US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI3888

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 003888 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/RA FEIERSTEIN; NEA/ARPI MISENHEIMER, WALKER, 
THORNE, SMYTH; EB FOR A/S WAYNE, SALOOM, NELSON 
TREASURY FOR OFAC WERNER 
MANAMA FOR BEAL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015 
TAGS: PTER, KTFN, EFIN, TC 
SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON HUMAN APPEAL INTERNTIONAL NONPAPER 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 166846 
     B. ABU DHABI 2169 
     C. 2003 SECSTATE 133205 
     D. 2003 ABU DHABI 2598 
     E. 2003 ABU DHABI 2853 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary.  Embassy thanks Department for forwarding 
Treasury's draft nonpaper on Human Appeal International 
(HAI), which is intended for OFAC Director Bob Werner's use 
during his 9/16-20 visit to the UAE (ref A).  Embassy 
strongly recommends against passing the paper as currently 
drafted to the UAEG.  We support passing a well-sourced, 
actionable paper on HAI.  However, we believe that the 
current draft does not effectively make the case.  When we 
take a case to the UAEG asking them to take action against 
this charity, the case needs to be based on current, credible 
intel -- otherwise, we lose credibility with our 
interlocutors.  End summary. 
 
2. (S) In 2003, Embassy Abu Dhabi raised the USG concern that 
the Ajman-based HAI supports terrorist organizations, such as 
al-Qa'ida and HAMAS, with UAE  Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed.  At the time, Sheikh Hamdan 
agreed to undertake a thorough investigation of HAI, but 
requested an intel package that could be shared with 
appropriate UAE intelligence agencies to aid in the 
investigation (refs C, D, E).  Embassy appreciates that 
Treasury is prepared to pass such a package to the UAEG, as 
it will aid the UAE in any investigation of HAI. 
 
3. (S) Embassy expects that the UAE Government would raise 
the following concerns about the nonpaper as currently 
drafted: 
 
-- Most of the information is outdated.  There are a few 
references to 2004 data, but the majority of the information 
is significantly older -- pre-2001. 
 
-- Boudella al Haj is no longer a concern.  He was arrested 
in 2001 and remains incarcerated in Guantanamo. 
 
-- There is nothing in the paper that indicates that the HAI 
leadership is complicit in nefarious activity. 
 
-- The overwhelming majority of the points are related to HAI 
activity outside of the UAE. 
 
-- The only datapoint that is within the UAE is inconsistent 
with what we know about the charity.  There is no Abu Dhabi 
HAI branch (see ref B). 
 
4. (S) Embassy continues to believe that taking our HAI 
concerns directly to the UAEG -- vice designating -- is the 
right approach to take.  We believe that the UAEG genuinely 
wants to be sure that its charities are all above-board and 
is wiling to take action if necessary.  However, the UAE 
leadership will certainly note that the paper does not 
contain current, actionable information. 
 
5. (S) When we take a case to the UAEG asking them to take 
action against one of the three largest charities in the UAE, 
the case needs to be well-sourced and based on current, 
credible intel -- otherwise, we lose credibility and no 
action is taken.  This case needs to demonstrate that the HAI 
headquarters in Ajman is either influencing control over the 
international offices and/or is aware that its officials have 
connections to extremists.  It also needs to demonstrate that 
HAI is aware it has received funds from other charities with 
extremist connections.  Without addressing these issues, the 
UAE could just argue that the USG should ask the governments 
in Bosnia and Jordan to close those HAI branches. 
 
6. (S) There are indeed many unanswered questions about the 
loyalties and motivations of certain HAI employees, and the 
natural question is to wonder how far up the chain of the HAI 
leadership this goes.  Embassy supports passing a 
well-sourced and fully vetted intel packet to the UAEG so 
that the UAE intelligence services can initiate their own 
investigation and take appropriate action.  (We note, 
however, that the UAE intelligence services only have an 
internal presence and will not be able to collect any intel 
on HAI's personnel and activities abroad.) 
SISON