US embassy cable - 05NDJAMENA1377

C O N F I D E N T I A L  NDJAMENA 001377 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, INR/GGI, 
PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS 
FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, 
ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREF, KAWC, CD, SU, Darfur Policy and Rebels 
SUBJECT: SALIM ON THE NEXT ROUND OF DARFUR PEACE TALKS, SLM 
CONFERENCE 
 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary: During his visit to Chad for consultations 
over September 8-9, the African Union's Special Envoy for 
Darfur, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, shared his views on the 
upcoming round of peace talks.  Salim is committed to 
starting the talks on September 15, but acknowledges that 
members of Mini Minawi's faction of the Sudan Liberation 
Movement (SLM) will likely come late if their leadership 
conference holds.  In his meeting with SLM members in 
N'Djamena, Salim urged them to be prepared to send 
representatives to the workshops while the conference is in 
progress.  SLM expressed their concerns that SLM members 
cannot be at the conference and the workshops at the same 
time.  SLM told Salim that they cannot go to Abuja without 
holding the conference because the field commanders are 
threatening to disavow them and the negotiations.  Salim's 
position on the postponement is deepening SLM suspicions of 
him and the AU.  Nonetheless, with no financing in sight for 
the conference, SLM members are flexible, but becoming 
increasingly discouraged that they will not be strong enough 
or united going into the most important round of talks.  We 
share their concerns that the same negative dynamic will once 
again play out in Abuja if SLM does not have a chance to 
organize itself and its negotiating agenda.  On the touchy 
issue for Chad of its co-mediation on Darfur, Salim's visit 
also appears to have alleviated some of the strain in the 
AU-Chad relationship over Chad's role.  End Summary. 
 
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START DATE FOR NEXT ROUND 
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2.  (SBU)  Salim, together with AU negotiators Sam Ibok and 
Boubou Niang, traveled to N'Djamena as part of their 
consultations in various capitals in advance of the next 
round of peace talks.  During their visit, Ambassador and P/E 
officer discussed the issue of the SLM conference and the 
timing of the re-start of the talks with them on September 8. 
 Salim said that the September 15 date best accommodated the 
views of the different parties.  He said that the GOS, JEM, 
and SLM Chairman wanted them sooner.  Salim, who is traveling 
to New York for the World Summit at the U.N., from September 
14-16, said that had he known about his invitation earlier, 
he would have proposed starting the talks later.  In the 
upcoming round of talks, Salim said the workshops will be run 
by experts in power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and security 
arrangements.  The talks will use three resource persons to 
run each session, which the AU would like to do concurrently. 
 President Obasanjo asked that the AU consider holding the 
talks in Ota, Ogun State at a conference facility there. 
Ibok and Niang are flying to Lagos in the coming days to view 
the facilities.  The idea is to isolate the participants from 
outside influence and distractions. 
 
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SLM CONFERENCE 
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3.  (SBU)  Salim said that it is possible for the SLM group 
to have the conference in the next two weeks, but it would be 
difficult.  In his opinion, international funding is not 
forthcoming because the conference is not all-inclusive and 
would appear to be an attempt to oust Abdelwahid.  Salim told 
us that the substantive discussions would not start until 
both groups were represented. 
 
4. (SBU)  Ambassador Ibok raised the possibility that the 
Mini-Abdelwahid split cannot be repaired and that the AU will 
be negotiating with three rebel movements: SLM-Abdelwahid, 
SLM-Mini, and JEM.  For practical purposes, this is what is 
already happening.  The AU sent its requests for participants 
to both Abdelwahid and Mini and held consultations with both 
separately.  Salim described his meeting with Mini and 
subsequent visit to Jebel Marra as inconclusive.  He came 
away from the trip with the impression that Mini and the 
Zaghawa have the top field commanders in their camp and the 
Fur and other ethnic groups constitute the middle and lower 
ranks with loyalty to Abdelwahid. 
 
