US embassy cable - 05ATHENS2371

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 002371 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2014 
TAGS: CY, GR, PGOV, PREL, TU, EU, TURKEY 
SUBJECT: MOLYVIATIS WORRIED TURKEY/EU IN DOWNWARD SPIRAL 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles P. Ries.  Reasons 1.4(b/d). 
 
 
1.  (C) On the margins of the Prime Minister_ September 10 
Thessaloniki Fair speech (septel), Foreign Minister Molyviatis 
told Ambassador that he was worried political pressures in Cyprus 
and France were pushing the Turkey/EU issue into a downward 
spiral. A glum Molyviatis, who had assured Ambassador on 
September 8 that the Cypriot hard line at Coreper September 7 had 
been pre-arranged with the French for political effect in both 
countries but would not go so far as to endanger October 3, was 
by Saturday night in a less sanguine mood. Public opinion was 
"very bad" in Greece, and "even worse" in Cyprus, he said. 
Molyviatis  admitted that he had directed MFA Spokesman 
Koumoutsakos to issue a press statement on Friday September 9 
critical of UK Presidency impartiality as "a signal" to Foreign 
Secretary Straw, but argued that Straw_ cheerleading for Turkey 
 
SIPDIS 
(in the IHT article where Straw is reported saying that it was 
"vital for the EU to draw Turkey into the EU at all costs") were 
provoking the French and Cypriots, and making a reasonable 
compromise on the counter statement that much harder. 
 
2.  (C) Molyviatis said that the situation was made much more 
difficult by the fact that Cypriot President Papadopoulos was 
presently in Florida for a checkup on problems with his throat 
and Molyviatis had been unable to speak to him directly for 
"three days."  He had been passing messages to Papadopoulos 
through Presidential National Security Adviser Tzounis but could 
not be sure he was communicating directly with Papadopoulos. 
Asked if he thought Papadopoulos was avoiding him, Molyviatis 
said he did not think so.  The Cypriot President had had a 
procedure on his throat and simply could not talk.  But in 
Papadopulos_absence, Cypriot Foreign Minister Iacovou was in 
charge.  Iacovou was "impossible" on the Turkey/EU issue and "I 
simply will not talk to him," said Molyviatis.  Even if his 
throat problems were to be cleared up, Papadopoulos would be 
spending the coming week at the UNGA in New York, limiting his 
ability to contain Cypriot political hysteria at home, explained 
Molyviatis. 
 
3.  (C) Ambassador said this news would be of great concern to 
Washington, which shared Greece_ strategic view that an October 
3 start to the EU/Turkey negotiations would be essential to all 
of our interests.  The U.S. would want to be helpful.  What 
pressure points would Molyviatis suggest? 
 
4.  (C) Despite the situation, Molyviatis urged the U.S. not/not 
to become publicly involved at this point.  The French, already 
making trouble for domestic political reasons, would like nothing 
better than to add resistance to the U.S. (viz., "we shouldn_ 
let the U.S. define the shape of the EU") to their rationale. 
That could kill it, he said. 
 
5.  (C) Molyviatis said that he had been told to expect a call 
from Foreign Secretary Straw soon and promised a readout for 
Ambassador.   He opined that, "in retrospect," it was clearly a 
mistake not to have settled the counter-statement at the Gymnich 
in Wales.  Although a special GAERC on September 26 was now a 
virtual certainty, it was clear he didn_ relish the prospect. 
RIES