US embassy cable - 05SANSALVADOR2507

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

EL SALVADOR: SIX MONTHS FROM ELECTIONS, ARENA CLIMBS/FMLN SELF-DESTRUCTS

Identifier: 05SANSALVADOR2507
Wikileaks: View 05SANSALVADOR2507 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy San Salvador
Created: 2005-09-09 15:31:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: ES PGOV PREL ELECTIONS 2006
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SAN SALVADOR 002507 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2015 
TAGS: ES, PGOV, PREL, ELECTIONS 2006 
SUBJECT: EL SALVADOR: SIX MONTHS FROM ELECTIONS, ARENA 
CLIMBS/FMLN SELF-DESTRUCTS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Butler, Reason 1.4 (b, d) 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY:  Six months away from March 12, 2006 
municipal and Legislative Assembly elections and fifteen 
months into his five-year term, President Saca continues to 
enjoy high approval ratings unprecedented in El Salvador's 
postwar history.  Recent polls rate Saca highest in 
infrastructure-building, education, and healthcare, while 
manifesting concern about the nation's pressing crime 
problems and little satisfaction with sluggish economic 
growth.  The high level of public confidence in the 
administration bodes ill for the Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front (FMLN) opposition, mired in disarray and 
obsolete 1970s-era revolutionary rhetoric.  Three more FMLN 
Legislative Assembly deputies defected this week to the 
recently-formed Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), 
reducing to 24 an FMLN delegation that only a year ago 
numbered 31, and could thereby block votes requiring a 
two-thirds majority of the Assembly's 84 seats.  Most 
political pundits expect that on Saca's coattails, ARENA will 
gain at least five additional deputies and make substantial 
gains in mayoralties next March. The National Conciliation 
Party (PCN) will likely make modest gains at the expense of 
the FMLN fissures.  ARENA appears to have a good shot at 
winning the San Salvador mayoralty for the first time in 
nearly a decade.  The continuing close bilateral relationship 
promises to bolster Saca and his party's advantage further, 
as the nation looks ahead to the March contest.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU)  ARENA presently holds 29 of the Legislative 
Assembly's 84 seats; with the usually-dependable support of 
its center-right National Conciliation Party (PCN) allies' 14 
deputies, legislation requiring a 43-vote simple majority is 
more or less a matter of routine business.  Seven former FMLN 
deputies of the new FDR have aligned themselves with five 
Democratic Center (CD) deputies and three Christian Popular 
Social Party (PPSC; a Christian Democratic Party/PDC 
breakaway group), to form a loose center-left coalition of 15 
seats with which ARENA and PCN must negotiate legislation 
requiring a two-thirds 56-vote supermajority, such as the 
assumption of external debt necessitated by approval of the 
federal budget.  ARENA and the PCN now hold, respectively, 
109 and 53 of the nation's 262 municipalities, including 
seven larger cities.  The FMLN's 71 municipalities include 
Santa Ana and all of greater San Salvador except for one 
ARENA-ruled upscale suburb. 
 
POLLS SHOW ARENA IN DRIVER'S SEAT 
--------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU)  A poll performed August 20-27 by leading daily La 
Prensa Grafica involved 1,500 interviews nationwide with 
persons above the age of 18.  Saca's 72 percent overall 
approval rating is scarcely lower than the 74 percent 
approval recorded at the end of the first trimester of his 
administration.  Some 71.4 percent of those polled 
characterized the administration's record on education as 
"Very Good" or Good", while 68.6 percent qualified as "Very 
Good" or "Good" Saca's accomplishments in the area of public 
health.  Respondents expressed least approval of the 
government's achievements in improving El Salvador's economy, 
which registered disappointing growth of two percent or less 
in recent years. 
 
4. (SBU)  A CID-Gallup poll publicized September 7-8 yielded 
a 71-percent level of approval for Saca, with 57 percent 
characterizing the President as "rather" or "very" sincere 
and truthful.  Saca's popularity appears rooted in his 
attention to improving the nation's infrastructure, his "Very 
Firm Hand" anti-gang initiative, and the FOSALUD program 
whereby public health clinics are funded via increased taxes 
on tobacco, alcohol, and firearms.  Some 31 percent of 
respondents indicated an intention to vote ARENA, with the 
FMLN mustering only 16 percent in intention to vote; some 48 
percent responded that they either did not intend to vote, or 
had not yet decided which party they favored.  Some 60 
percent of respondents stated they intended to vote in March. 
 
 
FOR ARENA, HANDAL IS "THE GIFT THAT KEEPS ON GIVING" -- FDR 
MAY BE ALSO 
--------------------------------- 
------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C)  The FMLM's latest troubles began September 2 with the 
public resignation from the FMLN of moderate San Salvador 
Mayor Carlos Rivas Zamora--long a thorn in the side of the 
orthodox FMLN faction aligned with former Communist Party 
leader and failed presidential candidate Schafik Handal.  The 
resignations of Legislative Assembly FMLN Whip Celina 
Monterrosa and deputies Hector Cordova and Arnoldo Bernal 
followed on September 6; all three immediately joined the 
FDR.  The latest exodus raises to seven the number of 
deputies the FMLN has lost during the past year.  The 
defectors were soon to be joined by additional moderate FMLN 
mayors, Rene Canjura of Nejapa and Carlos Menendez of 
Mejicanos.  Among the ranks of high-profile FMLN moderates 
from just one year ago, only Santa Tecla Mayor Oscar Ortiz 
and Deputy Hugo Martinez remain, and Ortiz is expected to 
defect to the FDR as well.  The key effect of these FMLN 
defections to the FDR is that the left will run at least two 
leftist candidates in many mayoral races, including San 
Salvador, diluting the leftist vote and paving the way for 
ARENA and PCN candidates. 
 
