US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3790

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003790 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, IZ, Kurdistan Islamic Union, Shia Islamists, Parliament 
SUBJECT: KURDISH PARTIES FIRE BLAST AT THEIR COALITION 
PARTNER, PRIME MINISTER JAFARI 
 
 
Classified By: (U) Classified by PolCouns Robert Ford, 
reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  Recent letters from President Talabani 
and Kurdish President Barzani show the extent of 
unhappiness inside the ruling coalition of Kurdish and Shia 
Islamist parties.  The Kurds in their latest letter hinted 
at withdrawing from the coalition, although the author of 
the letter, Deputy Prime Minister Shaways, said such a 
withdrawal is unlikely in the immediate future.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  There are new signs of unhappiness in the Kurdish 
political marriage with the Shia Islamist Coalition that 
comprises the Iraqi Government.  Deputy Prime Minister 
Rowsch Shaways shared with us September 11 a copy of letter 
he said Iraqi President Talabani and Kurdish Regional 
Government President Barzani had sent to Prime Minister 
Jafari.  Rowsch said the letter had been sent to Jafari 
earlier this month.  In the list the Kurdish leaders allege 
that the Jafari government has ignored the April 2005 
agreement between the Shia and Kurdish political 
coalitions, in particular by: 
 
-- not including the Kurdish ministers in developing 
consensus on important political, economic and security 
policy decisions; 
 
-- appointing top government jobs all from the Prime 
Minister's party, including the Secretary General of the 
Cabinet, the Government spokesman, directors general and 
counselors at the Prime Ministry and top employees in the 
ministries; 
 
--  not ensuring "balance" in the composition of 
delegations sent abroad; 
 
--  not ensuring "balance" in the distribution of 
development projects and not consulting the Kurdish 
Alliance on how government reconstruction funds would be 
spent; 
 
--  not bringing the Presidency Council, leadership of the 
Transitional National Assembly and the Prime Ministry 
together for consultative meetings; 
 
--  not developing consensus on the policies adopted by 
independent commissions, such as the de-Baathification 
commission and the Iraq Property Claims Commission; 
 
--  not stopping "crimes" committed against Sunni Arabs 
even while combatting terrorism vigorously; 
 
--  not "normalizing" the situation in Kirkuk and not 
providing funds for the Kirkuk Committee to do its work. 
 
3.  (C) The letter concludes with the ominous threat that 
if these problems continue, the Kurds will need to take 
"another step" in line with their agreement from April. 
PolCouns asked Shaways if he thought the Kurdish Alliance 
would actually withdraw from the governing coalition. 
Shaways said that such a withdrawal is not imminent, but he 
would not rule it out eventually. 
 
4.  (C)  This letter follows two others earlier this year 
from President Talabani (not co-signed by Barzani) to 
Jafari.  Jafari aide Adnan Ali al-Kadhimi on August 29 
showed PolCouns the second letter, sent August 27, in which 
Talabani told Jafari that Talabani should speak at both 
high-level events at the UN in New York this month. 
(Comment:  Talabani's language in the letter was quite 
blunt, telling Jafari that since Jafari had not organized 
his own trip in early August, Talabani had organized his 
own visit to the UN instead and Jafari should stay away 
from the UN.  End Comment.)  According to Kadhimi, the 
letter's tone had infuriated Jafari.  For this reason, 
Kadhimi said, Jafari had refused to attend the August 29 
ceremony hosted by Talabani to mark the formal presentation 
of the draft constitution to the Transitional National 
Assembly.  Kadhimi noted that Talabani has to understand 
that his role is a distant second to that of the Prime 
Minister, according to the Transition Law.  PolCouns 
underlined that the two men must coordinate and their 
failure to do so frequently causes problems not only for 
Iraq but for Iraq's friends.  PolCouns in particular chided 
Kadhimi for the Prime Minister not attending the 
constitution ceremony at a time when leadership unity is 
especially urgent.  Kadhimi accepted the points but 
promised no change. 
 
5.  (C)  Comment:  As we have reported, the political 
marriage between the Kurdish Alliance and the Shia 
Coalition was never a happy one.  The Kurds were especially 
unenthusiastic about Jafari being Prime Minister.  In 
addition, Talabani is especially sensitive to perceived 
slights, and his relationship with Jafari is very 
difficult; the two men hardly speak and even their aides 
hardly speak.  This new letter from Talabani and Barzani 
probably angered Jafari and his team further but probably 
won't change the dynamics of the Iraqi Transitional 
Government very much. 
Satterfield