US embassy cable - 05ALGIERS1914

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 001914 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015 
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PTER, AG, National Reconciliation 
SUBJECT: BELKHEIR ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 
 
REF: A. ALGIERS 1661 
 
     B. ALGIERS 1702 
     C. ALGIERS 1878 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RICHARD W. ERDMAN; REASONS 1.4 (B) (D) 
 
1. (C) Ambassador took advantage of a September 10 meeting 
with Presidential Chief of Staff Belkheir on other issues to 
ask about the September 29 referendum on national peace and 
reconciliation.  Without detectable enthusiasm, Belkheir said 
the goal of the referendum was to move beyond the divisons 
caused by over a decade of terrorism, isolate and weaken 
those terrorists in the "maquis," and give the leadership 
authority and latitude to move forward on national 
reconciliation as the situation and attitudes evolved. 
Bouteflika, he added, was not simply asking for a straight 
"yes" or "no" on whether the public supported national 
reconciliation.  He was asking them to vote on the provisions 
of the Charter, which would provide the government broad 
parameters and political support for subsequent measures 
aimed at promoting national reconciliation. 
 
2. (C) Expressing confidence the referendum would pass by a 
substantial margin, Belkheir noted that many people had the 
mistaken impression that major steps would be taken right 
away.  In fact, the Charter, if approved, would provide the 
leadership the flexibility it needed to decide the pace and 
way forward, depending on how events, public attitudes, and 
circumstances evolved.  The leadership understood how 
sensitive and difficult the process of national 
reconciliation was.  It would not be easy for many in the 
public to simply forgive and move on.  Nonetheless, most 
Algerians were prepared to do this in the interest of turning 
the page on the decade of terrorism, including 80% of the 
families of the "disparus". 
 
3. (C) Ambassador noted that some Algerians, including in the 
government, saw the referendum as a "gamble" whose impact 
(assuming it were approved) was not forordained.   Belkheir 
said the leadership did not expect approval of the charter 
would completely bring an end to the residual terrorism of 
those who remained in the maquis.  However, it would weaken 
the terrorists' support network while convincing many to turn 
themselves in.  It would also make it possible for former FIS 
supporters who left the country but who did not themselves 
commit terrorist acts to return to Algeria, provided they did 
not engage in politics. 
 
4. (C) Ambassador commented that other countries that had had 
to face similar national tragedies involving "disappeared" 
had found it necessary to incorporate elements of 
truth-telling and justice into their approach.  Historical 
experience suggested that without these elements, real 
national reconciliation could not take place.  It was not 
clear from the Charter how these necessary elements would be 
provided for. Belkheir repeated that the process would unfold 
gradually and in response to evolving events and attitudes, 
as the situation required.  There would not be impunity, he 
insisted.  The referendum was not about a general amnesty but 
about a pardon in certain circumstances for certain 
categories of those who had been involved in aspects of 
terrorism.  For example, those who had committed mass 
murders, rapes, and bomb attacks in public places would be 
excluded.  And those included in this process would not be 
pardoned automatically but would pass through some kind of 
judicial mechanism that would be set up. 
 
 
ERDMAN