US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1610

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001610 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR STATE SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PTER, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: LTTE CLOSES POLITICAL OFFICES IN 
GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AREAS AFTER REFUSING AIRPORT AS CFA 
TALKS VENUE 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 1224 
 
     B. COLOMBO 1448 
     C. COLOMBO 1493 
 
Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle.  Reason 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 8, Liberation Tamil Tigers of 
Eelam (LTTE) political leader Thamilchelvan announced the 
LTTE would close all remaining political offices in 
government-controlled areas in the wake of the LTTE refusal 
to hold Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) talks at Colombo airport. 
The LTTE statement implied that news reports about a 
months-old meeting between the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission 
(SLMM) and the breakaway Karuna faction added to the Tiger's 
feeling of unease.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU) Norwegian facilitators had sought to break a 
deadlock over the venue for CFA talks between the Government 
of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the LTTE (Reftel C) by proposing on 
September 7 Katunayake International Airport (KIA) as a 
suitable site. Turning LTTE arguments that the GSL inability 
to guarantee the Tiger's physical security necessitated a 
foreign venue; the Norwegians noted that any foreign capital 
would require several hours transiting through KIA, which, if 
deemed safe enough to occupy while waiting for a flight, it 
should be safe enough to sit and hold talks. 
 
3.  (SBU) At a September 8 press conference in Kilinochi, 
LTTE political leader Thamilchelvan rejected the airport 
proposal, saying it "does not hold good when what is 
contemplated is a serious political discussion".  He further 
cited the Emergency Regulations enacted after the murder of 
Kadirgamar (Reftel B) as additional grounds for rejecting the 
airport locale.   Later that same day, he announced the 
closure of all LTTE political offices in the GSL-controlled 
North and East in an interview with the pro-LTTE website 
"Puthinam".  The LTTE had already closed most of their 
political offices in the eastern part of Sri Lanka following 
the July 10 murder of three senior political cadres in 
Trincomalee (Reftel A).  The decision affects approximately 
64 offices in the Jaffna and Vavuniya districts. (Note: The 
CFA guarantees the right of unarmed LTTE political cadres to 
do political work in GSL controlled areas. End Note)   Sri 
Lankan Army sources report that some offices are closing but 
that the LTTE cadres remain in the area and have not 
withdrawn to LTTE controlled areas. 
 
4.  (C) There has been some speculation that a purported 
meeting between members of the breakaway Karuna faction 
influenced the decision to close the offices.  SLMM 
spokesperson Helen Olafsdottir confirmed that on May 29 while 
driving on the A-11 highway near Valachennai in Batticaloa 
district, SLMM personnel came upon a group of Karuna faction 
cadres.  (Note: Although under government control, this part 
of Batticaloa district has little military presence and is 
heavy jungle. End Note) The Karuna faction were apparently 
prepared for this meeting as they had chairs and a 
photographer. Olafsdottir reported that the Karuna group 
seemed eager to meet the SLMM and engage them.  Explaining 
the SLMM's decision to meet the renegade faction, Olafsdottir 
stated SLMM's position is that the GSL is responsible for 
areas under their control and that any armed parties 
operating in them should be disarmed in accordance with the 
CFA. 
 
5.  (C) COMMENT:  Although the meeting occurred three months 
ago, it appeared early this week on a pro-Karuna website and 
has since spread to pro-LTTE and English Sri Lankan language 
websites.  Even though this is old news, the LTTE appears to 
have seized on it as a pretext to close the offices -- and to 
put increasing pressure on the faltering peace process.  The 
LTTE has long held that the Karuna faction is aided and 
abetted by the SLA, targeting LTTE cadres at the military's 
behest.  Learning of a meeting between the SLMM and the 
Karuna faction, however old, may have increased Tiger 
paranoia and further shaken their confidence in protecting 
their cadres.  Since the right to operate political offices 
in GSL controlled territory was included in the CFA as a 
confidence building measure, the LTTE's message appears to be 
that, in the midst of ongoing tit-for-tat violence; it has no 
confidence in the GSL's ability to guarantee LTTE security. 
LUNSTEAD