US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2463

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002463 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL, TU, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU/TURKEY:  DUTCH LOSING PATIENCE 
 
REF: A. LONDON 7361 
 
     B. ANKARA 5183 
     C. SCHOFER-CARVER E-MAIL 
     D. 9/8/05 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS ANDREW SCHOFER FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY:  According to a senior Dutch MFA official 
(Pieter de Gooijer), the Dutch support starting EU accession 
talks with Turkey on October 3, but are losing patience with 
all sides.  The MFA assumes there will be a September 26 
GAERC and is planning accordingly.  PM Balkenende is facing 
growing domestic pressure not to support Turkish accession, 
and is personally more sympathetic to Croatia's prospects 
than his foreign minister.  De Gooijer expressed concern that 
efforts to link Croatia and Turkey are succeeding, and 
predicted that the UK presidency might seize upon an 
ambiguous finding by ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte to 
cut a deal.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) On September 8, Pieter de Gooijer (Deputy Director 
General of the Dutch MFA's Political Affairs Department), 
told POLCOUNS that COREPER's failure to reach agreement on an 
EU counter-declaration addressing Turkish recognition of the 
Republic of Cyprus made it "almost certain" that a special 
GAERC would be held on September 26.  The Dutch, he said, are 
proceeding as if such a meeting will take place even though 
they have not received the official word from London.  (Note: 
 On September 8, the MFA released Foreign Minister Bot's 
schedule including a September 26 GAERC meeting.) 
 
3. (C)  De Gooijer, who, during the Dutch EU presidency, 
personally helped craft the December 17 agreement paving the 
way for starting accession talks with Turkey on October 3, 
was clearly exasperated with the direction the process has 
taken in recent weeks.  He stressed that beginning accession 
talks with Turkey on October 3 was still possible, but 
definitely not assured.  Reaching EU agreement on a 
counter-declaration text had now become a prerequisite for 
concluding the Negotiation Framework.  This added an 
additional -- but, in his view, necessary -- step to the 
process and created new opportunities for obstruction on the 
part of EU members, and/or self-destructive outbursts on the 
part of Turkey. 
 
4. (C) De Gooijer was particularly disturbed that efforts to 
link Croatian and Turkish accession talks appeared to be 
gaining strength.  At the end of the day, he said, those 
members favoring starting talks with Croatia had the power to 
hold Turkish accession talks hostage.  Although the Dutch and 
British have been among the staunchest advocates of pushing 
Croatia to cooperate fully with the ICTY, he doubted that UK 
PM Blair would be willing to sacrifice starting Turkish talks 
-- which would be a clear blow to the British presidency -- 
to delay the inevitable.  De Gooijer warned that any 
ambiguity in ICTY Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte's reports could 
well be seized upon to "cut a deal."  Without stating it 
directly, de Gooijer made it clear that the Netherlands would 
not stand alone in this case. 
 
5. (C) Finally, de Gooijer offered that Dutch Prime Minister 
Balkenende and Foreign Minister Bot are coming under 
increasing domestic political pressure to back off their firm 
support for starting Turkish accession talks on October 3. 
While Bot -- a former Dutch Ambassador to Turkey -- believes 
strongly in the benefits of Turkey joining the EU, he said, 
he has been compelled to make some tough statements recently 
calling Turkish accession into question.  Balkenende, on the 
other hand, was never a true believer on Turkey and is 
personally more sympathetic to Croatia's situation than Bot. 
De Gooijer noted that the most serious parliamentary 
criticism in this area comes from Balkenende's own Christian 
Democrat party -- not a good sign for a prime minister 
already suffering the lowest poll figures in memory. 
 
6. (C) The fact that the December 17 agreement was negotiated 
during the Dutch EU presidency remains a powerful incentive 
for staying the course on October 3, according to de Gooijer. 
 He noted, however, that Balkenende's sense of loyalty to the 
agreement is weakening as memories of the Dutch EU presidency 
fade.  De Gooijer added that Balkenende had been "offended" 
by the apparent lack of Turkish gratitude for his efforts 
last year (and since) on their behalf.  Although Balkenende 
and Erdogan may talk from time to time, according to de 
Gooijer, the relationship is not a warm one. 
 
7. (C) COMMENT:  The Dutch, and Bot in particular, remain 
committed to implementing the December 17 agreement, 
including starting accession talks with Turkey on October 3. 
Their patience with all parties is wearing thin, however, and 
Balkenende will gain no domestic political capital from 
standing on principle in this case.  If the EU fails to reach 
consensus on a counter-declaration or negotiating framework, 
and/or if the Turks shoot themselves in the foot again, the 
Dutch may start to look for a face-saving way out rather than 
struggle to save "their" agreement.  END COMMENT. 
. 
 
 
 
BLAKEMAN