US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI7100

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SCENE-SETTER FOR MEETINGS WITH MANMOHAN SINGH & NATWAR SINGH IN NEW YORK

Identifier: 05NEWDELHI7100
Wikileaks: View 05NEWDELHI7100 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2005-09-13 12:49:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV IN External Political Relations
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 007100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR MULFORD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IN, External Political Relations 
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR MEETINGS WITH MANMOHAN SINGH & 
NATWAR SINGH IN NEW YORK 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Madame Secretary, your meetings this week 
with (we hope) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Foreign 
Minister Natwar Singh provide an occasion to sketch the real 
challenges we face in implementing legislative actions 
necessary for us to fulfill the civil nuclear vision of the 
July 18 Joint Statement, and to challenge India to take 
equally difficult steps on relations with Tehran and 
separation of India's civil and military nuclear facilities. 
In my meetings with the Foreign Minister and Foreign 
Secretary Saran, I have found them reluctant to acknowledge 
 
SIPDIS 
that Iran could jeopardize both our nuclear initiative and 
India's regional security interests.  Your meetings provide 
an occasion to encourage the GOI to exercise leadership on 
this Iran issue, rather than hiding behind the NAM consensus, 
as happened on UN reform.  In the region, Indo-Pak relations 
are progressing steadily, and you should urge India to 
consider further initiatives that build on the recent 
Delhi-Srinagar dialogue and PM Singh and President 
Musharraf's meeting on September 14 to sustain positive 
momentum.  If there's time, you may also wish to elicit 
Natwar's thoughts on Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, where 
our partnership is increasingly visible.  End Summary. 
 
Iran: India Needs Alternatives 
------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) The September 8 House International Relations 
Committee hearings alerted the GOI to the need to stop 
fence-sitting when it comes to Iran's nuclear weapons 
program.  New Delhi is trying to support us without 
alienating Tehran, on whom it depends for current oil 
supplies, future natural gas imports (pipeline and LNG), and 
access to Afghanistan and Central Asia.  The GOI claims that 
the Iranians reacted very negatively when Natwar pushed 
privately on NPT compliance during his recent visit to 
Tehran.  New Delhi believes it has helped behind-the- scenes 
in Vienna by moderating the position of other NAM countries, 
and FM Singh will likely point out that Congressman Lantos 
and others have not sufficiently appreciated India's positive 
role in the IAEA.  On the plus side, there is little warmth 
to the India-Iran relationship, suggesting that India's 
attachment to Iran could weaken as and when New Delhi is able 
to secure other energy sources (e.g. gas pipeline from 
Bangladesh) and alternative access routes to Central Asia 
(e.g., overland transit through Pakistan).    That said, 
Natwar Singh must be made to recognize that Congress is 
watching India's role at the IAEA with great care, and the 
Indian vote in Vienna will have real consequences for our 
ability to push ahead on civil nuclear energy cooperation. 
At least some in India's strategic elite have begun to argue 
that Indian indulgence of Iran's nuclear shenanigans does not 
serve the country's strategic interests. 
 
Civilian Nuclear Energy Cooperation 
----------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) In the face of Congressional and third country 
criticism over the non-proliferation ramifications of the 
July 18 agreement, the GOI has understood the importance of 
showing its willingness to cooperate with us on key 
proliferation benchmarks.  There is a real debate inside the 
Indian strategic and scientific communities over how far to 
go, and how fast, on separation of civil and military 
facilities.  In addition to India's critical support on Iran, 
you could use this opportunity to remind FM Singh of the need 
to be fully engaged as a partner in non-proliferation by 
moving briskly on civil/military nuclear separation and 
supporting the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. 
(Note: GOI concerns over the Suppression of Unlawful 
Activities Convention and PSI are on the agenda for a 
September 15 video-conference between NP experts and GOI 
counterparts.  End Note) 
 
UN Reform: New Delhi Says Yes, New York Says No 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4.  (C) Unhelpful positions on UN reform issues emanating 
from Indian officials in New York and their sympathizers in 
New Delhi are at odds with assurances from senior Ministry of 
External Affairs (MEA) officials that India enjoys large 
areas of agreement with the US vision.  During high-level 
meetings with Washington visitors, our MEA interlocutors have 
asserted their support for management reform, their backing 
for a credible Human Rights Council, and their recognition 
that UNSC expansion is just one element of the reform mix. 
Our contacts have insisted that the Indian delegation in New 
York was largely deciding its own positions on these issues 
while New Delhi remained preoccupied with planning the PM's 
agenda.  You should seek an end to these mixed signals, and 
reinforce Shirin Tahir-Kheli's message about the benefits 
that would come from India and the US being seen visibly to 
partner on one or two major UN reform projects.  The 
September 14 Democracy Fund event -- and the associated 
unveiling of India's democracy promotion tool kit -- are an 
important step forward in our effort to encourage a more 
courageous GOI line on this issue, but there are many other 
areas where we should be working together in a similar 
manner, to include peacekeeping. 
 
Indo-Pak Relations 
------------------ 
 
5.  (C) Indo-Pak relations are on a favorable trajectory, 
buoyed by a positive meeting in Delhi between the PM and 
moderate Kashmiri separatists and rumors in the press here of 
a possible breakthrough on the Siachen Glacier issue at the 
PM-Musharraf meeting in New York on the 14th.  We continue to 
encourage both dialogue tracks (Delhi-Islamabad and 
Delhi-Srinagar) without inserting ourselves into Indo-Pak 
diplomacy.  The Manmohan-Musharraf bilateral may move the 
process forward incrementally, but New Delhi will continue to 
watch Islamabad for any decisive action against terrorist 
infrastructure -- including shutting training camps, cutting 
communications links, and arresting terrorist cadres -- as 
the barometer to gauge before agreeing to an internal 
cease-fire in J&K, significant troop reductions in Kashmir or 
any possible concessions on territorial disputes.  You should 
push Natwar to have India think big in terms of CBMs that 
India can champion to build on this week's PM-Musharraf 
meeting. 
 
The Neighborhood 
---------------- 
 
6.  (C) Bombings in Bangladesh and the deteriorating 
situation in Nepal have India worried about its neighborhood. 
 The bright spot is Afghanistan, where Natwar and PM Singh 
had an excellent visit at the end of August.  If there is 
time, you may wish to engage in a tour d'horizon with Singh 
to gauge Indian views on their neighbors.  If you do, you 
could reiterate the value of meaningful New Delhi-Washington 
dialogue on ways we can work together to address regional 
tensions. 
 
Explaining the Stakes while Preserving our Equities 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
7. (C) In sum, we are enjoying real momentum from the July 18 
Joint Statement, and the Indian team will arrive in New York 
with a good political tailwind from the Parliamentary debate 
over relations with the US and successful summit meetings 
with Blair and Chirac.  However, Iran looms as a major 
political hurdle in Washington and a significant early test 
of India's readiness to exercise the responsibilities of 
global leadership.  Our GOI contacts tell us that Natwar was 
struck by the forcefulness of your presentation on September 
9 and feels squeezed between admonitions from us and pressure 
from the Iranians.  Under the circumstances, the Indian 
instinct will be to lie low and hope that discussions in New 
York avoid the unpleasant prospect of a BOG vote on September 
19.  We need to give a clear accounting of these stakes, 
while also preserving the significant equity that we have 
built-up in the transforming US-India relationship. 
MULFORD 

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