US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3753

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003753 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, IZ, Sunni Arab, Kurdistan Islamic Union 
SUBJECT: SUNNI-KURD MEETING IN IRBIL: FEW DECISIONS, 
SUNNIS IN DISARRAY 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 3718 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford, for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.(C) SUMMARY: Conversations with participants in discussions 
on the constitution in Irbil (reftel) confirm the lack of 
progress toward an agreement with the Kurds. The Kurds 
indicated that they reached agreement on at least one issue - 
using Arabic in the Kurdish region alongside the Kurdish 
language.  They did not reach agreement on big issues, such 
as Iraq's identity, and the Kurds told the Sunni Arabs to 
work out an agreement with the Shia Coalition on the manner 
by which new regional entities will be established.  Our 
sources have not told us of any planned meetings between the 
Shia Coalition and the Sunni Arab negotiators.  The Sunni 
Arabs continue to urge U.S. and UN engagement on their behalf 
with the Kurds and Shia, without clearly indicating what 
would constitute the price for Sunni support for the draft 
constitution.  We are telling the Sunni Arabs, and the Shia 
Coalition and the Kurds, that we now want closure on the 
text.  We doubt the Sunni Arab negotiators understand that 
the time for protracted negotiations is past.  We are dubious 
that Shia Coalition and Kurds ultimately will change the text 
much on the issue of Iraq's identity and federalism.  Thus, 
we anticipate that the draft constitution will have little or 
no public Sunni Arab leadership support.  END SUMMARY 
 
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FINDING SOME COMMON GROUND WITH KURDS ? 
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2. (C) Sunni Arab contacts differ on the outcome of the 
discussion with Kurdish representatives in Irbil September 
8-10.   Two participants,  Iraqi Republican Gathering leader 
Saad al Janabi and Iraqi Council of National Dialogue (ICND) 
member Sadoun al-Zubaidi, told poloff the Sunnis and Kurds 
agreed on compromise federalism language.   However, former 
Sunni Waqf leader Adnan al-Dulaimi, in a separate 
conversation, insisted that no such agreement was reached, 
stressing that he would reject any reference to federalism in 
the constitution.  ICND member Mahmoud Mashadani maintained 
that Sunnis neither accepted nor rejected any particular 
federalism language, stressing that the issue should be 
resolved by the next national assembly. He added that his 
party would accept federalism &as a principle only for 
Kurdistan8, not for the rest of Iraq. 
 
3. (C) Similarly, Poloff received differing answers on the 
status of agreement on natural resources language.  Al-Janabi 
said there had been agreement to accept Article 109 as it is 
currently reads in the constitution.  An ICND contact 
maintained that no such agreement was reached. 
 
 
4. (C) Sunni contacts further report continued differences 
with the Kurds over formulations for the constitution,s 
language on Iraq,s Arab identity: However, they said that 
the Kurds had agreed to accept language asserting that both 
Arabic and Kurdish would be used by official institutions in 
the Kurdistan region.  Masood Barzani told the Charge 
September 10 evening that the Sunni Arabs had brought 
proposals and a few, such as the one on the Arabic language 
in Kurdistan, had been accepted.  Other Sunni Arab proposals, 
including Iraq's identity and restricting Iraqi mothers' 
rights to transmit citizenship did not receive Kurdish 
backing.  The Kurds provided us the minutes of their last 
meeting with the Sunni Arabs that indicated that the Kurds 
had agreed to the Sunni Arab idea of changing Article 114 
about the next national assembly passing a law governing 
establishment of new regional entities.  The Sunni Arabs had 
wanted a two-thirds vote in the assembly for passage of this 
law.  Barzani told the Charge that the Kurds told the Sunni 
Arab negotiators that they would have to gain Shia Coalition 
agreement on difficult issues like federalism. 
 
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DISTRUSTING EACH OTHER; LOOKING TO U.S. AND UN 
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5. (C) In the aftermath of the Irbil discussions, the Sunni 
Arabs appear as distrustful of each other as of the Kurds and 
Shia.  Saad al-Janabi cautioned that most participants are 
likely to continue to reject the constitution publicly to 
maintain credibility with the Sunni Arab street.  Meanwhile, 
they likely will privately seek to engage the Kurds on 
textual changes.   Less than two days after the discussions 
ended,  one of the attendees -- Homeland Party Chairman 
Misha,an Thamin al-Jabouri ) published a newspaper 
commentary accusing the ICND,s Shaykh Abdul Nassir Al-Janabi 
of being in the pay of moderates. 
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URGING UN TO KILL THE DRAFT ENTIRELY 
------------------------------------ 
 
6. (C) Saad al-Janabi stated to Poloff September 12 that 
several Sunni Irbil meeting participants (i.e., Dulaimi, 
Abdul Nasr al-Janabi, and Khalaf al-Ayan) met with UNAMI 
September 12 to say they would reject the Constitution if no 
changes are made to accommodate the Sunni Arabs.  Adnan 
Dulaimi urged UNAMI to help stop the constitution draft 
entirely, according to al-Janabi.  Reportedly, UNAMI 
representatives replied by stressing that the constitution 
would need to be printed within 48 hours.  (NOTE: We are 
seeking a UNAMI account of the meeting and will report 
septel.) 
 
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URGING COMMON SENSE 
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7.  (C)  Poloff has told these Sunni Arab contacts that they 
must bring the discussions to a close very quickly; the 
window of opportunity must close so that the text can be 
distributed nationwide.  Poloff observed that the Sunni Arabs 
could not negotiate until October 14 - as much as they might 
like to.  In typical responses, Saadun al-Zubaydi and Mahmud 
Mashadani in separate conversations September 11 and 
September 12 insisted the draft text could be changed later 
and the changes put in the newspapers. 
 
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COMMENT 
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8. (C)  Acknowledging the lack of success in Irbil, our Sunni 
Arab contacts urged U.S. pressure on the Shia and Kurds to 
accommodate the Sunni Arab position.  Our sources have not 
told us of any planned meetings between the Shia Coalition 
and the Sunni Arab negotiators.  In our exchanges, we 
increasingly detect from the Sunni Arabs the message that 
they believe the USG needs closure on the Iraqi constitution 
more than the Sunni Arabs themselves. Mashandani told us that 
the U.S. should push for agreement on the document, because 
it is a &U.S. project.8  We are telling them that we now 
want closure - but the Sunni Arab political leadership is 
often slow to understand when events have passed them.  It is 
also increasingly clear that the draft text as it stands will 
have little or no public Sunni Arab leadership support. 
Satterfield