US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2465

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 002465 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2015 
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, NL, NATO, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/NATO: DUTCH THOUGHTS ON NATO INFORMAL 
DEFENSE MINISTERIAL 
 
REF: USNATO 529 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Polmiloff met with Sebastian Reyn (Deputy 
Director, Department of General Policy Affairs, MOD) 
September 9 to discuss Dutch thinking leading up to the 
September 13-14 NATO Informal Defense Ministerial in Berlin. 
Reyn handed over an 11-point paper (provided below) that 
Dutch Defense Minister Kamp will deliver in Berlin.  Reyn 
explained that Kamp took NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer's request seriously to propose what NATO might look 
like in the next 15 years.  As such, Reyn suggested that some 
of Kamp's proposals are controversial for some European 
Allies and lie "outside the box". 
 
2. (C) Cont. Summary: The paper advocates an expanded role 
for the NATO Response Force (NRF), a greater NATO role in 
maritime security, a major policy change in favor of missile 
defense for Europe, and increased NATO coordination with the 
UN, the EU, and the African Union (AU).  Polmiloff also 
discussed Washington's recent proposal for a mini-summit in 
2006, followed by a major summit in 2008.  Reyn noted that 
the Dutch would examine the proposal, but added that a 
mini-summit focusing entirely upon transformation and 
capabilities "might not be enough".  End summary. 
 
NATO Response Force 
------------------- 
 
3. (C) Reyn explained that the Dutch have come around on 
using the NRF more frequently.  Previously, the Dutch had 
erred on the side of caution, siding on occasion with the 
French to limit the use of the NRF.  Now, the Dutch are more 
willing to support NRF deployments.  Reyn noted that there 
are still some concerns regarding undermining force 
generation efforts -- the NRF should not fill gaps that 
should be filled through other mechanisms.  Reyn added that 
the Dutch see little distinction between the NRF and the 
strategic reserve forces; this burdens the Alliance with 
unnecessary financial costs.  Reyn concluded with a pitch to 
get the USG more involved with the NRF through force 
contributions -- hopefully land-based.  He added that many 
Allies see USG participation in the NRF as an opportunity to 
enhance interoperability by "working with the best". 
Polmiloff suggested that USG land-based assets were actively 
engaged in other efforts in the global war on terrorism. 
 
Maritime Security and Terrorism 
------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Reyn stated that the Dutch will actively support NATO 
Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer's recent paper regarding 
 
SIPDIS 
NATO's valued added contribution in the fight against 
terrorism.  Reyn suggested that NATO might play an active 
role in enhancing maritime security and by fighting piracy. 
He argued that current NATO maritime operations, such as 
Operation Active Endeavour, were largely symbolic and limited 
in scope -- NATO should focus on areas with high rates of 
piracy, such as the Straits of Malacca or the coast of 
Somalia. 
 
Missile Defense 
--------------- 
 
5. (C) Reyn noted that the Dutch are beginning to think about 
a missile defense system to protect the European theater -- 
this reflects a major policy change for the Dutch government. 
 Previously, the Dutch considered missile defense too costly 
and controversial.  However, with uncertainty over the 
missile programs of a number of countries -- most notably 
Iran -- Reyn stated that a missile defense system was now 
necessary.  He added that Defense Minister Kamp is very 
interested in missile defense, having first mentioned it 
during a speech in April 2004.  Kamp's speech at Berlin will 
officially acknowledge that the Dutch are now in favor of 
missile defense for Europe. 
 
Coordination with UN, EU, and the African Union 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
6. (C) Reyn stated that NATO should be more forthcoming and 
responsive to the UN; coordination between the two 
organizations is lacking.  As such, NATO should make clear 
that it is willing to deploy in support of a UN operation 
once the NRF is fully operational in October 2006.  In the 
same vein, NATO could also offer its services to assist 
planning and logistics in support of a UN operation.  Reyn 
added that the Netherlands is finding it very difficult to 
participate in inefficient and inadequately-planned UN 
missions; NATO support to the UN would assist in this regard. 
 Reyn also suggested that NATO should become more actively 
engaged in security sector reform, and increase ties with the 
African Union to help it become a more effective regional 
organization. 
 
