US embassy cable - 05ABUJA1703

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

NIGERIA: UK PROPOSED PRESS GUIDANCE ON A PRESIDENTIAL THIRD TERM

Identifier: 05ABUJA1703
Wikileaks: View 05ABUJA1703 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abuja
Created: 2005-09-13 09:45:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PGOV PREL KDEM OPRC NI THIRDTERM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

130945Z Sep 05
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001703 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, OPRC, NI, THIRDTERM 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: UK PROPOSED PRESS GUIDANCE ON A 
PRESIDENTIAL THIRD TERM 
 
REF: LAGOS 1363 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). 
 
1.  (U)  Action Request Para 11. 
 
2.  (S)  SUMMARY: Despite repeated public denials and 
constitutionally mandated term limits, President Obasanjo's 
alleged aspiration to a third term has become a lightening 
rod among the political elites.  The British High Commission 
proposes a common, public position affirming the 
international community's opposition to unconstitutional 
change in Nigeria.  Timing such a statement requires careful 
consideration.  Made now, the President will likely see it as 
a gratuitous slap in the face despite his feeling that he has 
done much to carry our water in Africa and many in political 
class will see it as an erosion of U.S. support.  Instead, we 
recommend the Department go on record in support of 
constitutionality and the rule of law during this 
pre-election period and recommend that we continue to 
reiterate our support for the rule of law in public. 
Privately with the President, we should stress restoration of 
civilian government and the transfer of power between 
different civilian administrations as central to his legacy. 
End Summary. 
 
3.  (C)  Septel reports the growing rift between President 
Obasanjo and Vice President Atiku, at base over the 
President's alleged aspirations to a third term.  The 
President's relations with Ibrahim Babangida, former military 
ruler and leading presidential candidate, are also 
deteriorating over the same issue.  Recent newspaper coverage 
highlighted a possible split in the ruling PDP between the 
followers of the President and the Vice President.  While 
such a split could acquire a North/South, Muslim/Christian 
complexion, it has not so far.  Meanwhile, the President 
continues to deny in public any intentions to do anything 
that contravenes the constitution which, in its current form, 
prohibits a third term.  However, he continues to manipulate 
the PDP machinery contrary to party rules in a way that 
appears to keep open that option.  The result is 
near-universal skepticism about the President's intentions, 
even within his own circle.  This Mission's current view is 
that Obasanjo is personally undecided about a third term, and 
he is searching for a candidate who would preserve his reform 
legacy should the third term option founder.  Whatever his 
personal motivation, people around him are urging him to keep 
his options open should no other "satisfactory" presidential 
candidate appear. 
 
4.  (C)  Conventional wisdom is that with the end of the 
Political Reform Conference, it is too late to amend the 
constitution to extend his current term of office.  However, 
Nigeria's constitution is only seven years old, and the 
Supreme Court demonstrated in the Buhari case that it is 
prepared to do the government's bidding, at least in certain 
circumstances.  Therefore, a legal, or more likely, 
quasi-legal amendment or interpretation of the constitution 
that could allow an accelerated amendment process might be 
possible. 
 
5.  (S)  This mission's view, apparently shared by the 
British High Commission, is that an overt effort by President 
Obasanjo to extend his time in office, whether constitutional 
or not, will be destabilizing domestically and thereby impact 
negatively on Nigeria's ability to play its current active, 
generally positive role on the international stage.  However, 
thus far, the most obvious alternatives to Obasanjo are few: 
Leading candidates, Buhari and Babangida are both ex-military 
rulers of Nigeria, the former a byword for authoritarianism 
and "discipline," the latter for corruption.  Former military 
governor of Lagos Gen. Marwa at present lacks the stature, 
though recently there was a press boomlet in his favor.  In 
conversations with his former personal lawyer (reftel) 
Obasanjo ruled out Babangida and Atiku because of their 
personal corruption and speculated that the small stable of 
pro-Obasanjo state governors might yield a candidate.  While 
most of them have such aspirations, no governor thus far has 
acquired national standing.  Meanwhile, the Nigerian press is 
having a field day with the FBI investigation of Atiku; the 
front page of the Sunday Guardian was dominated by a picture 
of Atiku's Potomac house 
 
