US embassy cable - 05ALGIERS1911

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POST LUGAR MISSION: ALGERIAN FM BEDJAOUI ON WESTERN SAHARA

Identifier: 05ALGIERS1911
Wikileaks: View 05ALGIERS1911 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Algiers
Created: 2005-09-11 12:52:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PBTS PHUM MO AG WI Polisario
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 001911 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PBTS, PHUM, MO, AG, WI, Polisario 
SUBJECT: POST LUGAR MISSION:  ALGERIAN FM BEDJAOUI ON 
WESTERN SAHARA 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) In an August 31 meeting on several topics with FM 
Bedjaoui, Ambassador reaffirmed President Bush's appreciation 
for Algeria's help in facilitating the release of the final 
404 Moroccan prisoners previously held by the Polisario. 
Making reference to President Bush's letter to President 
Bouteflika sent shortly after the conclusion of Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Lugar's visit to the 
region, Ambassador reiterated our appreciation.  Bedjaoui 
said Algeria appreciated the written message from the U.S. 
President and was further gratified by Morocco's gesture to 
grant agrement to Presidential Chief of Staff Belkheir as the 
next Ambassador to the Kingdom the same day the request was 
received.  For its part, the GOA approved Morocco's recent 
request for agrement to its candidate with the same speed. 
 
2.  (C) The prisoner release by the Polisario and the quick 
agreement for Belkheir were positive gestures, affirmed 
Bedjaoui.  More forward momentum was needed in economic and 
cultural exchanges.  Leaving alone the question of the 
Western Sahara, both Algeria and Morocco needed to move 
forward.  "Algeria is not the enemy of Morocco.  I am not the 
enemy of Morocco," emphasized the FM.  Bedjaoui noted that in 
1975 the UNGA had asked the International Court in the Hague 
for an advisory opinion on legal issues regarding the Western 
Sahara.  "I pleaded the case (for self-determination) as a 
diplomat.  Did that make me an enemy of Morocco?  No."  For 
30 years, Bedjaoui claimed, Morocco has made little to no 
effort to move toward the position of the international 
community on the Western Sahara issue despite having 
originally argued alongside Algeria for the right of 
self-determination, when Spain was still the colonial power. 
 
 
3. (C) Algeria, continued Bedjaoui, respected the Moroccan 
psychology on Western Sahara and had thus shown great 
flexibility in agreeing to the Baker Plan despite the fact 
that it did not provide for a true exercise of 
self-determination for the Sahrawi people.  Instead of 
limiting referendum voting rights strictly to the indigenous 
Sahrawis, the Baker Plan extended voting rights to over 
110,000 Moroccans as well.  With Algeria's strong 
encouragement, the Polisario had nonetheless accepted the 
participation of these Moroccans in a referendum. 
 
4. (C) Ambassador reiterated U.S. hopes that both sides would 
be able to seize upon the POW release to build a more 
positive climate in the region.  He noted that there was a 
serious problem of communication on both sides and that 
Belkheir's posting in Rabat hopefully would help reduce 
communication problems.  Well-intentioned actions by one side 
or the other were not always properly understood because they 
had not been adequately explained or privately briefed in 
advance.  Morocco's announcement lifting the visa 
requirement, for example, was not briefed in advance and thus 
caught the Algerians by surprise, prompting a negative rather 
than a positive reaction.  The abrupt canceling of Prime 
Minister Ouyahia's visit by Morocco, which misread Algerian 
seriousness about using the visit to move toward a reopening 
of the border, had also caused problems. 
 
5. (C) For its part, Ambassador continued, Algeria made a 
"serious mistake" in not responding in a more concrete and 
positive way to King Mohammed VI's significant gesture of 
visiting Algiers for the Arab League Summit.  Publicly, the 
perception was that the King had made a major gesture but had 
gotten nothing in return.  This in turn has affected the 
Moroccan mindset, strengthening those who argued against 
efforts to pursue rapprochement. If the situation was to 
improve, both sides would need to demonstrate greater 
sensitivity toward needs and concerns of the other.  Bedjaoui 
responded that it was not too late to improve matters. 
 
 
ERDMAN 

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