US embassy cable - 05CAIRO7045

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 007045 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, EG 
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT 
 
Classified by DCM Stuart E. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary:  After absorbing Washington's clear message 
on reform, Gamal Mubarak's NDP clique, allied with ministers 
and advisors, was given unprecedented power over the conduct 
of the election.  The positives of September 7 -- sidelining 
of the NDP "old guard" and the security forces -- were a 
direct result of the reformers' influence.  The upcoming 
parliamentary elections pose a greater challenge, 
particularly given the weakness of the opposition parties and 
the lack of time.  While pressing now for international 
observers, we should support the vocal constituency of 
democracy activists by expanding our support for their 
home-grown monitoring efforts.  NDI and IRI are now 
well-established here and we recommend they send expanded 
assessment teams for the parliamentary polls.  We should 
receive at high levels Egyptian reformers visiting Washington 
to support their efforts.  We should also consider a 
high-level U.S. visit to Cairo before the parliamentary 
elections take place.  End summary. 
 
2.  (S) The September 7 election brought fundamental changes 
to democracy in Egypt.  Serious flaws remain, but the 
restrained conduct of the security forces and the 
transparency epitomized by Ayman Nour's second place finish, 
show that Mubarak received the unambiguous high level 
messages from Washington (both private and public) that 
things must change.  Pressing our advantage will entail using 
the wide range of openings and tools provided by September 7. 
 Septel contains detailed recommendations on how to engage 
resources such as NDI and IRI and openings such as that 
provided by the access (late, but now irreversible) afforded 
to domestic monitors.  At a strategic level, we need to 
exploit the new openness that Mubarak underlined in an 
address following an NDP meeting after the victory when he 
said "let us expose ourselves to the outside world with an 
innovative mind." 
 
3.  (S)  The economic reformers, who have consolidated their 
power around Mubarak, achieved new prominence in this 
election.  Minister of Trade Rashid Rashid, Investment 
Minister Mahmoud Mohieldin, and Finance Minister Youssef 
Boutros Ghali joined Gamal Mubarak and key members of his NDP 
clique -- such as steel tycoon Ahmed Ezz and political 
scientist Mohamed Kamal -- to run every aspect of the 
election.  Their success was reflected by the total 
sidelining of the NDP's old guard in managing the president's 
campaign and the fact that the security forces were kept on 
such a tight leash throughout.  Since the outcome was never 
in doubt, the amount of effort and expense spent on the way 
"candidate Mubarak" was portrayed reflects the reformers' 
stamp on this new aspect of Egyptian politics.  The Mubarak 
campaign, which led by example, and ensured, at least on TV, 
improved media access for the candidates, was a creation of 
the reformers.  We now need to get them to apply the same 
energy to improving the conduct of the parliamentary 
elections.  Continued support for the reformers as they 
embark on this task is essential. 
 
4.  (S)  Realistically, however, we face a far tougher 
challenge in the parliamentary elections.  We lose the 
advantage of the novelty of the presidential election and 
return to familiar ground for manipulation by the NDP party 
apparatus.  Individual NDP party hacks will not easily 
relinquish the power they have built up over decades -- 
especially when their livelihoods are at stake.  The old 
guard and security apparatus (likely with Mubarak's support) 
will do everything possible to block Muslim Brotherhood 
members running as independents from gaining seats.  Finally, 
the political parties arrayed against the NDP are in sad 
shape.  The Wafd, the only party with a national presence, 
saw the myth that it leads the opposition soundly debunked on 
September 7.  Ayman Nour's Ghad party is too new to have 
established itself throughout Egypt and it is unclear that it 
can field competitive candidates -- let alone cross the 23 
seat threshold needed to secure a spot in the 2011 
presidential election race. 
 
5. (S)  We may face our greatest criticism now from Egypt's 
democracy activists who are lined up against Mubarak.  In a 
sense, the half-way passable performance by Mubarak is the 
worst of all possible worlds for them.  They fear Mubarak may 
have made just enough concessions to accommodate the West, 
while maintaining his pre-eminent position.  Frustrations 
will mount, as will a lack of clear direction, given the 
paucity of political choice.  The urge to incite the security 
forces may strengthen--particularly in the "Kifaya" movement 
as it retools its message.  However, we must not fuel the 
opposition activists' ever-present suspicion that the USG 
will waver in its support for their full democratic rights 
because of Mubarak's conduct of the presidential polls.  The 
most effective way to address the errors in the conduct of 
the election may be provided by the emboldened domestic 
observers' movement, with the possibility this time that 
international observers can join them.  Our support 
(including financial support) will be critical as the 
monitors build on the precedent established in the September 
7 polls and prepare for the parliamentary elections.  We will 
back the activists through the difficult days ahead through 
direct advocacy, public diplomacy and organizational 
activities that emphasize their positive role on the process. 
 
 
6. (S)  NDI and IRI are now firmly established in Egypt and 
through a variety of programs can continue to influence the 
situation here.  In the near term we see two tracks.  The 
first should be to press the GOE to allow full international 
monitoring for the parliamentary elections.  The second, 
building on the September 7 precedent, should be to provide 
funding and encouragement to IRI and NDI to send larger-scale 
assessment teams to monitor the parliamentary elections.  The 
EU needs to be moved from the sidelines into a more active 
role.  Now that we have the precedent of foreign assessment 
teams operating in Egypt without credentials, the EU should 
send teams for the November and December balloting. 
 
7. (S)  Mubarak's focus on prosperity and job creation in the 
campaign suggests there will be more reformers in his new 
Cabinet.  Minister of Trade Rashid has launched a full-court 
press on the FTA.  Public support for his efforts will 
strengthen the reform ministers as the "old guard" reassesses 
its position in the wake of September 7.  The last redoubt of 
the latter group is the back room politics of electoral 
districts, party lists, and Shura (advisory) council seats. 
The old guard's strongest card is the 
sovereignty/interference argument that they deploy against 
statements from Washington on how Egypt should run its 
democracy.  We can counter this tactic with a carefully 
calibrated balance of public support and private pressure. 
Specifically, we should continue to support members of the 
Gamal Mubarak reform group when they come to Washington 
through high-level meetings throughout the Administration and 
public statements in support of their role in Egyptian 
society.  Privately, we need to continue to underscore to 
senior GOE officials that the U.S. and the broader 
international community will be paying very close attention 
to the transparency of the parliamentary elections process. 
We also propose, now that the September 7 elections have 
passed without major upset, that a senior visitor, such as 
Deputy Secretary Zoellick, consider visiting Cairo before the 
Parliamentary campaigns begin in late October to reinforce 
this message. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
 
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