US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1604

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SRI LANKA: TIME FOR CO-CHAIRS TO STAND UP AGAINST LTTE VIOLENCE

Identifier: 05COLOMBO1604
Wikileaks: View 05COLOMBO1604 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2005-09-12 10:27:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PTER PGOV PHUM PREL CE LTTE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001604 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PREL, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  TIME FOR CO-CHAIRS TO STAND UP AGAINST 
LTTE VIOLENCE 
 
REF: COLOMBO 1537 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
1.  (C) The co-chairs will meet in New York at a 
time when the prospects for tangible progress on 
the Sri Lanka peace process are underwhelming, 
especially in the wake of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) refusal to accept the latest 
proposal by the Norwegian facilitators for a 
cease-fire agreement (CFA) meeting at Colombo 
airport (septel).  In addition, the brutal August 
12 assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister 
Kadirgamar by the LTTE; a presidential election 
(and, perhaps, a parliamentary election) which at 
best will turn attention away from the peace 
process and at worst widen existing ethnic 
tensions; and a steady drumbeat of killings on the 
margins of the CFA are exerting concerted pressure 
on an already faltering peace process.  The co- 
chairs' past practice of issuing carefully 
measured statements exhorting both sides to pursue 
peace has had near-negligible impact in 
influencing Tiger behavior since the 2003 Tokyo 
donors conference.  If the co-chairs are to remain 
relevant to the fast-disintegrating peace process, 
it is imperative that they explore new ways to 
improve Tiger behavior and push the peace process 
forward.  To do this, the co-chairs must stiffen 
the usual pro-peace statement-which this time 
should convey an unambiguous message that LTTE 
terrorism will earn the Tigers international 
opprobrium and isolation-with tangible immediate 
actions, i.e., a crackdown on LTTE fundraising, 
weapons procurement and travel to foreign 
capitals. 
 
2.  (C) First, the co-chairs must unequivocally 
support the GSL's laudably measured response to 
Kadirgamar's murder.  To its credit, the GSL, 
while harshly condemning the killing, has made 
clear that it remains committed to the peace 
process, as illustrated by its willingness to sit 
down to discuss CFA implementation with the LTTE 
when the blood on the Tigers' hands was barely 
dry.  At the same time, the GSL has urged its 
foreign partners to curb LTTE operations overseas. 
This "two track" policy, if a little clumsy in 
formulation and expression in the hectic days 
right after Kadirgamar's murder, makes sense and 
needs explicit co-chair support in New York. 
Thus, the co-chairs should, both in their 
discussions and statement, harshly condemn 
Kadirgamar's murder, call for the world community 
to squeeze LTTE operations abroad and praise GSL 
willingness to stay in the peace game when it 
would have been politically popular at home to 
wave the bloody shirt and pull the plug on the 
peace process. 
 
3.  (C) Second, the co-chairs must underscore 
their support for the Norwegian facilitators and 
the Scandinavian-led Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission 
(SLMM), whose roles have increasingly become a 
political football in Sri Lanka, especially as 
election fever mounts.  While UN envoy Brahimi, 
during his recent visit here, scotched rumors that 
the UN was going to replace the Norwegians, there 
continues to be an undercurrent of ill-informed 
resentment against the Norwegians.  This has been 
magnified by unfortunate public statements by the 
likes of new FM Anura Bandanaraike, and by the 
strong criticism of the Norwegians in the 
electoral pact signed last week by SLFP 
Presidential candidate Rajapakse with the JVP.  To 
their credit, the Norwegians have kept at it when 
it would have been easy to walk away, as 
illustrated by the effort to get the LTTE to agree 
to an airport CFA implementation meeting and the 
announcement that former SLMM head Tronde Furhovde 
will visit soon as a Norwegian envoy.  The 
Norwegian and SLMM focus is to concentrate on 
keeping the CFA intact during the months ahead, 
especially during the election(s), so that after 
the new government emerges, a basis for a return 
to a tangible peace process will still exist. 
 