 
5.  (SBU)  Salim expressed his concern that the conference is 
being planned by one group and will solidify the ethnic split 
within SLM rather than repair it.  Salim said that Mini's 
group could expand the meeting's scope and participation if 
it found ways to undercut Abdelwahid's refusal to attend, 
such as holding it in a neutral place and using an 
international facilitator.  Salim's proposed alternative is 
for the donors to finance an all-inclusive conference to be 
held during a break in the talks in late October. 
 
6.  (SBU)  SLM members in N'Djamena met with Salim on 
September 9 to discuss their plans for the conference and 
request to push back the Abuja talks to October 1.  According 
to Abdeljabar Dosa and Traiyo Ali, Salim explained the AU's 
reasoning for the September 15 date.  Dosa and the others 
told Salim that their group was not part of the Dar es Salam 
discussions which confirmed the re-start date.  They are 
going ahead with conference preparations. The SLM members 
told Salim that the field commanders are demanding the 
conference.  The "politicos" are literally "under the gun" on 
this issue.  The commanders want their positions well-known 
by the negotiators prior to the upcoming talks.  Moreover, 
the commanders are complaining that they have not seen "their 
Chairman" (Abdelwahid Nur) in over a year.  Dosa said this 
sentiment is shared by commanders in Jebel Marra as well. 
They want Abdelwahid and Mini Minawi to explain what they 
have been doing and where the peace talks are going.  Without 
these consultations, the negotiators believe the field 
commanders will disavow them and the peace process.  SLM will 
remain flexible and consider options such as sending one or 
two people to the workshops, according to Ali.  The problem 
is that key members of the negotiating teams need to attend 
the workshops, but should also be at the SLM conference. 
Even if SLM sent a few "seat-warmers", the result of this 
arrangement will once again be an unprepared SLM.  Ali and 
Dosa are discouraged by the lack of response to their funding 
appeals for the conference. 
 
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CHAD MEDIATION ISSUE 
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7.  (C)  While in N'Djamena, the team also met with President 
Idriss Deby, Foreign Minister Ahmad Allam-mi, and JC Chairman 
General Ali.  According to Salim, President Deby was still 
angry over attempts to oust or diminish Chad's role as a 
co-mediator in the process.  Salim said it is clear that the 
Chadians felt humiliated.  Ambassador Wall asked Salim the 
status of Chad's current role.  Salim said that he is the 
AU's mediator and he will be "assisted by" the Chad mediation 
team.  He said that the Chadians accept this arrangement and 
they will continue to play an important role in the mediation 
efforts.  Salim described General Ali as particularly helpful 
in Abuja and noted that the Chadians' know the movements and 
the terrain better than other international partners. 
 
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COMMENT 
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8.  (C)  Despite Salim's insistence, practically-speaking, 
the September 15 start date is somewhat untenable.  The AU is 
still deciding on the venue for a meeting that should start 
in less than a week.  The logistics of bringing the rebel 
movements should already be underway.  Salim himself will be 
in New York.  It is entirely possible the start-up could slip 
a week, which could give SLM more time for the conference. 
Salim's scenario that includes an October break for a 
conference will require a donor to take charge in planning 
for it to succeed.  In either case, the break between Mini 
and Abdelwahid appears unbridgeable and we should be prepared 
once again to deal with two separate SLM groups, possibly 
three, for the upcoming talks.  Meanwhile, the distrust of 
Salim and the AU among Mini's supporters is growing daily. 
They interpret his intransigence on postponing the talks for 
two weeks as a sign of weak leadership and his bias in favor 
of the Government of Sudan, Justice and Equality Movement, 
and Abdelwahid.  They are looking to the international 
community to place pressure on the AU to delay the talks.  On 
the issue of Chad's co-mediation on Darfur, the Joint 
Commission meeting and Salim's consultations in N'Djamena 
 
 
over September 8-9 also helped patch up Chad's strained 
relationship with the AU. 
 
9.  (U)  Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL 
 
 
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