US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA8550

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 008550 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015 
TAGS: KJUS, PTER, PREL, PGOV, CO 
SUBJECT: COLOMBIAN PROSECUTOR BEGINS TO IMPLEMENT JUSTICE 
AND PEACE LAW; KEY STEPS REMAIN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) The GOC has taken important steps to implement the 
Justice and Peace (J&P) law, but much more needs to be done. 
The most significant steps so far include the naming of J&P 
Specialized Unit Chief Luis Gonzalez in the Prosecutor's 
Office (Fiscalia) and the creation of the National 
Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (CNRR).  Embassy 
has stressed at every opportunity that the key to the success 
of this process lies in its rigorous implementation.  The 
GOC's next steps include funding and staffing the J&P unit; 
establishing intelligence sharing mechanisms among the GOC 
agencies; and improving 782 debriefings or "version libre." 
Embassy is formulating an action plan to ensure that the GOC 
implements the law as effectively as possible.  End Summary. 
 
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FISCALIA EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT J&P LAW 
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2. (C) The Fiscalia's appointment of J&P Specialized Unit 
Chief Luis Gonzalez is a move in the right direction. 
According to the law, the unit will investigate "the time, 
place, and manner in which the criminal acts were 
committed(and the damage the individual caused directly 
either alone or collectively as a member of the organization 
to victims."  Emboffs who knew Gonzalez when he served as 
head of the National Directorate in the Fiscalia describe him 
as practical and focused on getting the job done. 
Nevertheless, he reportedly lacks political clout within the 
Fiscalia and has limited influence over his boss, Prosecutor 
General Mario Iguaran. 
 
3.  (C) Gonzalez sought the advice of the Embassy and NGOs 
before he took office on September 1.  Gonzalez has agreed to 
implement some U.S. and other recommendations including some 
of Human Rights Watch.  He plans to: (1) require former 
combatants to divulge their names and aliases; involvement in 
or knowledge of their group's participation in atrocities; 
location of bodies and kidnapping victims; and the group's 
financing assets, supporters and structure in order to 
receive demobilization benefits; and (2) prepare a document 
demobilized paramilitaries will sign acknowledging that the 
Fiscalia will regard any omission to their statement as 
intentional and thus allow the GOC to process them in the 
regular justice system. 
 
4.  (C) Gonzalez told Emboffs that he has already picked 
seven out of 20 prosecutors ("Fiscales ante el Tribunal") 
required under the J&P law to process demobilized fighters. 
He has also sought an additional 60 auxiliary prosecutors 
("fiscales seccionales") and 150 investigators to work with 
the unit.  He has begun requesting international assistance 
(including USD 4.4 million from the USG) to fund 
investigations, perform forensic tests, and facilitate 
communications capabilities for prosecutors and Corps of 
Technical Investigators (CTI) agents assigned to the Unit. 
He has also secured office space for the J&P Unit. 
 
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FISCALIA: NEXT STEPS 
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5. (C) In a press interview in late August, Prosecutor 
General Iguaran said that the J&P unit would begin operating 
in a "couple of months."  He explained that the unit would 
begin to record confessions and investigate crimes once it 
received a list from the Ministry of Interior and Justice of 
the demobilized paramilitaries that qualify for J&P process. 
Iguaran noted that the High Council of the Judiciary's 
appointment of magistrates to the Justice and Peace Tribunal 
are still pending. 
 
6. (C) On September 2, J&P unit chief Gonzalez told us that 
he has a draft list of 125 demobilized paramilitaries.  He 
added that new prosecutors would begin their preliminary 
investigations once the unit is complete.  He is willing to 
share the list with the Embassy to obtain any additional 
information the USG might have on these individuals. 
 
7. (C) Key next steps for the Fiscalia include: 
 
-- Budgetary Authority: Gonzalez estimates that for the 
remainder of the year, the unit's budget is around USD 2 
million.  Next year's budget is estimated at USD 4.2 million, 
of which USD 3 million are for salaries alone, and USD 1.3 
million are for general expenses.  It appears that Gonzalez 
and others in the GOC are expecting foreign donors to provide 
some of the unit's funding needs. 
 
-- Finding "Volunteers" for the Unit: Gonzalez informed us 
that he was encountering resistance in staffing the unit 
because the J&P law did not create new positions, but rather 
requires re-assignment of existing personnel.  He added that 
many people would rather not be associated with the J&P 
process because they fear for their lives and those of their 
families.  In addition, Gonzalez was concerned with his 
superiors' decision to have the 60 auxiliary prosecutors work 
only part-time with the unit, making it difficult to complete 
the investigations within 60 days as the law requires. 
 