6.  (C)  The predominately Muslim, Hausa-Fulani dominated 
North believes itself to be marginalized, impoverished and is 
deeply hostile to Obasanjo, a Christian Yoruba.  Despite 
widespread resentment, it has remained passive, up to now, in 
part in anticipation that its turn will come in 2007. The 
predominately Christian South and the East clamor for the 
Presidency, but would settle for the Vice Presidency in 2007. 
 Both regions thus oppose extending Obasanjo's tenure, the 
former because it would mean continued marginalization, the 
latter because Obasanjo, as a Yoruba Christian, should have a 
Muslim Vice President from the North or the Middle Belt, 
blocking Southern and Eastern vice-presidential aspirations. 
Like the North, though for different reasons, those regions 
are already thoroughly disaffected from the Obasanjo 
government, and there are strange manifestations of the old 
Biafra separatist itch, e.g., the new circulation of the 
Biafra pound, despite Federal efforts to stop it.  In the 
aftermath of the deeply flawed 2003 elections, there is 
concern that if he decides to stay in office, Obasanjo will 
manipulate successfully the electoral process to ensure that 
outcome, no matter who opposes him on the ballot.  Bottom 
line -- if Obasanjo manipulates the political system to stay, 
in the current, highly fragile Nigerian polity, there is risk 
of widespread unrest the center will be unable to contain. 
 
7.  (S)  This is the context for the British High 
Commission's proposed "if asked" press guidance.  According 
to the High Commissioner, the FCO has it under consideration, 
and, he said, the British Embassy in Washington may have 
already shared it with the Department.  His idea is that this 
guidance, in some form, would be used by the UK, US, French, 
German, and Canadian Missions here.  Though the British draft 
makes no mention of Obasanjo, any Nigerian will see it as a 
statement that it would be unacceptable to the donor 
community for Obasanjo to prolong his power in an 
unconstitutional or extra-constitutional way. 
 
8. (S)  Begin text of British Draft If-Asked Press Guidance 
 
-- Any unconstitutional change would be condemned by the 
international community. 
 
-- Constitutional change is a matter for the Nigerian people, 
but Nigeria's friends would need to be convinced of the 
reason to change the rules only 7 years into the life of 
Nigeria's third shot at democracy.  Nigerians should 
carefully note the difference in the international reactions 
to elections in Uganda and Tanzania. 
 
-- Nigeria's friends want to see reform take strong root in 
Nigeria backed by the checks and balances provided by 
democracy.  Constitutional transfer of power from one 
government to another is an integral part of the democratic 
process. 
 
9.  (S)  Mission Comment on the British text:  We see the 
first and third ticks as conveying the essential message.  We 
do not see the utility of making a comparison with Uganda and 
Tanzania.  We are also uncomfortable with the idea that 
somehow Nigerians must justify to the outside world a 
constitutional change -- so long as it is done legally.  So, 
we would drop the second tick. 
 
10.  (S)  COMMENT, continued:  The High Commissioner believes 
now would be a good time to issue such a statement because 
President Obasanjo has repeatedly said that he does not 
intend to remain in office after 2007.  We are not so 
sanguine.  The political classes in Nigeria will give such a 
statement an Obasanjo focus and take it as an erosion of U.S. 
and Western support for the President.  The President may 
take it as gratuitous, if not a slap in the face, given his 
reiteration of his previous statements that he will leave 
office in 2007.  Nevertheless, given the President's current 
maneuvering within the PDP, inconsistent with his stated 
determination to leave office in 2007, during his upcoming 
travel to the U.S., it might be wise for senior U.S. 
interlocutors to reiterate privately that any constitutional 
change should be made in accordance with the rule of law and 
the provisions of the Nigerian constitution, and, in public, 
to emphasize that Obasanjo's legacy includes the restoration 
and handing over of civilian government in Nigeria.  End 
Comment. 
 
11.  (C)  ACTION REQUEST:  Mission recommends the Department 
go on record in support of constitutionality and the rule of 
law during this pre-election period and recommends that we 
continue to reiterate our support for the rule of law in 
public.  Mission also recommends that we should emphasize 
restoration of civilian government and the transfer of power 
between different civilian administrations as central to his 
legacy privately to  President Obasanjo. 
CAMPBELL 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04