Two Summit Approach 
------------------- 
 
7. (C) Polmiloff pitched the two-summit outlined in reftel. 
Reyn confirmed that the Dutch government is examining the 
idea, and supports it in principle.  He suggested, however, 
that a mini-summit in 2006 focusing just on transformation 
and capabilities may not "be enough".  Polmiloff stressed the 
importance of nailing down transformation at 26 prior to 
enlargement considerations.  Plus, a summit focusing on 
transformation and capabilities should focus on a fully 
operational NRF, success in Afghanistan, force generation 
reform, and "recapitalizing" the Alliance.  Reyn noted that 
the Dutch have looked at possible ways to reform the NATO 
cost-sharing mechanism, but had no new initiatives. 
 
Kamp Paper for Berlin NATO Informal Defense Ministerial 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
8. Begin text: 
 
- A Practical Vision for a Stronger NATO 
 
- Henk Kamp, NL Minister of Defense 
 
The Secretary General, in his letter of July 29th, expressed 
justifiable concern about the slow progress on NATO's 
transformation.  He called for a discussion of the political 
environment in which NATO will be operating in the future.  I 
will gladly take up his call by offering you my thoughts 
about what the Alliance should accomplish in the next ten 
years.  By doing so, I hope to contribute to the 
Comprehensive Political Guidance to be completed before the 
end of this year. 
 
NATO's "to do list" in the next ten years, as I see it, must 
include the following: 
 
- Maintain the military predominance of the alliance:  NATO 
should continue to be the world's most powerful military 
coalition.  Transatlantic cooperation within the NATO 
framework provides the best guarantee for peace and security 
in the NATO treaty area -- and in particular on the European 
continent -- in the 21st century.  It also continues to 
provide an indispensable avenue for projecting stability in 
other parts of the world and for supporting the international 
rule of law. 
 
- Provide a more relevant forum for security consultation 
among allies: NATO's future depends on the willingness of all 
allies -- North American and European -- to consult each 
other in the world's important security issues and t build a 
security consensus.  There is room for improvement, both in 
the context of discussing NATO's current operations (e.g. 
Afghanistan) and beyond.  If NATO is indeed based on shared 
values and interests, is there not much to be gained from a 
more active political discussion?  Is this not the best way 
to foster transatlantic unity?  I support the efforts of the 
SG and encourage him to come forward with further proposals. 
 
- Strengthen NATO as an instrument for collective action:  In 
today's world, only effective multilateral action can provide 
lasting solutions.  Against this background, it is vital to 
make the NATO Response Force (NRF) into a more effective and 
useful tool.  There must be a greater willingness to deploy 
the NRF, of course without using the NRF to fill gaps that 
should be filled otherwise.  The sharp distinction between 
the NRF and the Strategic Reserve Forces (SRF) makes little 
sense in practice and burdens us with unnecessarily high 
costs.  We should reconsider the policy on this issue.  In 
addition, I encourage greater involvement of the US, not only 
with critical enablers but also with US troops in the NRF to 
underscore that it is NATO's pre-eminent tool for collective 
action. 
 
- Ensure the interoperability of our armed forces: One of 
NATO's most important functions continues to be to ensure 
that our armed forces can operate together.  Stardardisation, 
interoperability, and collective generation of military 
capabilities remain at the core of NATO's work.  There is, 
however, still a lot to be gained in terms of efficiency as 
well as interoperability from further standardisation and a 
reduction of the diversity of weapon systems being developed 
or used.  We should make more substantial progress on 
enhancing the usability of our forces, including by adapting 
NATO's planning mechanisms. 
 
- Deliver a more effective contribution in the fight against 
terrorism:  The scourge of terrorism will be with us for the 
foreseeable future.  The military plays an important role in 
combating it.  NATO's actual response to the terrorist threat 
on the whole has been too haphazard.  There is a need to 
better define NATO's role and contribution in support of UNSG 
Annan's comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy to be 
welcomed at the UN Summit in September and adopted by the UN 
General Assembly.  NATO's contribution to combating terrorist 
organisations and their infrastructure could be more robust, 
both in the framework of its current operations (e.g. in 
Afghanistan) and of protecting important sea lanes and 
maritime assets against terrorist attacks and piracy. 
 
- Protect NATO territory against the growing missile threat: 
Given the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
missile technology, NATO cannot forever evade the question 
whether the whole of its territory needs to be protected 
against long-range missiles of countries of risk.  We need to 
further discuss the options and costs of such protection.  An 
effective missile defence system is only feasible within a 
NATO framework (for military-operational, political and 
financial reasons). 
 