-- Developing an Intelligence Software Program: Gonzalez said 
they have begun to collect raw data from their own internal 
CTI system, and from other sources (including media), but he 
was extremely skeptical of his in-house ability to develop 
and fund a software program capable of storing and searching 
intelligence from the military, DAS, Peace Commissioner's 
office, etc.  Gonzalez stated that none of the Fiscalia's 
agencies could spare a trained computer systems person to 
dedicate full-time to this project because they are all too 
busy with the transition to the accusatory justice system and 
other responsibilities. 
 
-- Obtain Access to Other Agencies: Gonzalez expressed 
frustration over his inability to gain access to the 
Department of Administrative Security's (DAS, rough FBI 
equivalent) and the military's intelligence information on 
AUC activities and membership.  Gonzalez stated, however, 
that he is in the process of working out an agreement to 
obtain access to this information.  Based on the Fiscalia's 
past experience, Gonzalez expressed skepticism that the 
military, in particular, would actually turn over to the CTI 
its best intelligence. 
 
-- Status of 782 Debriefings or "Version Libre": Gonzalez 
appeared to retreat from his support to beef up the 782 
&version libre,8 which he had expressed to us in an August 
22 meeting.  This came after Iguaran instructed him to report 
directly to Ramiro Marin, who is the fiscal responsible for 
designing and implementing the 782 process.  Emboffs, who 
have dealt with Marin in the past, say he is less receptive 
to our recommendations and has expressed resistance to change 
the current "version libre," at least with respect to the 782 
demobilization process.  On September 7, Emboffs met with 
Marin and he informed us that the resistance to a more 
rigorous debriefing not only comes from the Fiscalia, but 
from the High Commissioner's Office.  He added, however, that 
he would respect the decision if Iguaran insists on more 
rigorous 782 debriefings.  (Note: Emboffs have discussed with 
the Fiscalia the need to combine the 782 legal process with 
the new J&P law in order help identify the paramilitary 
leadership and most serious offenders who should be 
prosecuted under the J&P law and not 782; acquire as much 
information as possible about the demobilized individual's 
participation in illegal activities; and obtain intelligence 
about the activities of other members of the group, which can 
later be used in J&P investigations.) 
 
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VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT J&P LAW 
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8. (C) The J&P law created an institution to manage the 
National Reconciliation and Reparations Fund, and Vice 
President Francisco Santos has designed the National 
Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (CNRR) to fulfill 
this task.  At the head of this commission will be 
representatives from the Vice Presidency, Fiscalia, Ministry 
of Interior and Justice, Ministry of Finance, Human Rights 
Ombudsman's Office, and Social Solidarity Network.  The 
commission also includes two representatives from victims' 
groups and five civil society members (Note: Three of the 
five prominent civil society leaders have already been named: 
Eduardo Pizarro Leon Gomez, Jaime Jaramillo Panesso, and 
Monsignor Nel Beltran.)  The GOC will soon name two CNRR High 
Commissioners: (1) the Director for Social Solidarity Network 
Luis Alfonso Hoyos, who is currently in charge of the 
reparations fund; and (2) the Director of the Reinsertion 
Program Juan David Angel. Just below will be the Director for 
the Presidential Human Rights Program and the General 
Coordinator of the four main structures of the CNRR: 
Reparations, Reconciliation, Institutional Strengthening, and 
Administrative Support.  A coordinator for each of these 
structures will be named to manage the other 
inter-institutional support agencies that will support this 
process. 
 
9. (C) A representative from the Vice President's Office told 
us that USD 1.4 million is the total estimated budget needed 
for the CNRR in the next seven months.  This projection does 
not include USD 652,000 estimated as being required for the 
Reparations Fund.  Emboffs were told that the estimates were 
conservative figures that the GOC has already budgeted to pay 
for this commission.  GOC representatives explained that the 
Vice President's Office is also trying to reach out to the 
private sector to attract financial support for CNRR.  So 
far, they informed us that five of the country's main trade 
associations ("gremios") have expressed their willingness to 
contribute to CNRR, but could supply no further details. 
 
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VICE PRESIDENTS OFFICE: NEXT STEPS 
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10. (C) President Uribe will shortly approve the design and 
composition of the commission.  Emboffs were told that it has 
been hard to develop a preliminary list of individuals due to 
salary constraints.  According to representatives from the 
Vice President's Office, the challenge will be to translate 
this structure from paper into practice.  Vice Presidency 
officials cautioned us that the commission's success is 
subject to the ability of the Fiscalia's J&P units to get 
started as well.  They add that the Vice President's Office 
would like as much as possible to be working in parallel with 
the Fiscalia, but they foresee delays given the complexity of 
the justice side of the law. 
 
11. (C) Embassy will continue to maintain close contact with 
GOC and Fiscalia officials as implementation rolls forward. 
 
DRUCKER