4.  (C) Third, and most challenging, the co-chairs 
need to talk bluntly about how they should 
proceed.  There is a tendency by all parties in 
Sri Lanka to push their country's problems onto 
foreign actors.  In the case of the peace process, 
this means a constant refrain of wondering when 
(to name a few) the co-chairs, or the Norwegians, 
or the Indians will bring peace to Sri Lanka.  A 
good case can be made that perhaps the co-chairs 
should step back a bit over the next few months 
and let Sri Lankans, especially during electoral 
season, sort out peace priorities for themselves. 
The challenge, of course, would be to do that 
without creating a sense of abandonment. 
Unfortunately, the Tigers' assassination of 
Foreign Minister Kadirgamar has poisoned the pre- 
electoral political atmosphere by exacerbating 
ethnic tensions and feeding the Sinhalese 
nationalist anti-peace lobby, led by the Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).  While co-chair 
statements in the past have tried to strike a 
careful balance between encouraging progress and 
condemning backsliding on both sides, the Tigers' 
ruthless, unprovoked killing of the Foreign 
Minister has unquestionably tipped the scales, and 
the co-chairs must say so explicitly or risk 
becoming completely irrelevant to the foundering 
peace process. 
 
5.  (C) The LTTE's outrageous behavior merits 
unambiguous condemnation-tied to immediate 
negative consequences-from the international 
community.  The co-chairs should state bluntly 
that LTTE actions are intolerable and unless LTTE 
behavior improves, the attitude and behaviour of 
the international community towards the LTTE will 
be different.  The statement must reinforce this 
stance with explicit actions, e.g., careful 
investigation of Tiger fundraising operations 
abroad; curtailing Tiger weapons procurement 
efforts overseas; an indefinite moratorium on 
outside visits to Kilinocchi except for Norwegian 
facilitators; a ban on LTTE visits to foreign 
capitals. 
 
6.  (C) While the co-chairs meeting in New York 
needs to get down to practical actions  rather 
than focusing on the contents of a statement, it 
is essential that a public pronouncement follow 
the meeting.  We suggest it incorporate the 
following themes: 
 
Begin text of draft statement 
 
The co-chairs met in New York on (date) and 
reviewed the situation in Sri Lanka in light of 
the brutal August 12 murder of former Foreign 
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar by the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the continued 
killings on the margins of the cease-fire 
agreement (CFA) and the impending Presidential 
election in Sri Lanka.  The co-chairs condemned 
the murder of Minister Kadirgamar in the strongest 
possible terms and called on the world community 
to take action against fundraising and weapons 
procurement by the LTTE.  In view of the LTTE's 
persistent disregard for the commitments it 
undertook in the CFA, culminating in the ruthless 
assassination of our respected colleague, the co- 
chairs decided that, with the exception of Norway, 
they will suspend any meetings with LTTE 
representatives in Kilinochchi or elsewhere, 
including foreign capitals.  They called on other 
countries to implement a similar policy.  The co- 
chairs also praised the Government of Sri Lanka 
(GSL) for its willingness, even in the immediate 
aftermath of Kadirgamar's murder, to meet in 
Sri Lanka with the LTTE to discuss improvements 
in CFA implementation and urged the LTTE to 
accept the GSL's offer to do so.  Moreover, 
the co-chairs called on all parties 
to dedicate themselves to maintaining the CFA in 
the months ahead, especially during the upcoming 
election in Sri Lanka.  Finally, the co-chairs 
expressed their full support for the tireless 
facilitation role played by Norway and valuable 
truce monitoring function performed by the Sri 
Lanka Monitoring Mission. 
 
End text of draft statement. 
 
7.  (U) Ambassador will meet with other co-chair 
chiefs of Mission on Tuesday, September 13 and 
will report their thoughts. 
LUNSTEAD 

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