US embassy cable - 05PARIS6133

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 006133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2015 
TAGS: KNNP, PARM, TRGY, ENRG, FR, IAEA 
SUBJECT: MORE FRENCH THOUGHTS ON IAEA COMMITTEE ON 
SAFEGUARDS AND VERIFICATION 
 
REF: A) STATE 159113 B) PARIS 5866 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, Reason 1 
.4 B/D 
 
1. (C) MFA official covering IAEA issues Hugues de 
Longevialle shared with us September 7 some additional 
comments on U.S. proposals for the Committee on Safeguards 
and Verification.  His general assessment was that the MFA 
agreed with many of our proposals.  He also shared the 
following thoughts with us in no specific order of importance: 
 
-- On general points of discussion, Longevialle cautioned 
that it was not in the IAEA's mandate to "enforce compliance 
with nuclear nonproliferation obligations."  The IAEA could 
monitor, but enforcement actions were a UNSC responsibility. 
Additionally, he suggested that it might be useful to review 
the IAEA's "93 plus 2" program, as it might help with 
verification issues. 
 
-- Elaborating further on the question of detection of 
clandestine activities, he said we need to be clear about the 
respective roles of the Agency and the Secretariat.  By way 
of example, he said it could become a problem if the 
Committee, operating under the Additional Protocol, 
discovered undeclared activity, made it public, sought 
referral to UNSC under 1540, and then found itself unable to 
work directly with the proliferator due to the Committee's 
lack of enforcement responsibilities.  Longevialle opined 
that the NSG might be better suited for enforcement. 
 
-- Longevialle noted that we must take care that U.S. 
proposals not duplicate the role of the Standing Advisory 
Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI).  Referring back 
to our Non-paper (long-term actions), he said that the SAGSI 
was better at evaluating and reporting compliance to the 
Secretariat. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
-- France would also propose additional transparency measures 
for the consideration of the Committee.  Specifically, France 
would suggest the reporting of high-enriched uranium, i.e., 
countries would communicate to the Agency information on 
their stocks of high-enriched uranium. 
 
2. (C) Additional points:  France is fine with the U.S. offer 
to update the Annexes to the Additional Protocol, although, 
Longevialle added, care should be taken not to expand or 
intrude on the NSG's responsibilities. 
 
-- Longevialle said the MFA was unclear on the intent of our 
final comments on "confidentiality," under the "longer-term 
actions." 
 
-- On format of the proposed meetings for the Committee, 
Longevialle said France is reticent about the idea for four 
meetings per year.  He said that many delegations would find 
it difficult to participate.  He suggested fewer meetings, 
perhaps three meetings annually of three-days length, but 
obviously the length of each meeting would depend on the 
issues for discussion.  The French, however, would support 
informal consultations in between the scheduled  meetings. 
 
3. (C) In response to our queries for French suggestions on 
candidates to chair the Committee, Longevialle admitted that 
the MFA had not focused on the question, although it should 
be someone who represents a balance between technical staff 
and political-level representation.  He conjectured that the 
candidate could also be chosen from outside the IAEA, 
possibly a retired senior IAEA official. 
 
--  Referring to our "medium-term action" suggestions for the 
working group of technical experts, Longevialle put in a plug 
for the EU's European Safeguards Association for Research and 
Development (ESARDA), noting that this agency could also 
provide input to the technical working group. 
 
-- Longevialle's last comment pertained to the "medium-term 
action" proposal for review of the IAEA role in investigating 
and reporting weaponization activities.  The MFA strongly 
believe