6. (C)  The response of the Handal hardliners to the 
defections was characteristically intransigent; FMLN national 
coordinator Medardo Gonzalez characterized the latest 
defections as "irrelevant."  Departed FMLN Assembly Whip 
Celina Monterrosa viewed Gonzalez's comments as evidence of 
the party's leadership being out of touch with political 
reality.  Furthermore, despite unsubstantiated rumors that 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is funneling funds to the 
FMLN, all indications are that the party has little money at 
this time to mount a robust national campaign, and clearly 
cannot match ARENA's resources, or even those of the PCN in 
large municipalities.  For its part, the FDR leadership has 
indicated that they intend to run full slates in all the 
major cities and many municipalities, as well as a full 
congressional slate.  Despite its bravado, the FDR is only 
beginning to build a national party structure, lacks 
financing, and is competing head-to-head with the FMLN for 
political space on the left.  Because of these impediments, 
many political observers predict that the FDR will be lucky 
to keep two of the present seven National Assembly seats it 
holds.  Observers further state that the FDR will largely 
play the role of spoiler to the FMLN in important mayoral 
races such as San Salvador, and will tilt the balance in 
these races to ARENA or the PCN. 
 
BILATERAL WARMTH BOLSTERS GOVERNMENT 
------------------------------------ 
 
7. (C)  The close U.S.-El Salvador bilateral relationship 
tends to further strengthen ARENA's hand in next spring's 
elections.  Newspapers have frequently publicized 
USAID-funded projects in housing construction for 2001 
earthquake victims, potable water supplies for poor rural 
communities, new clinics and schools, agricultural and 
rural-sector development finance through USDA, and other 
much-needed social investment, and U.S. assistance is widely 
perceived to be a benefit of postwar ARENA governments' close 
relationships with the U.S.  Indeed, fears of a possible 
deterioration in that relationship likely played a 
significant role in the 2004 presidential election, after an 
ARENA campaign that highlighted the party's longtime 
friendship with the U.S. 
 
8. (C)  Recent U.S. ratification of CAFTA, which should go 
into effect January 1, was a boon to the GOES, which has 
raised expectations that CAFTA can help to jump-start the 
nation's sluggish economy.  The Embassy is following CAFTA 
implementation closely, and USG-commited Trade Capacity 
Building (TCB) funds will help facilitate a smoother 
transition to a CAFTA environment, and in so doing, further 
enhance the GOES's standing.  Commerce Secretary Gutierrez's 
upcoming visit in October presents an important opportunity 
to showcase how CAFTA, and the trade benefits and 
institutional strengthening it brings, can help address the 
country's widespread poverty and--by extension--its other 
pressing social problems.  In the wake of July 15 meetings 
between President Bush and President Saca, the GOES is 
motivated to compete for Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) 
funding, with which the GOES plans to facilitate economic 
growth among the nation's heretofore-isolated northern 
municipalities.  Signing a compact with the MCC would also 
help legitimize ARENA's economic program by showing it 
carries concrete benefits.  All of these projects and the 
close personal relationship between Presidents Saca and Bush 
provide the U.S. with multiple opportunities to continue to 
showcase the benefits of the relationship, and to contrast El 
Salvador's democratic parties with the FMLN's radicalism. 
 
 
9. (C)  COMMENT:  Notwithstanding the traditional handicap 
that midterm elections usually represent for any ruling 
party, ARENA would appear to be poised to gain both 
municipalities and Legislative Assembly seats next March, all 
on Saca's coattails.  The electorate's understandable 
frustration with lack of significant progress on crime and 
the economy is more than offset by the low esteem in which 
they hold the strife-riven FMLN.  The FMLN's latest defectors 
not only further erode its relevance to the legislative 
process, but in their joining the new FDR and fashioning 
possible coalition candidacies, they dilute the left's 
strength in even traditional FMLN strongholds such as San 
Salvador, Chalatenango, and Morazan.  If it cannot find a way 
to stem the continuing hemorrhage of its best political 
talent, the FMLN may awaken March 13 to find an ARENA-ruled 
San Salvador, after the ruling party's near-decade absence 
from city hall, as well as key defeats in other departmental 
capitals and a significant loss of deputies. 
 
10. (C)  At this point, ARENA has by far the best national 
political organization, the deepest pockets thanks to the 
private sector, and a national leader in Saca who pulls major 
votes.  Washington and Post need to continue to work closely 
with Saca on a successful bilateral agenda that includes 
ameliorating the negative effects of criminal deportees, 
making CAFTA a vehicle for economic growth and poverty 
reduction, and promoting U.S. direct private investment. 
Saca and his ARENA team are impressive political operatives 
who know how to use the power and resources of the presidency 
to run an effective national campaign on their own. 
Butler 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04