- Reform NATO's mechanism for generating forces for 
operations: The difficulty in generating troops and 
capabilities for NATO's mission in Afghanistan has brought 
the inadequacy of its current force generation system to 
light.  This is partly a political problem.  In my view, 
political consensus within NATO to start an operation 
generally entails a commitment by all to participate 
militarily, and share in the burdens and the risks of an 
operation.  Yet it is also a matter of reforming the force 
generation system, to lower the threshold for nations to 
participate.  This reform will have to include the increasing 
use of common funding mechanisms for critical enablers and 
common infrastructure in theatre and for deployments such as 
the NRF. 
 
- Build more effective and cooperative relationships with the 
UN, the EU, and the AU:  With the UN, NATO's institutional 
relationship is so far underdeveloped (even as NATO 
cooperates closely with UN missions in the Balkans and 
Afghanistan).  When the NRF becomes operational in October 
2006, NATO should make clear that it could be deployed 
following a request by the UN.  NATO could also be more 
active in providing planning support for UN peacekeeping 
operations.  NATO and the UN should continue discussions on 
how the military and civil aspects of crisis management and 
peacekeeping operations could be coordinated better.  With 
the EU, there already exists a well-established system of 
collaboration ('Berlin-plus').  Yet the relationship is too 
often hampered by political and bureaucratic rivalry.  We 
should insist on developing the habit of cooperation and more 
regular contacts at all levels of bureaucracy and at the 
ministerial level.  Our cooperation should cover the widest 
possible range of issues, including terrorism.  With the AU, 
NATO should build on the Sudan experience to seek ways to 
support it to become an increasingly effective regional 
organisation. 
 
- Make a more effective NATO contribution to solving the 
problem of weak states: Weak states are a major source of 
problems.  In all its operations, NATO is heavily involved in 
promoting good governance.  It has a wealth of experience 
with defence reform in the context of its Partnership for 
Peace program.  NATO is therefore well placed to provide 
valuable support in security sector reform (SSR) and 
demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR).  Yet 
NATO needs to become more active in supporting weak states 
(coordinating its efforts with in particular the UN, the AU, 
and the EU). 
 
- Provide support to national authorities: There is a growing 
interdependency between internal and external security.  NATO 
should respond to legitimate requests from member states for 
assistance, such as during the Olympic games in Greece.  In 
such cases, deployments of NATO assets in support of national 
authorities should be financed by the requesting country. 
Armed forces clearly also have a role to play in response to 
massive natural disasters such as the Asian tsunami or the 
New Orleans floods.  In such cases, NATO could act as a 
coordinating agency, making use of the EADRCC. 
 
- Last but not least, bring missions that NATO undertakes to 
a successful conclusion:  NATO's credibility depends on the 
results of the missions it undertakes: 
 
-- Afghanistan: NATO will extend operations over all of 
Afghanistan in 2006.  This will be a momentous moment on the 
history of the Alliance.  Military involvement through ISAF 
will remain necessary in the coming years.  The role of NATO 
will gradually evolve into that of a security enabler: 
increasing Afghan ownership and building up the Afghan 
security forces.  Coordination and cooperation between the 
different SSR-components (military and civilian) should be 
enhanced, for instance to promote the rule of law.  For 
security in the provinces, PRTs will remain the main vehicle. 
 The reconstruction and stabilisation processes are mutually 
reinforcing.  NATO's input into the post-Bonn strategy is an 
important first step towards a responsible exit strategy. 
When would it be safe to transfer full control to the Afghan 
authorities?  What can NATO usefully do in this regard? 
Should NATO assume a bigger role in training Afghan forces? 
 
-- Iraq: NATO's training mission is still hampered by 
lingering divisions within the Alliance concerning Iraq as 
well as by the security situation in Iraq.  All member states 
should nonetheless ensure that this mission makes an 
effective contribution towards stabilising Iraq.  A stable 
Iraq is in the vital interest of all.  If circumstances so 
dictate, NATO should be prepared to train more Iraqi 
personnel outside the country. 
 
-- Kosovo: NATO continues to have a vital interest in 
transforming the Balkans into a stable region.  Its 
operational focus will be on Kosovo.  In the next few years, 
NATO should focus on helping to create the conditions for 
resolving the definitive status of Kosovo.  This will be f 
utmost importance to the future stability of the region. 
 
End text. 
 
BLAKEMAN