MNF-I. 
 
4.  (C)  Poloff told Maliki and Sahlani that the 
message the report would send is a bad one to the 
American public.  She asked who would help secure 
Iraq were the American forces to depart.  Neither 
man could answer the question, but Maliki claimed 
that he had used all his influence to reduce its 
anti-American tone. Sahlani agreed that Iraq 
would need foreign forces' help for some time to 
come. 
 
5.  (C) Maliki suggested that after the TNA reads 
the full report, it will urge the Iraqi 
Government to secure a new UN Security Council 
resolution that will make MNF-I responsible for 
its actions and confirm the sovereignty of Iraq. 
He expects the full report to be printed by 
September 18.  Both Maliki and Sahlani consider 
the work of this committee to be completed. 
 
6.  (C)  Comment:  Many of our political contacts, 
even outside the TNA, raise questions about the 
political optics of continued Coalition forces' 
presence in Iraq.  We doubt the TNA will call for 
MNF-I to withdraw, and its leadership will likely 
try to sweep the issue under a carpet of other 
legislative business. 
Satterfield