US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA8516

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 008516 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL, SNAR, PHUM, MARR, ETRD, CO 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT URIBE'S VISIT TO 
WASHINGTON 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Milton K. Drucker, reasons: 1.4 B & B. 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) President Uribe arrives in Washington September 14-15 
for a visit with the legislative branch on the eve of a 
Constitutional Court decision on his right to seek immediate 
reelection.  The military situation is at a strategic 
standoff and both the GOC and illegal armed groups appear to 
be assessing their recent performance and planning for future 
operations.  Uribe is likely to request the maintenance of 
current U.S. funding levels and may seek additional 
intelligence or military support.  The GOC paramilitary 
demobilization process is on track; almost 10,000 have 
demobilized, and the GOC expects another 8,000 to demobilize 
by the end of the year.  Added to approximately 7,000 
deserters from armed groups, some 25,000 fighters will have 
been removed from the battlefield by December.  U.S. and 
other donor funding for their reintegration into society 
remains a critical issue that Uribe is likely to discuss. 
Uribe may raise again the possibility of U.S. funding for a 
fourth aerial eradication package.  He has instructed his FTA 
negotiating team to lay all its cards on the table in 
Washington talks.  End summary. 
 
 
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Reelection Decision Approaching 
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2.  (C) President Uribe arrives in the U.S. for an 
essentially legislative branch visit September 14-15 on the 
eve of a Constitutional Court decision (expected between late 
September and early November) that will decide his immediate 
political future; if he is allowed to run for reelection in 
May, he will win.  His approval ratings exceed 65 percent. 
If he is not allowed to run, Uribe has said he will support 
the democratic process, including supporting a presidential 
candidate whom he believes would continue his policies. 
Congressional elections will take place next March. 
 
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Human Rights 
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3.  (C) Colombia has made steady but slow progress on human 
rights cases involving military abuse or collaboration with 
paramilitaries. The GOC has taken positive steps on several 
outstanding cases.  Uribe delivered an important human rights 
speech August 27, in which he called for progress on a number 
of prominent human rights cases that are of interest to the 
U.S.  The U.S.-backed switch to an oral trial system has had 
a successful beginning, where it has been implemented.  The 
Colombian military justice system is reforming slowly. 
 
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Military Balance 
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4.  (C) The military situation in Colombia is at a strategic 
standoff in advance of the upcoming reelection decision. 
Both the GOC security forces and illegal armed groups appear 
to be assessing their recent performance and planning for 
future operations.  Colombian military efforts in the Joint 
Task Force-Omega area of operations have ended FARC control 
of this area, but this effort has ended.  The ELN continues 
to weaken, and paramilitary numbers are declining through 
demobilizations.  However, the FARC continues to conduct 
terrorist attacks of limited scope as it attempts to 
discredit President Uribe's Democratic Security policy.  U.S. 
security cooperation assistance has been instrumental in 
attaining the current level of security in the country. 
President Uribe is likely to insist that the next twelve 
months are critical to the security effort and request the 
maintenance of current U.S. assistance levels, and may even 
make specific requests for additional intelligence support, 
military equipment and advisory assistance. 
 
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Free Trade 
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5.  (C) Negotiations on an FTA with Andean countries is 
stalled but the September 6 meeting between Presidents Toledo 
and Uribe and their trade teams may prove to have broken the 
logjam.   In what appears to be a breakthrough, Colombian 
Foreign Minister Barco told Ambassador Wood September 7 that, 
after being pressed by Peruvian President Toledo, President 
Uribe has ordered the team to &lay all their cards on the 
table.8  Uribe wants the negotiations to conclude in 
October, because all four negotiating parties face elections 
next year and because the WTO Hong Kong ministerial and other 
priorities will distract USTR later this year.  Barco 
emphasized that Uribe wants to close this deal right away. 
Uribe's instructions may present an opportunity to move the 
process forward.  If the GOC in fact presents an improved 
offer, we should welcome it and follow through with a quick 
response.  If the GOC does not present an improved offer, it 
would indicate that the President and his negotiating team 
are not on the same sheet of music, in which case we should 
bring the problem to Uribe himself during his visit. 
 
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Paramilitary Demobilization 
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6.  (C) The paramilitary demobilization process is on track. 
Almost 10,000 have demobilized to date and the GOC expects 
another 8,000 to demobilize before the end of the year.  When 
added to approximately 7,000 deserters under Uribe, about 
25,000 fighters will have been removed from the battlefield 
by December.  The estimated cost for the GOC's plan to 
reinsert demobilized paramilitaries into society before the 
end of 2007 is $171 million.  Colombia plans to invest $88 
million of its own resources and will request $48 million 
from the U.S., with the balance to be covered by other 
international donors and the private sector.  The Colombian 
budget covers the total costs of the AUC demobilization, as 
well as initial reincorporation assistance, such as civil 
registry and social services.  The Colombian Government's 
reinsertion plan is the weakest link in the demobilization 
program.  More than 9,000 paramilitaries require immediate 
reintegration assistance and this number will double over the 
next three months.  The DR program is severely under-funded 
for 2005 and 2006, which puts the peace process, and 
international support of it, at risk.  U.S. assistance is 
urgently needed to fill critical needs in four interrelated 
components and at the corresponding funding levels:  (1) 
reintegration of ex-combatants - $29 million; (2) 
prosecution, legal processing and monitoring of ex-combatants 
- $12.2 million; (3) verification of the DR process - $4.5 
million; and (4) implementation of the victims, reparation 
fund - $2.3 million.  Both USAID and DOJ may redirect $19 
million and $1.5 million, respectively, from their existing 
programs to support DR.  Deputies will meet October 5, to 
consider USG support for their DR program. 
 
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Aerial Eradication 
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7.  (C) As in previous visits, Uribe is likely to request 
Washington assistance in providing funds for a fourth spray 
package for the aerial eradication program.  The GOC cost 
estimate of $100 to $120 million is only for purchasing the 
necessary air assets.  It has never included the real costs 
of training personnel, providing of intelligence and 
security, and operating and maintaining the fourth spray 
package.  Chairman Hyde and several members voiced 
congressional support for a fourth Colombia spray package in 
a letter to the House Appropriations Committee Chairman Jerry 
Lewis in July.  A fourth spray package would certainly 
increase the area that could be eradicated, but this could 
only be done if there were sufficient money for the first two 
years to operate and maintain the package.  Post estimates 
that the minimum total cost for purchasing and operating a 
fourth spray package for two years to be $225 million.  If 
funding were made available, a fourth spray package would be 
a valuable tool in combating the increasing replant rate of 
coca in Colombia.  However, an increase in air fleet size 
will require additional pilots and mechanics and will delay 
Post's training and Colombianization timetables. 
 
8.  (C) Various GOC officials have made the pitch for USG 
assistance for manual eradication during their many visits to 
Washington.  While manual eradication can be an important 
tool in eliminating illicit cultivation in Colombia, aerial 
eradication is the only efficient and safe manner to 
accomplish the mission.  Embassy believes that manual 
eradication is much more dangerous than aerial eradication 
and it is quite limited in the amount of hectares that can be 
eradicated in a year.  We have provided limited equipment and 
support to Colombia's manual eradication program and will 
continue to do so in the future; however, aerial eradication 
is still our primary eradication tool and we do not believe 
that significant USG resources should be devoted to manual 
eradication, since it will take resources away from our top 
priority ) aerial eradication. 
WOOD