US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI3805

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003805 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, TW, Domestic Politics 
SUBJECT: KMT INSIDERS WATCH MA START AND STUMBLE 
 
REF: TAIPEI 3496 
 
Classified By: AIT Acting Director David J. Keegan, Reason(s): 
1.4 (B/D). 
 
1. (C) In a meeting with the Deputy Director on August 24 
(reported septel), Taichung Mayor Jason Hu said the recent 
KMT 17th National Congress was poorly organized, and blamed 
senior KMT holdovers from Lien's chairmanship for failing to 
prepare for the procedural and logistics challenges created 
by proposed voting changes (see ref A).  Hu explained that 
the popular Ma benefited from the rule change allowing the 
1,600 national delegates to directly elect the Central 
Standing Committee (CSC).  Had the CSC been elected under the 
old system by the Central Committee's 210 members, explained 
Hu, Ma's preferred candidates would have lost badly.  The 
direct election change, however, reduced the effect of 
"vote-exchange" and other vote-controlling schemes typical of 
earlier CSC elections.  But, in approving the measure, Hu 
said, delegates voted their self-interest, not their 
allegiance to Ma's reform agenda. 
 
2. (C) Nevertheless, Hu told the Deputy Director, the 
National Congress proved to be a "rocky start" for Ma.  Ma 
had advocated a proposal to allow students under 27 years of 
age to participate in CSC meetings to demonstrate the KMT's 
new emphasis on youth and greater inclusiveness.  Ma's inner 
circle, Hu explained, had operated under the misconception 
that Ma's endorsement alone was enough to secure the 
measure's passage.  Instead, influential KMT elders and 
legislators balked at the idea of opening the doors of the 
KMT's highest policy-making organ to students, and organized 
to defeat the measure.  Hu said a similar measure might have 
received a warmer reception if, for example, Ma had chosen to 
welcome students to the less-exalted Central Committee.  Hu 
maintained that Ma's advisors had failed to appreciate the 
functional difference between the two committees, and did not 
understand why it was considered inappropriate to invite 
political novices to participate in senior-level policy 
discussions.  Hu said that, although he supports Ma, he 
opposed the entry of youth into the CSC. 
 
3.  (C) Mayor Hu further told the Deputy Director that the 
31-member CSC cannot really be broken down into the 10 
pro-Wang, 10 pro-Ma, and 11 undeclareds ratio widely reported 
in the press.  Rather, he continued, CSC members' loyalties 
are not so clear-cut, and he speculated that as many as half 
of the new CSC pro-Wang members may shift to support Ma.  At 
the same time, most of the CSC members were elected without 
any support from Ma, Hu explained, and have no obligations to 
him.  Some may choose to create difficulties for Ma in order 
to attract his attention and extract political favors. 
Nevertheless, Hu said, time is on Ma's side, and most of the 
CSC members will realize that further weakening of the KMT is 
bad for their own political fortunes, and will decide to help 
Ma, if only to help themselves. 
 
4. (C) Mayor Hu wondered aloud about Ma's political 
understanding and innate leadership and decision-making 
abilities.  He told the Deputy Director that he had cautioned 
Ma several times, after Ma had won the Chairman race, not to 
publicly apologize to former KMT opponent Wang Jin-pyng for 
tactics used during the campaign.  Wang, he told Ma, would 
never leave the party because he is an at-large LY member, 
with no natural constituency of his own, and therefore was 
wholly dependent on the party for his position, power, and 
authority.  Despite Hu's advice and Wang's repeated rebuffs, 
Ma did publicly apologize several times.  In doing so, Hu 
said, Ma came across as an insecure leader trying too 
desperately to win over a former adversary and wasting 
valuable political capital in the process.  Hu told the 
Deputy Director that he often called Ma during the Chairman 
race to offer advice on various points but now felt it was 
time for Ma "to make his own decisions, make his own 
mistakes, and learn from the consequences."  Ma, he said, 
must set a vision for the party, not just an image for 
himself.  In this regard, Hu said, he had urged Ma to make 
the KMT more youth-friendly by formulating policies which 
appeal to voters in the 20- to 40-year-old demographic, 
including home-buying incentives, educational loans for 
adults, education subsidies for young children, and reforming 
Taiwan's military service laws. 
 
5. (C) Mayor Hu told the Deputy Director that Chairman Ma 
needs a political victory in the year-end local elections. 
Any KMT gain in the city and county elections, or even the 
avoidance of a major loss, will strengthen Ma.  Hu said the 
KMT's chances in Taipei County are 50-50, so a victory there 
would be a credit to Ma.  Ma's greatest weakness, however, 
is his circle of senior advisors, who are perceived within 
the party as inexperienced and overly aggressive.  Many KMT 
senior leaders were alienated by the Ma campaign decision to 
accuse openly Wang Jin-pyng of corruption and vote-buying, 
said Hu.  Hu claimed to have warned Ma not to insult Wang 
unless absolutely necessary -- Ma's advisors said Ma had to 
use such tactics to assure victory in such a "close" race. 
 
6. (C) Separately, KMT Mainland Affairs Director (and ally of 
former KMT Chairman Lien Chan) Chang Jung-kung told AIT that 
those closest to Ma "appear anxious to take power and 
important party positions," and are costing Ma political 
support among potential allies.  Chang also confirmed that 
Lien Chan deliberately snubbed Ma by failing to invite him to 
Lien's 70th birthday.  KMT Spokesman Zheng Li-wen separately 
acknowledged that this had been a great loss of face for Ma. 
The insult was, according to Chang, motivated by Lien's 
resentment over Ma's reaction to the March 19, 2004 shooting 
of President Chen.  On the night of the shooting, Ma demanded 
KMT candidates cease their campaign activities in Taipei.  Ma 
also refused to join Lien in the March 27 demonstration 
protesting the election outcome.  According to Chang, Lien is 
also upset over Ma's decision to change the Central Standing 
Committee election procedure, which Lien believes was done 
not to democratize the party, but to strengthen Ma's control 
over the CSC. 
 
7. (C) Chang also told AIT that Ma does not have a "clear 
Mainland policy."  Chang speculated that Ma, as a Mainlander 
born in Hong Kong, is not sure the Taiwanese people will 
accept him as a presidential candidate in 2008, and that this 
explains in part why Ma strove to emphasize the KMT's links 
to Taiwan in his inaugural speech. 
 
8. (C) Comment:  In recent meetings with pro-Ma and pro-Lien 
contacts within the KMT, there has been one consistent 
refrain:  Ma's inner circle of advisors are his greatest 
liability.  Their eagerness, coupled with their inexperience, 
has rankled senior KMT leaders and party elders, whose 
cooperation is essential to party reform and KMT 
voter-mobilization efforts this December.  Ma is also 
criticized for failing, thus far, to craft an overarching 
vision for the party.  Perhaps he is concentrating his 
attention on securing KMT victories in December.  Once that 
house is in order, Ma may shuffle his "cabinet," to install 
those more capable of guiding him through the KMT's 
procedural and political shoals.  End comment. 
KEEGAN