US embassy cable - 05AMMAN7273

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 007273 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015 
TAGS: PREL, EFIN, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: READOUT ON JORDANIAN MINISTERS' SEPT. 10 VISIT TO 
BAGHDAD 
 
REF: AMMAN 6689 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (U) In the first visit of a senior Arab state official 
to Iraq since the fall of Saddam, Jordanian PM Adnan 
Badran, accompanied by four other cabinet members, 
met in Baghdad September 10 with Iraqi Vice President 
Adel Abdul Mehdi and Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari. 
 
2.  (C) Jordanian Foreign Minister Farouq Kasrawi, who 
accompanied the PM, gave Charge a readout September 
11.  Kasrawi called the visit "very positive."  He said 
PM Jaafari told the Jordanian visitors of his desire to 
further strengthen relations.  Jaafari referred to Jordan 
as "Iraq's lung," and was pleased that PM Badran had 
been the first Arab leader to visit; it had "cleared the 
air" in the complex bilateral relationship. 
 
3.  (C) Characterizing the meetings as positive overall, 
Kasrawi said the Iraqis had raised a few "irritants" in 
the Jordan-Iraq relationship.  Delays at the border 
clearing truck traffic were a problem, for example. 
(Comment:  We estimate at least 40 percent of Iraq's 
imports come through the Iraqi-Jordanian border 
crossing point at Karama/Trebil.  End Comment.)  The 
Jordanians replied by describing Jordanian efforts to 
tighten security, while trying to expedite traffic. 
Jaafari also mentioned the King's late 2004 "Shia crescent" 
remark, but did not dwell on it.  Jaafari expressed 
concern about what he called "negative comments" 
about the ITG in Jordanian mosques and in the 
Jordanian press.  Badran reportedly replied "you should 
hear what they say about me." 
 
4.  (C) Kasrawi said Jaafari wanted to revitalize the 
Jordan-Iraq joint ministerial committee, and wanted to 
come himself to Amman to reciprocate the visit and 
chair the next meeting.  In sum, Kasrawi said the visit 
was "an ice breaker, long overdue, but there will be 
more." 
 
5.  (C) Kasrawi asked Charge to convey his sincere 
thanks for all the logistical and security help that 
Embassy Baghdad and the U.S. military provided for 
this visit. 
 
6.  (C) Prime Minister Badran's spokesman Ali Al Ayed, 
who accompanied the delegation, gave Polcouns a 
similar readout. He commented that Jaafari "at first 
frankly expressed some bitterness" over what he 
described as the Arab states' "boycott" of the ITG. 
Jaafari reportedly asked how Jordanian media could 
describe insurgents as "martyrs"; "isn't an Iraqi child a 
martyr too?"  In reply to PolCouns' query, Al Ayed 
said the Iraqis did not express dissatisfaction with 
Jordanian efforts to intercept would-be jihadists trying 
to make their way to Iraq.  Al Ayed said the atmosphere 
soon improved markedly, that Badran had assured 
Jaafari that the Jordanian media did not represent the 
GOJ view, and that he expected to see further 
ministerial-level meetings soon within the framework 
of the Joint Committee.  These will include discussions 
between finance ministers of the balance remaining 
from the old Jordan-Iraq trade protocol, a meeting 
between interior ministers on border security, and 
discussions between planning ministers on proposals to 
improve the transport and border infrastructure between 
Aqaba and Baghdad. 
 
Islamic Action Front Blasts Visit 
--------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Jordan's Islamic Action Front (IAF) was quoted in 
international media as criticizing Badran for supporting 
"a fraudulent Iraqi government," a condemnation we 
suspect will resonate with ordinary Jordanians, who 
polls show continue to oppose the U.S. presence in Iraq 
by large majorities. 
 
8.  (C) Comment:  This visit, which was prominently 
covered by the local media, came at the King's 
direction.  With Jordan's strategic interests entwined 
with our own in Iraq, Jordanian officials will continue 
to look for ways to help the political process there and 
to reach beyond the Sunni Muslim community.  They 
recognize that, because of the heavy historical baggage 
encumbering the bilateral relationship, Jordan will have 
to continue to create opportunities to demonstrate 
readiness to help the new leadership and new currents 
in Iraq.  End Comment. 
HALE